| 1 | //! Run credentials: the least-privilege tokens a sandbox works with. |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! Every sandbox run (checks, the merge queue, a merge check, a deployment, |
| 4 | //! a security update's bump) gets its own tokens, bound to the run, its |
| 5 | //! repository, what that kind of run needs to do, and an expiry no later |
| 6 | //! than the run's timeout. Each carries a composite identity: g1t acting on |
| 7 | //! behalf of the person who started the work. What it may do is the |
| 8 | //! intersection of the two: the run's scope, and what that person may do |
| 9 | //! right now. |
| 10 | //! |
| 11 | //! g1t's retired hosted agents had run credentials too (`implement`, |
| 12 | //! `revise`, `review`, `answer`, `update`, `plan`). Those kinds still parse, |
| 13 | //! so stored tokens and the history they wrote read as before, but no |
| 14 | //! credential is made for them and they grant nothing |
| 15 | //! ([`RunCredentialKind::retired`]). |
| 16 | //! |
| 17 | //! The policy lives here, as pure functions, so that identity (which mints |
| 18 | //! the tokens), the API (which serves REST and MCP) and repos (which serves |
| 19 | //! git) all enforce the same rules, and so the rules can be tested. |
| 20 | |
| 21 | use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; |
| 22 | |
| 23 | use crate::identity::AgentScope; |
| 24 | use crate::repos::RepoPath; |
| 25 | use crate::access::{BasePermission, RepoGrant, RepoRole}; |
| 26 | use crate::{Membership, PrincipalKind, Role, User}; |
| 27 | |
| 28 | /// What a run does, as far as its credentials are concerned. |
| 29 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 30 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 31 | pub enum RunCredentialKind { |
| 32 | /// Retired with g1t's hosted agents, as are `revise`, `review`, |
| 33 | /// `answer`, `update` and `plan`: kept so stored tokens parse; never |
| 34 | /// issued, and they grant nothing. |
| 35 | Implement, |
| 36 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 37 | Revise, |
| 38 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 39 | Review, |
| 40 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 41 | Answer, |
| 42 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 43 | Update, |
| 44 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 45 | Plan, |
| 46 | Checks, |
| 47 | Queue, |
| 48 | Mergecheck, |
| 49 | Deploy, |
| 50 | /// A security update: raising one package's version in its lockfiles |
| 51 | /// and pushing that to a branch of its own. Not an agent. |
| 52 | Bump, |
| 53 | } |
| 54 | |
| 55 | impl RunCredentialKind { |
| 56 | pub const ALL: [RunCredentialKind; 11] = [ |
| 57 | RunCredentialKind::Implement, |
| 58 | RunCredentialKind::Revise, |
| 59 | RunCredentialKind::Review, |
| 60 | RunCredentialKind::Answer, |
| 61 | RunCredentialKind::Update, |
| 62 | RunCredentialKind::Plan, |
| 63 | RunCredentialKind::Checks, |
| 64 | RunCredentialKind::Queue, |
| 65 | RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck, |
| 66 | RunCredentialKind::Deploy, |
| 67 | RunCredentialKind::Bump, |
| 68 | ]; |
| 69 | |
| 70 | pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { |
| 71 | match self { |
| 72 | RunCredentialKind::Implement => "implement", |
| 73 | RunCredentialKind::Revise => "revise", |
| 74 | RunCredentialKind::Review => "review", |
| 75 | RunCredentialKind::Answer => "answer", |
| 76 | RunCredentialKind::Update => "update", |
| 77 | RunCredentialKind::Plan => "plan", |
| 78 | RunCredentialKind::Checks => "checks", |
| 79 | RunCredentialKind::Queue => "queue", |
| 80 | RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck => "mergecheck", |
| 81 | RunCredentialKind::Deploy => "deploy", |
| 82 | RunCredentialKind::Bump => "bump", |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | } |
| 85 | |
| 86 | /// Whether this kind was one of g1t's retired hosted agents' runs: it |
| 87 | /// still parses, but no credential is made for it and it grants |
| 88 | /// nothing. |
| 89 | pub fn retired(self) -> bool { |
| 90 | matches!( |
| 91 | self, |
| 92 | RunCredentialKind::Implement |
| 93 | | RunCredentialKind::Revise |
| 94 | | RunCredentialKind::Review |
| 95 | | RunCredentialKind::Answer |
| 96 | | RunCredentialKind::Update |
| 97 | | RunCredentialKind::Plan |
| 98 | ) |
| 99 | } |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /// Which part of a sandbox a credential is for. |
| 103 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 104 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 105 | pub enum CredentialUse { |
| 106 | /// g1t's runner: cloning, fetching and pushing what the run needs. It |
| 107 | /// acts as the person downstream, so that what it pushes is theirs, |
| 108 | /// within the run's scope. |
| 109 | Runner, |
| 110 | /// A retired hosted agent's own tools, over MCP. Kept so stored tokens |
| 111 | /// parse; never issued. |
| 112 | Tools, |
| 113 | } |
| 114 | |
| 115 | impl CredentialUse { |
| 116 | pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { |
| 117 | match self { |
| 118 | CredentialUse::Runner => "runner", |
| 119 | CredentialUse::Tools => "tools", |
| 120 | } |
| 121 | } |
| 122 | } |
| 123 | |
| 124 | /// A repository a run may push to, and the one branch, if only one. |
| 125 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 126 | pub struct GitGrant { |
| 127 | pub repo: RepoPath, |
| 128 | /// Null: any branch. A pull request's fork is its own repository, so |
| 129 | /// the whole of it is the pull request's. |
| 130 | #[serde(default)] |
| 131 | pub branch: Option<String>, |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | |
| 134 | /// What binds a token to one run. Absent on tokens g1t's retired hosted |
| 135 | /// agents were issued before run credentials. |
| 136 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 137 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 138 | pub struct RunBinding { |
| 139 | pub kind: RunCredentialKind, |
| 140 | #[serde(rename = "use")] |
| 141 | pub usage: CredentialUse, |
| 142 | /// The run, once the sandbox has recorded it. |
| 143 | #[serde(default)] |
| 144 | pub run_id: Option<String>, |
| 145 | /// The pull request the run works on, for the kinds that work on one. |
| 146 | #[serde(default)] |
| 147 | pub number: Option<u32>, |
