g1t/services/identity/src/throttle.rs
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| Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look | 1 | //! Slowing down password guessing, and mail sent on request. |
| 2 | //! | |
| 3 | //! Every check of a password (signing in on the site, git over HTTPS with a | |
| 4 | //! password, confirming the password for a sensitive change) counts its | |
| 5 | //! failures twice: against the account (or, for a name no account has, | |
| 6 | //! against that name, so the answer never says which exist) and against | |
| 7 | //! the client's IP address when the caller gives one. Past a key's limit in | |
| 8 | //! its window, the key is locked for a minute, then twice as long after | |
| 9 | //! each further failure, up to an hour ([`lockout_seconds`]). While either | |
| 10 | //! key is locked, no password is even checked, and the answer is the same | |
| 11 | //! [`THROTTLED`] for every account. A correct password clears the | |
| 12 | //! account's count, never the client's. The first time an account is | |
| 13 | //! locked in an hour, its primary and backup addresses are told. | |
| 14 | //! | |
| 15 | //! Requests that send mail (password resets, confirmation links) are | |
| 16 | //! counted the same way, by address, account and client; past the limit | |
| 17 | //! they quietly send nothing. | |
| 18 | //! | |
| 19 | //! Counts live in `auth_throttle` (migration 0019), one row per key. | |
| 20 | ||
| 21 | use g1t_contracts::time::rfc3339; | |
| 22 | use g1t_kit::now_ms; | |
| 23 | use serde::Deserialize; | |
| 24 | use worker::Result; | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | use crate::{Identity, crypto}; | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | /// What anyone hears while a key is locked. | |
| 29 | pub const THROTTLED: &str = "Too many attempts. Wait a few minutes and try again, or reset your password."; | |
| 30 | ||
| 31 | /// How many hits a key may have in its window. | |
| 32 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] | |
| 33 | pub struct Rule { | |
| 34 | pub name: &'static str, | |
| 35 | pub limit: u32, | |
| 36 | pub window_seconds: u64, | |
| 37 | } | |
| 38 | ||
| 39 | const HOUR: u64 = 60 * 60; | |
| 40 | ||
| 41 | /// Wrong passwords for one account (or one name), from anywhere. | |
| 42 | pub const PASSWORD_ACCOUNT: Rule = Rule { name: "password.account", limit: 10, window_seconds: HOUR }; | |
| 43 | /// Wrong passwords from one client, for any accounts. | |
| 44 | pub const PASSWORD_CLIENT: Rule = Rule { name: "password.client", limit: 30, window_seconds: HOUR }; | |
| 45 | /// Password resets asked for one address. | |
| 46 | pub const RESET_EMAIL: Rule = Rule { name: "reset.email", limit: 5, window_seconds: HOUR }; | |
| 47 | /// Password resets asked from one client. | |
| 48 | pub const RESET_CLIENT: Rule = Rule { name: "reset.client", limit: 20, window_seconds: HOUR }; | |
| 49 | /// Confirmation links one account asks for. | |
| 50 | pub const CONFIRM_ACCOUNT: Rule = Rule { name: "confirm.account", limit: 10, window_seconds: HOUR }; | |
| 51 | ||
| 52 | // One account is held to less than one client, which may be an office. | |
| 53 | const _: () = assert!(PASSWORD_ACCOUNT.limit < PASSWORD_CLIENT.limit && RESET_EMAIL.limit < RESET_CLIENT.limit); | |
| 54 | ||
| 55 | /// How long a key with `hits` in its window is locked: not at all below | |
| 56 | /// the limit, a minute at it, doubling with each hit past it, up to an hour. | |
| 57 | pub fn lockout_seconds(hits: u32, limit: u32) -> u64 { | |
| 58 | if hits < limit { | |
| 59 | return 0; | |
| 60 | } | |
| 61 | (60u64 << (hits - limit).min(6)).min(HOUR) | |
| 62 | } | |
| 63 | ||
