| 1 | # sudo |
| 2 | |
| 3 | g1t's staff console, at <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: the back office g1t is |
| 4 | building for itself, for sales, support and finance. It is organised the |
| 5 | way customers know g1t: by **workspace**. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | The sidebar (`app/lib/nav.ts`) has Overview and Reach out at the top, then |
| 8 | sections that fold open to their pages: Customers, Revenue, Platform, |
| 9 | Support and Team. Each fold is a `<details>`, drawn open for the section |
| 10 | holding the current page; on a phone the same menu sits behind a "Menu" |
| 11 | button in the top bar. Pages not built yet are marked **Soon**: each is a |
| 12 | real page (`routes/soon.tsx`, made from its entry in `nav.ts`) saying what |
| 13 | it will do, why, and what it will have, so the sidebar doubles as the |
| 14 | roadmap. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | - **Overview** (`/`): this month charged, cost and margin; the last six |
| 17 | months as a chart; this month by kind of usage; paying workspaces; how |
| 18 | many are stopped, near their limit or declined (each a link into Reach |
| 19 | out); open invoices; follow-ups due; and the five most urgent signals. |
| 20 | From billing's `admin_overview` and `admin_signals`. |
| 21 | - **Reach out** (`/reach-out`): every workspace worth a word, most urgent |
| 22 | first (at limit, declined, near limit, high spend, growing, established, |
| 23 | first payment), with its owners, the reason in a sentence, the figure, |
| 24 | and its sales stage and owner at g1t. Filter by why and by whose |
| 25 | (everyone's, unassigned, mine), or show only **follow-ups due** (a next |
| 26 | step due today or earlier, on a deal not won or lost; one per |
| 27 | workspace). Rows show the next step and its day. Each row opens the |
| 28 | workspace's Sales. |
| 29 | - **Invoices** (`/invoices`): every invoice g1t has sent, workspaces' and |
| 30 | enterprises', newest first (`admin_invoices`, at most 200). Filter by |
| 31 | status and month; totals for what is listed (amount, paid, outstanding); |
| 32 | each links to its workspace or enterprise and to Stripe's page (https |
| 33 | only). |
| 34 | - **Audit log** (`/audit`): every change made in sudo, and what Stripe told |
| 35 | billing, newest first, 100 a page with "Older" (`admin_audit`). Filter by |
| 36 | staff email and kind of change; each line links to its workspace or |
| 37 | enterprise. |
| 38 | - **Workspaces** (`/workspaces`): every workspace, newest first, 50 to a |
| 39 | page, with its owners, members, who it is billed to, its terms, this |
| 40 | month's usage against its limit, what it was charged and what it cost |
| 41 | g1t. Search by workspace, owner, email or enterprise (across the whole |
| 42 | list); filter to stopped or warning, comped or custom, or on an |
| 43 | enterprise. Billing's figures are fetched for exactly the page shown, so |
| 44 | the filters, and the totals over the list, cover that page; the page |
| 45 | says so when there is more than one. A workspace's page shows its members; |
| 46 | **Sales** (its stage, the staff member who has it, the next step and its |
| 47 | date, and notes, newest first; `admin_sales`, `admin_set_sales`, |
| 48 | `admin_add_note`); and under **Billing** its limit in words (trust, the |
| 49 | owners' own spend limit or the default, the most they may set, how it |
| 50 | grows), its last six months as a chart, its invoices (`admin_workspace_invoices`, |
| 51 | with Stripe's page and PDF), its terms, who it is billed to (move it onto or off an |
| 52 | enterprise), a credit form, a Stripe billing link, its ledger and its |
| 53 | audit log. If billing does not answer for sales or invoices, the page |
| 54 | still opens and says so in those sections. A protected workspace (one |
| 55 | nobody can ever delete: identity's `PROTECTED_WORKSPACES`, and |