| 148 | /// Who acts, as the audit log names it: `g1t`. |
| 149 | pub agent: String, |
| 150 | /// Repositories it may clone and fetch, besides those it may push to. |
| 151 | #[serde(default)] |
| 152 | pub read: Vec<RepoPath>, |
| 153 | /// Where it may push. |
| 154 | #[serde(default)] |
| 155 | pub push: Vec<GitGrant>, |
| 156 | /// g1t's own run (a security update): the |
| 157 | /// credential belongs to the workspace, and acts on behalf of g1t |
| 158 | /// (`system::ID`), so what it does is g1t's, and the pull request g1t |
| 159 | /// opened, and its working copy, are its own. |
| 160 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")] |
| 161 | pub system: bool, |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | |
| 164 | /// A person, by id and name. |
| 165 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 166 | pub struct Principal { |
| 167 | pub id: String, |
| 168 | pub username: String, |
| 169 | } |
| 170 | |
| 171 | impl From<&User> for Principal { |
| 172 | fn from(user: &User) -> Self { |
| 173 | Principal { |
| 174 | id: user.id.clone(), |
| 175 | username: user.username.clone(), |
| 176 | } |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | } |
| 179 | |
| 180 | /// Set on a [`User`] resolved from a run credential: the composite |
| 181 | /// identity, "g1t on behalf of syntaqx", and what it may do. |
| 182 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 183 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 184 | pub struct Acting { |
| 185 | /// The token's id, as audit entries name it. |
| 186 | pub credential_id: String, |
| 187 | pub agent: String, |
| 188 | pub on_behalf_of: Principal, |
| 189 | pub scope: AgentScope, |
| 190 | } |
| 191 | |
| 192 | impl Acting { |
| 193 | pub fn run(&self) -> Option<&RunBinding> { |
| 194 | self.scope.run.as_ref() |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | } |
| 197 | |
| 198 | /// `create_run_credential`: a token for one sandbox run. It acts as g1t on |
| 199 | /// behalf of `on_behalf_of`, can do only what `kind` and `usage` allow in |
| 200 | /// `repo`, and expires after `ttl_seconds`, which should be the run's |
| 201 | /// timeout. A [retired](RunCredentialKind::retired) kind is refused. |
| 202 | /// Returns `CreatedAccessToken`. |
| 203 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 204 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 205 | pub struct CreateRunCredentialArgs { |
| 206 | pub on_behalf_of: User, |
| 207 | pub repo: RepoPath, |
| 208 | pub kind: RunCredentialKind, |
| 209 | #[serde(rename = "use")] |
| 210 | pub usage: CredentialUse, |
| 211 | #[serde(default)] |
| 212 | pub number: Option<u32>, |
| 213 | #[serde(default)] |
| 214 | pub read: Vec<RepoPath>, |
| 215 | #[serde(default)] |
| 216 | pub push: Vec<GitGrant>, |
| 217 | pub ttl_seconds: u64, |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | |
| 220 | /// `bind_run_credentials`: ties tokens, named by the SHA-256 of their |
| 221 | /// text in hex, to the run their sandbox recorded. Returns how many. |
| 222 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 223 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 224 | pub struct BindRunCredentialsArgs { |
| 225 | pub token_hashes: Vec<String>, |
| 226 | pub run_id: String, |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | |
| 229 | /// `revoke_run_credentials`: ends tokens when their sandbox stops, by hash |
| 230 | /// or by run. Only run credentials are touched, never a token a person |
| 231 | /// made. Returns how many. |
| 232 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 233 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 234 | pub struct RevokeRunCredentialsArgs { |
| 235 | #[serde(default)] |
| 236 | pub token_hashes: Vec<String>, |
| 237 | #[serde(default)] |
| 238 | pub run_id: Option<String>, |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | |
| 241 | // --- Policy -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 242 | |
| 243 | /// Operations that only read. |
| 244 | pub const READ_OPERATIONS: &[&str] = &[ |
| 245 | "whoami", |
| 246 | "get_usage", |
| 247 | "get_budget", |
| 248 | "list_invoices", |
| 249 | "get_billing_details", |
| 250 | "list_repos", |
| 251 | "get_repo", |
| 252 | "list_projects", |
| 253 | "get_project", |
| 254 | "list_deleted_repos", |
| 255 | "list_collaborators", |
| 256 | "get_collaborator_permission", |
| 257 | "list_repo_invitations", |
| 258 | "list_my_repo_invitations", |
| 259 | "list_outside_collaborators", |
| 260 | "list_teams", |
| 261 | "get_team", |
| 262 | "list_team_members", |
| 263 | "list_child_teams", |
| 264 | "list_team_repos", |
| 265 | "list_user_teams", |
| 266 | "get_codeowners_errors", |
| 267 | "get_repo_settings", |
| 268 | "list_check_names", |
| 269 | "get_merge_queue", |
| 270 | "recall", |
| 271 | "list_issues", |
| 272 | "get_issue", |
| 273 | "list_labels", |
| 274 | "list_issue_labels", |
| 275 | "list_milestones", |
| 276 | "get_milestone", |
| 277 | "list_pull_requests", |
| 278 | "get_pull_request", |
| 279 | "read_session", |
| 280 | "get_pull_request_changes", |
| 281 | "list_events", |
| 282 | "get_context", |
| 283 | "search", |
| 284 | "list_workflows", |
| 285 | "get_workflow", |
| 286 | "list_workflow_runs", |
| 287 | "get_workflow_run", |
| 288 | "get_job_logs", |
| 289 | "get_pending_deployments", |
| 290 | "get_workflow_permissions", |
| 291 | "get_fork_pr_approval", |
| 292 | "list_commit_statuses", |
| 293 | "get_combined_status", |
| 294 | "list_check_runs_for_ref", |
| 295 | "get_check_run", |
| 296 | "list_check_run_annotations", |
| 297 | "list_check_suites_for_ref", |
| 298 | "get_check_suite", |
| 299 | "list_integrations", |
| 300 | "list_webhooks", |
| 301 | "list_webhook_deliveries", |
| 302 | "list_actions_secrets", |
| 303 | "list_actions_variables", |
| 304 | "list_security_alerts", |
| 305 | "list_secret_scanning_alerts", |
| 306 | "get_secret_scanning_alert", |
| 307 | "list_secret_scanning_locations", |
| 308 | "list_bypass_requests", |
| 309 | "list_custom_patterns", |
| 310 | "list_code_scanning_alerts", |
| 311 | "get_code_scanning_alert", |
| 312 | "list_code_scanning_analyses", |
| 313 | "get_sarif_upload", |
| 314 | "list_vulnerability_alerts", |
| 315 | "get_vulnerability_alert", |
| 316 | "get_dependency_graph", |
| 317 | "get_sbom", |
| 318 | "compare_dependencies", |
| 319 | "get_security_settings", |