| 64 | /// A key's name in `auth_throttle`. Addresses, IPs and names are hashed, | |
| 65 | /// so the table holds nothing to read back. | |
| 66 | pub fn key(rule: Rule, subject: &str) -> String { | |
| 67 | format!("{}:{}", rule.name, crypto::sha256_hex(&subject.trim().to_lowercase())) | |
| 68 | } | |
| 69 | ||
| 70 | #[derive(Deserialize)] | |
| 71 | struct Hits { | |
| 72 | hits: f64, | |
| 73 | } | |
| 74 | ||
| 75 | /// What one more failure did. | |
| 76 | #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] | |
| 77 | pub struct Counted { | |
| 78 | pub hits: u32, | |
| 79 | /// This failure is the one that locked the key. | |
| 80 | pub locked_now: bool, | |
| 81 | } | |
| 82 | ||
| 83 | impl Identity { | |
| 84 | /// Whether `key` is locked. | |
| 85 | pub async fn locked(&self, key: &str) -> Result<bool> { | |
| 86 | let now = rfc3339(now_ms()); | |
| 87 | let row = self | |
| 88 | .db | |
| 89 | .prepare("SELECT 1 AS hits FROM auth_throttle WHERE key = ? AND locked_until > ?") | |
| 90 | .bind(&[key.into(), now.as_str().into()])? | |
| 91 | .first::<Hits>(None) | |
| 92 | .await?; | |
| 93 | Ok(row.is_some()) | |
| 94 | } | |
| 95 | ||
| 96 | /// Counts one more hit on `key`, starting a new window when the last | |
| 97 | /// one has passed, and locks it past `rule`'s limit. | |
| 98 | pub async fn count(&self, rule: Rule, key: &str) -> Result<Counted> { | |
| 99 | let now = now_ms(); | |
| 100 | let stamp = rfc3339(now); | |
| 101 | let window_start = rfc3339(now.saturating_sub(rule.window_seconds * 1000)); | |
| 102 | let hits = self | |
| 103 | .db | |
| 104 | .prepare( | |
| 105 | "INSERT INTO auth_throttle (key, hits, window_start) VALUES (?1, 1, ?2) | |
| 106 | ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET | |
| 107 | hits = CASE WHEN auth_throttle.window_start < ?3 THEN 1 ELSE auth_throttle.hits + 1 END, | |
| 108 | window_start = CASE WHEN auth_throttle.window_start < ?3 THEN ?2 ELSE auth_throttle.window_start END | |
| 109 | RETURNING hits", | |
| 110 | ) | |
| 111 | .bind(&[key.into(), stamp.as_str().into(), window_start.as_str().into()])? | |
| 112 | .first::<Hits>(None) | |
| 113 | .await? | |
| 114 | .map_or(1, |row| row.hits as u32); | |
| 115 | let lock = lockout_seconds(hits, rule.limit); | |
| 116 | if lock > 0 { | |
| 117 | self.db | |
| 118 | .prepare("UPDATE auth_throttle SET locked_until = ? WHERE key = ?") | |
| 119 | .bind(&[rfc3339(now + lock * 1000).into(), key.into()])? | |
| 120 | .run() | |
| 121 | .await?; | |
| 122 | } | |
| 123 | if hits == 1 { | |
| 124 | // A new window: forget keys a day quiet. | |
| 125 | self.db | |
| 126 | .prepare("DELETE FROM auth_throttle WHERE window_start < ? AND (locked_until IS NULL OR locked_until < ?)") | |
| 127 | .bind(&[rfc3339(now.saturating_sub(24 * HOUR * 1000)).into(), stamp.as_str().into()])? | |
| 128 | .run() | |
| 129 | .await?; | |
| 130 | } | |
| 131 | Ok(Counted { hits, locked_now: hits == rule.limit }) | |
| 132 | } | |
| 133 | ||
| 134 | /// Counts a request that sends mail; false once past the limit. | |
| 135 | pub async fn allow(&self, rule: Rule, subject: &str) -> Result<bool> { | |
| 136 | Ok(self.count(rule, &key(rule, subject)).await?.hits <= rule.limit) | |
| 137 | } | |
| 138 | ||
| 139 | /// Forgets a key's failures: its owner got the password right. | |
| 140 | pub async fn clear(&self, key: &str) -> Result<()> { | |
| 141 | self.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_throttle WHERE key = ?").bind(&[key.into()])?.run().await?; | |
| 142 | Ok(()) | |
| 143 | } | |
| 144 | ||
| 145 | /// The keys a password check for `login` (a username or an address) | |
| 146 | /// from `client` counts against: the account's, or the name's when no | |