| 56 | flagon-io always) says so beside its name. |
| 57 | - **Deleted workspaces** (`/workspaces/deleted`, linked from Workspaces): |
| 58 | workspaces their owners deleted, newest first (`admin_deleted_workspaces`), |
| 59 | each with who deleted it and when, when it is purged, what went with it |
| 60 | (repositories, projects, members, counted at the deletion) and the days |
| 61 | left. An owner deletes a workspace with everything in it in one step, and |
| 62 | identity keeps it 30 days (`WORKSPACE_RESTORE_DAYS`) so support can undo a |
| 63 | deletion that was a mistake or not theirs to make. **Restore** |
| 64 | (`admin_restore_workspace`) brings it back with its members and tokens, |
| 65 | and its repositories, projects and apps with `workspace.restored`; its |
| 66 | plan stays ended, so its owners start it again from Billing. Check that |
| 67 | whoever asks is an owner of it before restoring. **Purge now** |
| 68 | (`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed to confirm) removes it at once, |
| 69 | as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up; never for a |
| 70 | protected workspace. Both go in the workspace's audit log, as g1t, and in |
| 71 | sudo's (`workspace_restored`, `workspace_purged`), naming the staff |
| 72 | member. |
| 73 | - **Enterprises**: customers that pay for several workspaces with one |
| 74 | bill, one limit and one set of terms. Each has its workspaces (add or |
| 75 | remove them), combined usage, terms, credits, ledger and audit log, and |
| 76 | **Invoices**: where they go (the billing email, which also makes its |
| 77 | Stripe customer), a "Send invoice now" button, and every invoice with |
| 78 | its status (open, paid, overdue, void), a line per workspace, and a link |
| 79 | to Stripe's hosted invoice page. An invoice also goes out on its own as |
| 80 | each month closes: one Stripe invoice, a line per workspace for what it |
| 81 | owes, net 30, emailed by Stripe. |
| 82 | - **Stripe**: whether billing's key is in test or live mode (or off), the |
| 83 | webhook Stripe calls (URL, endpoint id, events, who registered it and |
| 84 | when), and the events Stripe sent lately with what billing did with |
| 85 | each. "Register webhook" (or "Replace") has billing delete the endpoint |
| 86 | it made before, create a new one and keep its signing secret, which no |
| 87 | one sees. Do it once per mode, and again after switching to live keys. |
| 88 | |
| 89 | Sales changes are not money, so they have no confirmation step; they are |
| 90 | still POSTs from sudo's own pages, recorded with who made them. |
| 91 | |
| 92 | Billing's internal account ids (`ws_<slug>` for a workspace's own, |
| 93 | `ent_…` for an enterprise) are never shown as names; an enterprise's id |
| 94 | appears only as small "Billing account id" text. Old `/accounts/…` links |
| 95 | redirect to the workspace or enterprise they meant. |
| 96 | |
| 97 | **Cards stay on Stripe.** sudo never shows a card field. To help a customer |
| 98 | update their card or see invoices, staff make a Stripe billing link on the |
| 99 | workspace's page (it is recorded) and send it to the owner. |
| 100 | |
| 101 | It holds no data. Workspaces, owners and members come from identity's |
| 102 | staff methods (`admin_workspaces`, `admin_workspace`; `IdentityAdminApi` in |
| 103 | `packages/contracts/src/identity.ts`); everything about money goes to the |
| 104 | billing service's (`admin_*`, `BillingAdminApi` in |
| 105 | `packages/contracts/src/billing.ts`), where each change is recorded with |
| 106 | the staff member's email. Both are reached over service bindings only, and |
| 107 | nothing but sudo binds to them. |
| 108 | |
| 109 | ## How it is locked |
| 110 | |
| 111 | 1. **Cloudflare Access** sits in front of `sudo.g1t.sh` and signs people in. |
| 112 | 2. **The worker checks Access's work** on every request, the stylesheet |