| 320 | "get_workspace_security_settings", |
| 321 | "get_security_overview", |
| 322 | "list_security_advisories", |
| 323 | "get_security_advisory", |
| 324 | "list_vulnerability_reports", |
| 325 | "list_notifications", |
| 326 | "get_notification_thread", |
| 327 | "get_thread_subscription", |
| 328 | "get_repo_subscription", |
| 329 | "list_watched_repos", |
| 330 | "list_pinned_projects", |
| 331 | ]; |
| 332 | |
| 333 | /// What no run credential may ever do, whatever its scope says: |
| 334 | /// workspaces, repositories' settings, members, tokens, billing, |
| 335 | /// integrations, webhooks, secrets, workflows' controls and merging. |
| 336 | pub const NEVER: &[&str] = &[ |
| 337 | // Billing is people's: runs never spend or change it. |
| 338 | "set_budget", |
| 339 | "create_workspace", |
| 340 | "delete_workspace", |
| 341 | "update_workspace", |
| 342 | // So is who belongs to a workspace and who owns it. |
| 343 | "list_members", |
| 344 | "update_member", |
| 345 | "remove_member", |
| 346 | "transfer_ownership", |
| 347 | "leave_workspace", |
| 348 | "transfer_repo", |
| 349 | "create_repo", |
| 350 | "update_repo", |
| 351 | "update_project", |
| 352 | "delete_repo", |
| 353 | "list_deleted_repos", |
| 354 | "restore_repo", |
| 355 | "purge_repo", |
| 356 | "rename_repo", |
| 357 | "archive_repo", |
| 358 | "unarchive_repo", |
| 359 | "set_repo_visibility", |
| 360 | "rename_branch", |
| 361 | "delete_branch", |
| 362 | "update_repo_settings", |
| 363 | "merge_pull_request", |
| 364 | "import_issue", |
| 365 | "list_integrations", |
| 366 | "connect_integration", |
| 367 | "update_integration", |
| 368 | "disconnect_integration", |
| 369 | "test_integration", |
| 370 | "list_webhooks", |
| 371 | "create_webhook", |
| 372 | "update_webhook", |
| 373 | "delete_webhook", |
| 374 | "ping_webhook", |
| 375 | "list_webhook_deliveries", |
| 376 | "redeliver_webhook", |
| 377 | "dispatch_workflow", |
| 378 | "cancel_workflow_run", |
| 379 | "rerun_workflow_run", |
| 380 | "update_workflow", |
| 381 | // Nor lets runs or deployments through, or changes what holds them. |
| 382 | "approve_workflow_run", |
| 383 | "review_pending_deployments", |
| 384 | "update_environment", |
| 385 | "delete_environment", |
| 386 | "set_workflow_permissions", |
| 387 | "set_fork_pr_approval", |
| 388 | "set_actions_access", |
| 389 | "create_repository_dispatch", |
| 390 | "set_workspace_workflow_permissions", |
| 391 | // An agent never reports checks on its own work, nor asks for them |
| 392 | // to run again: what checks say is the integrations' to say. |
| 393 | "create_commit_status", |
| 394 | "create_check_run", |
| 395 | "update_check_run", |
| 396 | "rerequest_check_run", |
| 397 | "rerequest_check_suite", |
| 398 | "list_actions_secrets", |
| 399 | "set_actions_secret", |
| 400 | "delete_actions_secret", |
| 401 | "list_actions_variables", |
| 402 | "set_actions_variable", |
| 403 | "delete_actions_variable", |
| 404 | "list_collaborators", |
| 405 | "get_collaborator_permission", |
| 406 | "add_collaborator", |
| 407 | "update_collaborator", |
| 408 | "remove_collaborator", |
| 409 | "list_repo_invitations", |
| 410 | "revoke_repo_invitation", |
| 411 | "list_my_repo_invitations", |
| 412 | "accept_repo_invitation", |
| 413 | "decline_repo_invitation", |
| 414 | // Nor answers a workspace invitation: only the person it is for does. |
| 415 | "accept_invitation", |
| 416 | "decline_invitation", |
| 417 | "set_base_permission", |
| 418 | "list_outside_collaborators", |
| 419 | // Deploy keys, which let a machine into a repository. |
| 420 | "list_deploy_keys", |
| 421 | "get_deploy_key", |
| 422 | "create_deploy_key", |
| 423 | "delete_deploy_key", |
| 424 | // Teams: who is in which, and what they reach, is for people. |
| 425 | "create_team", |
| 426 | "update_team", |
| 427 | "delete_team", |
| 428 | "set_team_member", |
| 429 | "remove_team_member", |
| 430 | "set_team_repo", |
| 431 | "remove_team_repo", |
| 432 | "set_team_review_assignment", |
| 433 | // Dismissing a secret lets it through push protection. |
| 434 | "dismiss_security_alert", |
| 435 | "reopen_security_alert", |
| 436 | // Nor any other decision about security: closing or reopening an |
| 437 | // alert, pushing past push protection or deciding who may, or changing |
| 438 | // what is looked for or when checks fail. |
| 439 | "update_secret_scanning_alert", |
| 440 | "bypass_push_protection", |
| 441 | "review_bypass_request", |
| 442 | "create_custom_pattern", |
| 443 | "update_custom_pattern", |
| 444 | "delete_custom_pattern", |
| 445 | "update_code_scanning_alert", |
| 446 | "update_vulnerability_alert", |
| 447 | "update_security_settings", |
| 448 | "update_workspace_security_settings", |
| 449 | // A person's own inbox: a run acts as g1t, which has none. |
| 450 | "list_notifications", |
| 451 | "get_notification_thread", |
| 452 | "mark_notifications_read", |
| 453 | "mark_thread_read", |
| 454 | "mark_thread_done", |
| 455 | "save_thread", |
| 456 | "snooze_thread", |
| 457 | "get_thread_subscription", |
| 458 | "set_thread_subscription", |
| 459 | "delete_thread_subscription", |
| 460 | "get_repo_subscription", |
| 461 | "set_repo_subscription", |
| 462 | "delete_repo_subscription", |
| 463 | "list_watched_repos", |
| 464 | // Pins are a person's own, as the inbox is. |
| 465 | "list_pinned_projects", |
| 466 | "pin_project", |
| 467 | "unpin_project", |
| 468 | "reorder_pinned_projects", |
| 469 | // Deleting packages and deciding who may use them is for people: an |
| 470 | // agent publishes its repository's packages and never deletes them. |
| 471 | "update_package", |
| 472 | "link_package", |
| 473 | "unlink_package", |
| 474 | "set_package_access", |
| 475 | "remove_package_access", |
| 476 | "set_package_actions_access", |
| 477 | "remove_package_actions_access", |
| 478 | "delete_package", |
| 479 | "restore_package", |
| 480 | "delete_package_version", |
| 481 | "restore_package_version", |
| 482 | // Sharing an artifact and deleting one for good are for people. |
| 483 | "set_workspace_artifact_access", |
| 484 | "purge_workspace_artifact", |
| 485 | ]; |
| 486 | |
| 487 | pub fn is_read(operation: &str) -> bool { |
| 488 | READ_OPERATIONS.contains(&operation) |
| 489 | } |
| 490 | |
| 491 | /// The API and MCP operations a run of `kind` may use with a credential |