| 147 | /// account has it, and the client's. | |
| 148 | pub fn password_keys(account: &str, client: Option<&str>) -> (String, Option<String>) { | |
| 149 | ( | |
| 150 | key(PASSWORD_ACCOUNT, account), | |
| 151 | client.filter(|client| !client.trim().is_empty()).map(|client| key(PASSWORD_CLIENT, client)), | |
| 152 | ) | |
| 153 | } | |
| 154 | ||
| 155 | /// Whether a password check may run now. | |
| 156 | pub async fn password_locked(&self, account_key: &str, client_key: Option<&str>) -> Result<bool> { | |
| 157 | if self.locked(account_key).await? { | |
| 158 | return Ok(true); | |
| 159 | } | |
| 160 | match client_key { | |
| 161 | Some(client_key) => self.locked(client_key).await, | |
| 162 | None => Ok(false), | |
| 163 | } | |
| 164 | } | |
| 165 | ||
| 166 | /// Counts a wrong password, and tells the account's owner the first | |
| 167 | /// time in an hour that it locks their account. | |
| 168 | pub async fn password_failed(&self, account_key: &str, client_key: Option<&str>, user: Option<(&str, &str)>) -> Result<()> { | |
| 169 | let counted = self.count(PASSWORD_ACCOUNT, account_key).await?; | |
| 170 | if let Some(client_key) = client_key { | |
| 171 | self.count(PASSWORD_CLIENT, client_key).await?; | |
| 172 | } | |
| 173 | if counted.locked_now | |
| 174 | && let Some((user_id, username)) = user | |
| 175 | && self.first_notice(account_key).await? | |
| 176 | { | |
| 177 | self.log_security(user_id, "password_locked", Some(&format!("{} wrong passwords", counted.hits)), None) | |
| 178 | .await; | |
| 179 | self.tell_primary_and_backup( | |
| 180 | user_id, | |
| 181 | username, | |
| 182 | &format!("Password sign-in was paused after {} wrong passwords", counted.hits), | |
| 183 | ) | |
| 184 | .await; | |
| 185 | } | |
| 186 | Ok(()) | |
| 187 | } | |
| 188 | ||
| 189 | /// Marks that the owner was told about a lock; false when they were in | |
| 190 | /// the last hour. | |
| 191 | async fn first_notice(&self, key: &str) -> Result<bool> { | |
| 192 | let now = now_ms(); | |
| 193 | let row = self | |
| 194 | .db | |
| 195 | .prepare( | |
| 196 | "UPDATE auth_throttle SET notified_at = ?1 | |
| 197 | WHERE key = ?2 AND (notified_at IS NULL OR notified_at < ?3) RETURNING 1 AS hits", | |
| 198 | ) | |
| 199 | .bind(&[rfc3339(now).into(), key.into(), rfc3339(now.saturating_sub(HOUR * 1000)).into()])? | |
| 200 | .first::<Hits>(None) | |
| 201 | .await?; | |
| 202 | Ok(row.is_some()) | |
| 203 | } | |
| 204 | } | |
| 205 | ||
| 206 | #[cfg(test)] | |
| 207 | mod tests { | |
| 208 | use super::*; | |
| 209 | ||
| 210 | #[test] | |
| 211 | fn a_key_locks_at_its_limit_and_backs_off_to_an_hour() { | |
| 212 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(0, 10), 0); | |
| 213 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(9, 10), 0); | |
| 214 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(10, 10), 60); | |
| 215 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(11, 10), 120); | |
| 216 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(12, 10), 240); | |
| 217 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(15, 10), 1920); | |
| 218 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(16, 10), 3600); | |
| 219 | assert_eq!(lockout_seconds(1000, 10), 3600); | |
| 220 | } | |
| 221 | ||
| 222 | #[test] | |
| 223 | fn keys_hash_their_subject_and_ignore_case() { | |
| 224 | let a = key(PASSWORD_ACCOUNT, "Ada@Example.com "); | |
| 225 | assert_eq!(a, key(PASSWORD_ACCOUNT, "ada@example.com")); | |
| 226 | assert!(a.starts_with("password.account:")); | |
| 227 | assert!(!a.contains("ada")); | |
| 228 | assert_ne!(a, key(RESET_EMAIL, "ada@example.com")); | |
| 229 | } | |
| 230 | } |