| 113 | included (`run_worker_first`): it verifies the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` |
| 114 | JWT itself (RS256 against the team's published keys, audience, issuer, |
| 115 | expiry), then requires its email to be in `STAFF_EMAILS`. That email is |
| 116 | who every change is recorded as. See `app/lib/access.ts`. |
| 117 | 3. **It fails closed.** Until `ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN`, `ACCESS_AUD` and |
| 118 | `STAFF_EMAILS` are all set, every request gets a 403 saying sudo is not |
| 119 | configured. |
| 120 | 4. **Changes** are POSTs only, and only from sudo's own pages (`Origin`, or |
| 121 | `Referer`, must be `https://sudo.g1t.sh`). Terms, enterprise moves, new |
| 122 | enterprises, Stripe billing links, invoice emails, invoices and the |
| 123 | webhook show a confirmation step first; a credit needs the workspace's |
| 124 | slug typed out. |
| 125 | 5. **The pages ship no JavaScript.** The content security policy forbids |
| 126 | every script and inline style; responses are `no-store`, `noindex` and |
| 127 | cannot be framed. The worker has no `workers.dev` address or preview URLs. |
| 128 | |
| 129 | ## Setting up Access (once, in the Cloudflare dashboard) |
| 130 | |
| 131 | 1. **Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add an application → Self-hosted.** |
| 132 | - Application name: `sudo`. |
| 133 | - Session duration: short, such as 8 hours. |
| 134 | - Public hostname: `sudo.g1t.sh` (path empty, so it covers everything). |
| 135 | 2. **Add a policy** (`g1t staff`): action *Allow*, include *Emails* → the |
| 136 | owner's address, and *Emails ending in* → `g1t.sh` for everyone with a |
| 137 | g1t address (the same entries as `STAFF_EMAILS`, where a domain is |
| 138 | written `@g1t.sh`). Add more staff here *and* in `STAFF_EMAILS`; either |
| 139 | one alone is not enough. |
| 140 | 3. Save, then open the application's **Overview** (or *Basic information*) |
| 141 | and copy the **Application Audience (AUD) tag**. |
| 142 | 4. Find the **team domain** under **Zero Trust → Settings → Custom pages** |
| 143 | (or *Team name and domain*): it looks like `<team>.cloudflareaccess.com`. |
| 144 | 5. Put both into `wrangler.jsonc`: |
| 145 | |
| 146 | ```jsonc |
| 147 | "vars": { |
| 148 | "ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN": "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com", |
| 149 | "ACCESS_AUD": "<the AUD tag>", |
| 150 | "STAFF_EMAILS": "syntaqx@gmail.com, @g1t.sh" |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | ``` |
| 153 | |
| 154 | 6. Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh sudo` (after `billing` and `identity`, whose |
| 155 | `admin_*` methods it calls). |
| 156 | |
| 157 | Visit <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: Access asks you to sign in, then the workspaces |
| 158 | list opens. Anyone else gets Access's own refusal; anyone Access lets in who |
| 159 | is not in `STAFF_EMAILS` gets a 403 from the worker. |
| 160 | |
| 161 | ## Signing in through WARP |
| 162 | |
| 163 | Staff signed in to the Zero Trust org in the Cloudflare One agent (WARP) |
| 164 | reach sudo without the login page: the org allows WARP sessions as Access |
| 165 | sign-ins (8 hours), the sudo app accepts them, and the `g1t staff` policy |
| 166 | is also on the WARP enrollment app, so staff can enroll their devices. |
| 167 | The same two checks still apply: the Access policy, and `STAFF_EMAILS`. |
| 168 | |
| 169 | ## Working on it |
| 170 | |
| 171 | ```sh |
| 172 | npm run typecheck -w @g1t/sudo |
| 173 | npm test -w @g1t/sudo # JWT verification, forms, money, the workspace join, paging, nav, charts, signals |
| 174 | npm run build -w @g1t/sudo |
| 175 | ``` |
| 176 | |
| 177 | `npm run dev` serves the pages, but every request is refused without a real |
| 178 | Access token, by design. |