| 492 | /// for `usage`. Git is separate: see [`decide_git`]. None today: every run |
| 493 | /// still issued works through git alone, and a |
| 494 | /// [retired](RunCredentialKind::retired) kind grants nothing. A stored |
| 495 | /// token keeps the operations it was made with until it expires. |
| 496 | pub fn operations_for(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<&'static str> { |
| 497 | let _ = (kind, usage); |
| 498 | Vec::new() |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | |
| 501 | /// What a run's credential may do, in the scope vocabulary that access |
| 502 | /// tokens use (see [`crate::scopes`]): the scopes of its operations, and |
| 503 | /// for a runner, git's. Its operations, its repository and its run still |
| 504 | /// bound it more tightly than these scopes say. |
| 505 | pub fn run_scopes(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<crate::scopes::Scope> { |
| 506 | use crate::scopes::{Scope, normalize, scope_for}; |
| 507 | let mut scopes: Vec<Scope> = operations_for(kind, usage) |
| 508 | .into_iter() |
| 509 | .filter_map(scope_for) |
| 510 | .collect(); |
| 511 | if usage == CredentialUse::Runner && !kind.retired() { |
| 512 | scopes.push(Scope::CodeRead); |
| 513 | if kind == RunCredentialKind::Bump { |
| 514 | scopes.push(Scope::CodeWrite); |
| 515 | } |
| 516 | } |
| 517 | normalize(&mut scopes); |
| 518 | scopes |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | |
| 521 | /// Operations that change a pull request, which a runner may do only to |
| 522 | /// the pull request its run works on. |
| 523 | const PULL_WRITES: &[&str] = &["record_session", "mark_pull_request_ready"]; |
| 524 | |
| 525 | /// Whether something was allowed, and the rule that decided it. |
| 526 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 527 | pub struct Decision { |
| 528 | pub allowed: bool, |
| 529 | /// A short, stable name: `run:implement/tools`, `never`, |
| 530 | /// `scope:repository` and so on. Shown in the audit log. |
| 531 | pub rule: String, |
| 532 | /// Why it was refused, for the caller. |
| 533 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] |
| 534 | pub reason: Option<String>, |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | |
| 537 | impl Decision { |
| 538 | pub fn allow(rule: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 539 | Decision { |
| 540 | allowed: true, |
| 541 | rule: rule.into(), |
| 542 | reason: None, |
| 543 | } |
| 544 | } |
| 545 | |
| 546 | pub fn deny(rule: impl Into<String>, reason: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 547 | Decision { |
| 548 | allowed: false, |
| 549 | rule: rule.into(), |
| 550 | reason: Some(reason.into()), |
| 551 | } |
| 552 | } |
| 553 | } |
| 554 | |
| 555 | fn same_repo(a: &RepoPath, b: &RepoPath) -> bool { |
| 556 | a.namespace.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.namespace) && a.name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.name) |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | |
| 559 | fn scope_rule(scope: &AgentScope) -> String { |
| 560 | match &scope.run { |
| 561 | Some(run) => format!("run:{}/{}", run.kind.as_str(), run.usage.as_str()), |
| 562 | None => "agent-token".to_owned(), |
| 563 | } |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | |
| 566 | /// Whether `user`, resolved from a run credential with `scope`, may use |
| 567 | /// `operation`. `repo` is the repository the call names, if any, and |
| 568 | /// `needs_repo` whether the operation is about one; `number` the issue or |
| 569 | /// pull request it names. |
| 570 | pub fn decide_operation( |
| 571 | user: &User, |
| 572 | scope: &AgentScope, |
| 573 | operation: &str, |
| 574 | repo: Option<&RepoPath>, |
| 575 | needs_repo: bool, |
| 576 | number: Option<u32>, |
| 577 | ) -> Decision { |
| 578 | let who = "A run's token"; |
| 579 | if NEVER.contains(&operation) { |
| 580 | return Decision::deny( |
| 581 | "never", |
| 582 | format!( |
| 583 | "{who} can never use {operation}: settings, members, tokens, billing, integrations, webhooks, secrets and merging are for people." |
| 584 | ), |
| 585 | ); |
| 586 | } |
| 587 | if !scope.operations.iter().any(|name| name == operation) { |
| 588 | return Decision::deny( |
| 589 | "scope:operation", |
| 590 | format!("{who} for this run cannot use {operation}."), |
| 591 | ); |
| 592 | } |
| 593 | if needs_repo && !repo.is_some_and(|asked| same_repo(asked, &scope.repo)) { |
| 594 | return Decision::deny( |
| 595 | "scope:repository", |
| 596 | format!( |
| 597 | "{who} works in {}/{} only.", |
| 598 | scope.repo.namespace, scope.repo.name |
| 599 | ), |
| 600 | ); |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | // The intersection: the person it acts for must still be able to work |
| 603 | // in the repository's workspace, as a member or with a role on its |
| 604 | // repositories. What it may do in the repository itself is their |
| 605 | // role there, which services check (`access::can`). |
| 606 | if !crate::access::has_access_in(user, &scope.repo.namespace) { |
| 607 | return Decision::deny( |
| 608 | "on-behalf-of:membership", |
| 609 | format!( |
| 610 | "The person this run works for is no longer a member of {}.", |
| 611 | scope.repo.namespace |
| 612 | ), |
| 613 | ); |
| 614 | } |
| 615 | if let Some(run) = &scope.run |
| 616 | && run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner |
| 617 | && PULL_WRITES.contains(&operation) |
| 618 | && run.number.is_some() |
| 619 | && number != run.number |
| 620 | { |
| 621 | return Decision::deny( |
| 622 | "scope:pull", |
| 623 | format!( |
| 624 | "{who} can change pull request #{} only.", |
| 625 | run.number.unwrap_or_default() |
| 626 | ), |
| 627 | ); |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | Decision::allow(scope_rule(scope)) |
| 630 | } |
| 631 | |
| 632 | /// Whether a run credential may clone or fetch (`write` false), or push to |
| 633 | /// (`write` true), the repository at `repo`. |
| 634 | pub fn decide_git(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, write: bool) -> Decision { |
| 635 | let Some(run) = scope |
| 636 | .run |
| 637 | .as_ref() |
| 638 | .filter(|run| run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner) |
| 639 | else { |
| 640 | return Decision::deny( |
| 641 | "git:not-a-run", |
| 642 | "A tools token cannot be used with git.", |
| 643 | ); |
| 644 | }; |
| 645 | let pushable = run.push.iter().any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo)); |
| 646 | if write { |
| 647 | return if pushable { |
| 648 | Decision::allow(format!("{}:push", scope_rule(scope))) |
| 649 | } else { |
| 650 | Decision::deny( |
| 651 | "git:push", |
| 652 | format!( |
| 653 | "A {} run cannot push to {}/{}.", |
| 654 | run.kind.as_str(), |
| 655 | repo.namespace, |
| 656 | repo.name |
| 657 | ), |
| 658 | ) |
| 659 | }; |
| 660 | } |
| 661 | let readable = pushable |
| 662 | || same_repo(&scope.repo, repo) |
| 663 | || run.read.iter().any(|path| same_repo(path, repo)); |
| 664 | if readable { |
| 665 | Decision::allow(format!("{}:read", scope_rule(scope))) |
| 666 | } else { |
| 667 | Decision::deny( |
| 668 | "git:read", |
| 669 | format!( |
| 670 | "A {} run cannot read {}/{}.", |
| 671 | run.kind.as_str(), |
| 672 | repo.namespace, |
| 673 | repo.name |
| 674 | ), |
| 675 | ) |
| 676 | } |
| 677 | } |
| 678 | |
| 679 | /// Whether a push to `repo` is limited to certain branches, so that the |
| 680 | /// refs it moves have to be read and checked with [`decide_refs`]. |
| 681 | pub fn limits_branches(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath) -> bool { |
| 682 | scope |
| 683 | .run |
| 684 | .iter() |
| 685 | .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter()) |
| 686 | .any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo) && grant.branch.is_some()) |
| 687 | } |
| 688 | |
| 689 | /// Whether a push to `repo` may move `refs` (full refs, such as |
| 690 | /// `refs/heads/main`). Tags are never a run's to move. |
| 691 | pub fn decide_refs(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, refs: &[String]) -> Decision { |
| 692 | let repo_decision = decide_git(scope, repo, true); |
| 693 | if !repo_decision.allowed { |
| 694 | return repo_decision; |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | let grants: Vec<&GitGrant> = scope |
| 697 | .run |
| 698 | .iter() |
| 699 | .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter()) |
| 700 | .filter(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo)) |
| 701 | .collect(); |
| 702 | for git_ref in refs { |
| 703 | let Some(branch) = git_ref.strip_prefix("refs/heads/") else { |
| 704 | return Decision::deny("git:ref", format!("A run cannot push {git_ref}.")); |
| 705 | }; |
| 706 | let allowed = grants |
| 707 | .iter() |
| 708 | .any(|grant| grant.branch.as_deref().is_none_or(|only| only == branch)); |
| 709 | if !allowed { |
| 710 | return Decision::deny( |
| 711 | "git:ref", |
| 712 | format!( |
| 713 | "A run cannot push to {branch} in {}/{}.", |
| 714 | repo.namespace, repo.name |
| 715 | ), |
| 716 | ); |
| 717 | } |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | repo_decision |
| 720 | } |
| 721 | |
| 722 | /// The most an agent may be on a repository, whoever it works for: it |
| 723 | /// can push, merge and run, never change settings or who has access. |
| 724 | pub const AGENT_CEILING: RepoRole = RepoRole::Write; |
| 725 | |
| 726 | /// The memberships an agent working for `person` has: the run's |
| 727 | /// workspace, as a member, only if the person is in it now, with the |
| 728 | /// person's role on its repositories (an owner's Admin included) cut down |
| 729 | /// to [`AGENT_CEILING`]. |
| 730 | pub fn intersect(person: &[Membership], namespace: &str) -> Vec<Membership> { |
| 731 | let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase(); |
| 732 | person |
| 733 | .iter() |
| 734 | .filter(|membership| membership.slug == namespace) |
| 735 | .map(|membership| { |
| 736 | let base = match membership.role { |
| 737 | Role::Owner => BasePermission::Admin, |
| 738 | Role::Member => membership.base_permission.unwrap_or_default(), |
| 739 | }; |
| 740 | Membership { |
| 741 | role: Role::Member, |
| 742 | base_permission: Some(match base { |
| 743 | BasePermission::Admin => BasePermission::Write, |
| 744 | base => base, |
| 745 | }), |
| 746 | // Billing and security manager are the person's, never |
| 747 | // their agent's. |
| 748 | org_roles: Vec::new(), |
| 749 | ..membership.clone() |
| 750 | } |
| 751 | }) |
| 752 | .collect() |
| 753 | } |
| 754 | |
| 755 | /// The repository grants an agent working for `person` has: those in the |
| 756 | /// run's workspace, each cut down to [`AGENT_CEILING`]. |
| 757 | pub fn intersect_grants(person: &[RepoGrant], namespace: &str) -> Vec<RepoGrant> { |
| 758 | let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase(); |
| 759 | person |
| 760 | .iter() |
| 761 | .filter(|grant| grant.workspace == namespace) |
| 762 | .map(|grant| RepoGrant { |
| 763 | role: grant.role.min(AGENT_CEILING), |
| 764 | ..grant.clone() |
| 765 | }) |
| 766 | .collect() |
| 767 | } |
| 768 | |
| 769 | /// Who a runner's credential acts as downstream: the person, with only the |
| 770 | /// agent's (already intersected) memberships. `None` for anything else. |
| 771 | pub fn as_person(user: &User) -> Option<User> { |
| 772 | let acting = user.acting.as_ref()?; |
| 773 | if user.kind != PrincipalKind::Agent { |
| 774 | return None; |
| 775 | } |
| 776 | let run = acting.run()?; |
| 777 | if run.usage != CredentialUse::Runner { |
| 778 | return None; |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | Some(User { |
| 781 | id: acting.on_behalf_of.id.clone(), |
| 782 | username: acting.on_behalf_of.username.clone(), |
| 783 | display_username: None, |
| 784 | kind: PrincipalKind::User, |
| 785 | verified: user.verified, |
| 786 | workspaces: user.workspaces.clone(), |
| 787 | avatar: None, |
| 788 | acting: None, |
| 789 | grants: user.grants.clone(), |
| 790 | token: None, |
| 791 | held: Vec::new(), |
| 792 | }) |
| 793 | } |
| 794 | |
| 795 | /// How an actor is described: "g1t on behalf of syntaqx". |
| 796 | pub fn describe(user: &User) -> String { |
| 797 | match &user.acting { |
| 798 | Some(acting) => format!( |
| 799 | "{} on behalf of {}", |
| 800 | acting.agent, acting.on_behalf_of.username |
| 801 | ), |
| 802 | None => user.username.clone(), |
| 803 | } |
| 804 | } |
| 805 | |
| 806 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 807 | mod tests { |
| 808 | use super::*; |
| 809 | |
| 810 | #[test] |
| 811 | fn a_run_s_scopes_are_never_admin() { |
| 812 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 813 | for usage in [CredentialUse::Runner, CredentialUse::Tools] { |
| 814 | let scopes = run_scopes(kind, usage); |
| 815 | assert!(scopes.iter().all(|scope| !scope.dangerous()), "{kind:?} {usage:?}: {scopes:?}"); |
| 816 | } |
| 817 | } |
| 818 | use crate::scopes::Scope; |
| 819 | let bump = run_scopes(RunCredentialKind::Bump, CredentialUse::Runner); |
| 820 | assert!(bump.len() == 2 && bump.contains(&Scope::CodeRead) && bump.contains(&Scope::CodeWrite)); |
| 821 | assert_eq!(run_scopes(RunCredentialKind::Checks, CredentialUse::Runner), [Scope::CodeRead]); |
| 822 | } |
| 823 | |
| 824 | /// The hosted agents' kinds still parse, so stored tokens read, but |
| 825 | /// they grant nothing: no operations, no scopes. |
| 826 | #[test] |
| 827 | fn retired_kinds_parse_and_grant_nothing() { |
| 828 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 829 | let parsed: RunCredentialKind = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!(kind.as_str())).unwrap(); |
| 830 | assert_eq!(parsed, kind); |
| 831 | for usage in [CredentialUse::Runner, CredentialUse::Tools] { |
| 832 | assert!(operations_for(kind, usage).is_empty(), "{kind:?} {usage:?}"); |
| 833 | if kind.retired() { |
| 834 | assert!(run_scopes(kind, usage).is_empty(), "{kind:?} {usage:?}"); |
| 835 | } |
| 836 | } |
| 837 | } |
| 838 | let retired: Vec<&str> = RunCredentialKind::ALL.iter().filter(|kind| kind.retired()).map(|kind| kind.as_str()).collect(); |
| 839 | assert_eq!(retired, ["implement", "revise", "review", "answer", "update", "plan"]); |
| 840 | } |
| 841 | |
| 842 | #[test] |
| 843 | fn site_wide_search_only_reads() { |
| 844 | assert!(is_read("search")); |
| 845 | assert!(!NEVER.contains(&"search")); |
| 846 | } |
| 847 | |
| 848 | fn path(namespace: &str, name: &str) -> RepoPath { |
| 849 | RepoPath { |
| 850 | namespace: namespace.to_owned(), |
| 851 | name: name.to_owned(), |
| 852 | } |
| 853 | } |
| 854 | |
| 855 | /// What a token stored before the hosted agents were retired lists: |
| 856 | /// the operations it was made with, which it keeps until it expires. |
| 857 | fn stored_operations(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<String> { |
| 858 | use RunCredentialKind as K; |
| 859 | let names: Vec<&str> = match usage { |
| 860 | CredentialUse::Runner => match kind { |
| 861 | K::Implement => vec!["get_repo", "get_pull_request", "record_session", "mark_pull_request_ready"], |
| 862 | K::Revise | K::Answer | K::Update => vec!["get_repo", "get_pull_request", "record_session"], |
| 863 | _ => vec![], |
| 864 | }, |
| 865 | CredentialUse::Tools => match kind { |
| 866 | K::Implement | K::Revise | K::Answer => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "create_issue", "add_comment", "remember"], |
| 867 | K::Review => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "add_comment", "review_pull_request"], |
| 868 | K::Plan => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "create_issue"], |
| 869 | K::Update => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request"], |
| 870 | _ => vec![], |
| 871 | }, |
| 872 | }; |
| 873 | names.into_iter().map(str::to_owned).collect() |
| 874 | } |
| 875 | |
| 876 | fn scope(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> AgentScope { |
| 877 | AgentScope { |
| 878 | repo: path("acme", "rocket"), |
| 879 | operations: stored_operations(kind, usage), |
| 880 | run: Some(RunBinding { |
| 881 | kind, |
| 882 | usage, |
| 883 | run_id: Some("run_1".to_owned()), |
| 884 | number: Some(7), |
| 885 | agent: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 886 | system: false, |
| 887 | read: vec![path("acme", "rocket")], |
| 888 | push: match kind { |
| 889 | RunCredentialKind::Implement |
| 890 | | RunCredentialKind::Revise |
| 891 | | RunCredentialKind::Answer => vec![GitGrant { |
| 892 | repo: path("pulls", "pul_7"), |
| 893 | branch: None, |
| 894 | }], |
| 895 | RunCredentialKind::Update => vec![GitGrant { |
| 896 | repo: path("acme", "rocket"), |
| 897 | branch: Some("fix-login".to_owned()), |
| 898 | }], |
| 899 | _ => vec![], |
| 900 | }, |
| 901 | }), |
| 902 | } |
| 903 | } |
| 904 | |
| 905 | fn agent(member_of: &[&str], scope: AgentScope) -> User { |
| 906 | User { |
| 907 | id: "usr_g1t_agent".to_owned(), |
| 908 | username: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 909 | display_username: None, |
| 910 | kind: PrincipalKind::Agent, |
| 911 | verified: true, |
| 912 | workspaces: member_of |
| 913 | .iter() |
| 914 | .map(|slug| Membership::member(*slug)) |
| 915 | .collect(), |
| 916 | avatar: None, |
| 917 | grants: Vec::new(), |
| 918 | token: None, |
| 919 | held: Vec::new(), |
| 920 | acting: Some(Box::new(Acting { |
| 921 | credential_id: "tok_1".to_owned(), |
| 922 | agent: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 923 | on_behalf_of: Principal { |
| 924 | id: "usr_1".to_owned(), |
| 925 | username: "syntaqx".to_owned(), |
| 926 | }, |
| 927 | scope, |
| 928 | })), |
| 929 | } |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | |
| 932 | fn op(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse, operation: &str) -> Decision { |
| 933 | let scope = scope(kind, usage); |
| 934 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 935 | decide_operation( |
| 936 | &user, |
| 937 | &scope, |
| 938 | operation, |
| 939 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 940 | true, |
| 941 | Some(7), |
| 942 | ) |
| 943 | } |
| 944 | |
| 945 | use CredentialUse::{Runner, Tools}; |
| 946 | use RunCredentialKind as K; |
| 947 | |
| 948 | /// A stored token may use only what it lists, and never what no run |
| 949 | /// may. |
| 950 | #[test] |
| 951 | fn a_stored_token_uses_only_what_it_lists() { |
| 952 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Tools, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 953 | assert!(op(K::Review, Tools, "review_pull_request").allowed); |
| 954 | assert!(!op(K::Review, Tools, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 955 | assert!(!op(K::Plan, Tools, "add_comment").allowed); |
| 956 | assert!(!op(K::Checks, Tools, "get_issue").allowed); |
| 957 | for operation in ["record_session", "merge_pull_request", "update_repo_settings", "create_webhook", "set_actions_secret"] { |
| 958 | for kind in [K::Implement, K::Revise, K::Answer, K::Review, K::Plan, K::Checks] { |
| 959 | assert!(!op(kind, Tools, operation).allowed, "{operation} by a {} run's tools", kind.as_str()); |
| 960 | } |
| 961 | } |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | |
| 964 | #[test] |
| 965 | fn runner_matrix() { |
| 966 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 967 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed); |
| 968 | assert!(op(K::Revise, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 969 | assert!(!op(K::Revise, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed); |
| 970 | assert!(!op(K::Implement, Runner, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 971 | assert!(!op(K::Review, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 972 | assert!(!op(K::Checks, Runner, "get_issue").allowed); |
| 973 | } |
| 974 | |
| 975 | #[test] |
| 976 | fn settings_billing_tokens_and_members_are_never_reachable() { |
| 977 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 978 | for usage in [Runner, Tools] { |
| 979 | for operation in NEVER.iter().copied() { |
| 980 | let decision = op(kind, usage, operation); |
| 981 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 982 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never"); |
| 983 | } |
| 984 | } |
| 985 | } |
| 986 | // Even a scope that lists one is refused. |
| 987 | let mut wide = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 988 | wide.operations.push("merge_pull_request".to_owned()); |
| 989 | let user = agent(&["acme"], wide.clone()); |
| 990 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 991 | &user, |
| 992 | &wide, |
| 993 | "merge_pull_request", |
| 994 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 995 | true, |
| 996 | Some(7), |
| 997 | ); |
| 998 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never"); |
| 999 | } |
| 1000 | |
| 1001 | #[test] |
| 1002 | fn another_repository_is_refused() { |
| 1003 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1004 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1005 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1006 | &user, |
| 1007 | &scope, |
| 1008 | "create_issue", |
| 1009 | Some(&path("acme", "other")), |
| 1010 | true, |
| 1011 | None, |
| 1012 | ); |
| 1013 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 1014 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository"); |
| 1015 | let decision = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "create_issue", None, true, None); |
| 1016 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository"); |
| 1017 | // The repository's name is matched without regard to case. |
| 1018 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1019 | &user, |
| 1020 | &scope, |
| 1021 | "create_issue", |
| 1022 | Some(&path("Acme", "Rocket")), |
| 1023 | true, |
| 1024 | None, |
| 1025 | ); |
| 1026 | assert!(decision.allowed); |
| 1027 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "run:implement/tools"); |
| 1028 | } |
| 1029 | |
| 1030 | #[test] |
| 1031 | fn the_permission_is_the_intersection_with_the_person() { |
| 1032 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1033 | // The person left the workspace: their agent can do nothing there. |
| 1034 | let user = agent(&[], scope.clone()); |
| 1035 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1036 | &user, |
| 1037 | &scope, |
| 1038 | "get_issue", |
| 1039 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 1040 | true, |
| 1041 | Some(1), |
| 1042 | ); |
| 1043 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 1044 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "on-behalf-of:membership"); |
| 1045 | // And an owner's agent is only ever a member. |
| 1046 | let owner = vec![ |
| 1047 | Membership { |
| 1048 | slug: "acme".to_owned(), |
| 1049 | role: Role::Owner, |
| 1050 | name: None, |
| 1051 | avatar: None, |
| 1052 | base_permission: Some(BasePermission::None), |
| 1053 | team_creation: None, |
| 1054 | org_roles: vec![crate::OrgRole::SecurityManager], |
| 1055 | privileges: None, |
| 1056 | }, |
| 1057 | Membership::member("elsewhere"), |
| 1058 | ]; |
| 1059 | let memberships = intersect(&owner, "Acme"); |
| 1060 | assert_eq!(memberships.len(), 1); |
| 1061 | assert_eq!(memberships[0].slug, "acme"); |
| 1062 | assert_eq!(memberships[0].role, Role::Member); |
| 1063 | assert!(memberships[0].org_roles.is_empty()); |
| 1064 | assert!(intersect(&owner, "nowhere").is_empty()); |
| 1065 | } |
| 1066 | |
| 1067 | /// An agent gets at most the person's role on the repository, and |
| 1068 | /// never more than Write; nothing outside the run's workspace. |
| 1069 | #[test] |
| 1070 | fn an_agent_has_at_most_its_persons_role() { |
| 1071 | use crate::access::{Capability, RepoRef, can, permission}; |
| 1072 | let rocket = RepoRef { id: "rep_1", namespace: "acme", private: true }; |
| 1073 | let other = RepoRef { id: "rep_2", namespace: "acme", private: true }; |
| 1074 | let elsewhere = RepoRef { id: "rep_3", namespace: "globex", private: true }; |
| 1075 | let tools = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1076 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1077 | // An owner's agent: Write, never Admin. |
| 1078 | let owner = [Membership { role: Role::Owner, ..Membership::member("acme") }, Membership::member("globex")]; |
| 1079 | let mut agent_user = agent(&[], scope.clone()); |
| 1080 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&owner, "acme"); |
| 1081 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1082 | assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::ManageSettings)); |
| 1083 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None); |
| 1084 | // A member whose workspace gives Read: Read, so it cannot push. |
| 1085 | let reader = [Membership { base_permission: Some(BasePermission::Read), ..Membership::member("acme") }]; |
| 1086 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&reader, "acme"); |
| 1087 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Read)); |
| 1088 | assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::Push)); |
| 1089 | // An outside collaborator with Maintain on one repository: Write |
| 1090 | // there, nothing elsewhere, and the run is allowed. |
| 1091 | let grants = [ |
| 1092 | RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_1".into(), workspace: "acme".into(), role: RepoRole::Maintain, team: None }, |
| 1093 | RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_3".into(), workspace: "globex".into(), role: RepoRole::Admin, team: None }, |
| 1094 | ]; |
| 1095 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&[], "acme"); |
| 1096 | agent_user.grants = intersect_grants(&grants, "Acme"); |
| 1097 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1098 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), other), None); |
| 1099 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None); |
| 1100 | let decision = decide_operation(&agent_user, &tools, "get_issue", Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), true, Some(1)); |
| 1101 | assert!(decision.allowed, "{}", decision.reason.unwrap_or_default()); |
| 1102 | // The person, downstream of a runner's credential, carries the same. |
| 1103 | let person = as_person(&agent_user).expect("a runner acts as the person"); |
| 1104 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&person), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1105 | } |
| 1106 | |
| 1107 | #[test] |
| 1108 | fn a_runner_changes_only_its_own_pull_request() { |
| 1109 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1110 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1111 | let repo = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1112 | let other = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(8)); |
| 1113 | assert!(!other.allowed); |
| 1114 | assert_eq!(other.rule, "scope:pull"); |
| 1115 | let own = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(7)); |
| 1116 | assert!(own.allowed); |
| 1117 | // Reading another is fine. |
| 1118 | assert!( |
| 1119 | decide_operation( |
| 1120 | &user, |
| 1121 | &scope, |
| 1122 | "get_pull_request", |
| 1123 | Some(&repo), |
| 1124 | true, |
| 1125 | Some(8) |
| 1126 | ) |
| 1127 | .allowed |
| 1128 | ); |
| 1129 | } |
| 1130 | |
| 1131 | #[test] |
| 1132 | fn git_matrix() { |
| 1133 | let fork = path("pulls", "pul_7"); |
| 1134 | let upstream = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1135 | let elsewhere = path("acme", "billing"); |
| 1136 | let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1137 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, true).allowed); |
| 1138 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, false).allowed); |
| 1139 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, false).allowed); |
| 1140 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, true).rule, "git:push"); |
| 1141 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &elsewhere, false).rule, "git:read"); |
| 1142 | let review = scope(K::Review, Runner); |
| 1143 | assert!(decide_git(&review, &upstream, false).allowed); |
| 1144 | assert!(!decide_git(&review, &upstream, true).allowed); |
| 1145 | assert!(!decide_git(&review, &fork, true).allowed); |
| 1146 | // A tools token made before run credentials never reaches git. |
| 1147 | let old = AgentScope { |
| 1148 | repo: upstream.clone(), |
| 1149 | operations: vec!["get_issue".to_owned()], |
| 1150 | run: None, |
| 1151 | }; |
| 1152 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&old, &upstream, false).rule, "git:not-a-run"); |
| 1153 | // Nor does an agent's tools token. |
| 1154 | assert_eq!( |
| 1155 | decide_git(&scope(K::Implement, Tools), &upstream, false).rule, |
| 1156 | "git:not-a-run" |
| 1157 | ); |
| 1158 | } |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | #[test] |
| 1161 | fn a_push_moves_only_granted_branches() { |
| 1162 | let update = scope(K::Update, Runner); |
| 1163 | let repo = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1164 | let refs = |names: &[&str]| { |
| 1165 | names |
| 1166 | .iter() |
| 1167 | .map(|name| (*name).to_owned()) |
| 1168 | .collect::<Vec<_>>() |
| 1169 | }; |
| 1170 | assert!(decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login"])).allowed); |
| 1171 | assert_eq!( |
| 1172 | decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/main"])).rule, |
| 1173 | "git:ref" |
| 1174 | ); |
| 1175 | assert_eq!( |
| 1176 | decide_refs( |
| 1177 | &update, |
| 1178 | &repo, |
| 1179 | &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login", "refs/tags/v1"]) |
| 1180 | ) |
| 1181 | .rule, |
| 1182 | "git:ref" |
| 1183 | ); |
| 1184 | let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1185 | assert!( |
| 1186 | decide_refs( |
| 1187 | &implement, |
| 1188 | &path("pulls", "pul_7"), |
| 1189 | &refs(&["refs/heads/main"]) |
| 1190 | ) |
| 1191 | .allowed |
| 1192 | ); |
| 1193 | } |
| 1194 | |
| 1195 | #[test] |
| 1196 | fn a_runner_acts_downstream_as_the_person() { |
| 1197 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Runner)); |
| 1198 | let person = as_person(&user).unwrap(); |
| 1199 | assert_eq!(person.id, "usr_1"); |
| 1200 | assert_eq!(person.username, "syntaqx"); |
| 1201 | assert_eq!(person.kind, PrincipalKind::User); |
| 1202 | assert!(person.is_member("acme")); |
| 1203 | assert!(person.acting.is_none()); |
| 1204 | assert_eq!(describe(&user), "g1t on behalf of syntaqx"); |
| 1205 | // The tools act as the agent. |
| 1206 | assert!(as_person(&agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Tools))).is_none()); |
| 1207 | } |
| 1208 | |
| 1209 | #[test] |
| 1210 | fn scopes_without_a_run_still_parse() { |
| 1211 | let old: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str( |
| 1212 | r#"{"repo":{"namespace":"acme","name":"rocket"},"operations":["get_issue"]}"#, |
| 1213 | ) |
| 1214 | .unwrap(); |
| 1215 | assert!(old.run.is_none()); |
| 1216 | let written = serde_json::to_string(&scope(K::Review, Tools)).unwrap(); |
| 1217 | assert!(written.contains(r#""use":"tools""#)); |
| 1218 | assert!(written.contains(r#""kind":"review""#)); |
| 1219 | let back: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str(&written).unwrap(); |
| 1220 | assert_eq!(back.run.unwrap().kind, K::Review); |
| 1221 | // Only g1t's own runs say so; every other reads as not. |
| 1222 | assert!(!written.contains("system")); |
| 1223 | assert!(!back_run(&written).system); |
| 1224 | let mut own = scope(K::Bump, Runner); |
| 1225 | own.run.as_mut().unwrap().system = true; |
| 1226 | let written = serde_json::to_string(&own).unwrap(); |
| 1227 | assert!(written.contains(r#""system":true"#)); |
| 1228 | assert!(back_run(&written).system); |
| 1229 | } |
| 1230 | |
| 1231 | fn back_run(written: &str) -> RunBinding { |
| 1232 | serde_json::from_str::<AgentScope>(written).unwrap().run.unwrap() |
| 1233 | } |
| 1234 | } |