| 1 | //! Run credentials: a token per sandbox run (checks, the merge queue, a |
| 2 | //! merge check, a deployment or a security update's bump), bound to the |
| 3 | //! run, its repository and what its kind of work needs, acting as g1t on |
| 4 | //! behalf of the person who started the work, or of the workspace for |
| 5 | //! g1t's own. See `g1t_contracts::credentials` for the policy. |
| 6 | //! |
| 7 | //! Credentials made for agent runs before g1t stopped running agents keep |
| 8 | //! resolving until they expire (at most six hours), so nothing in flight |
| 9 | //! breaks; no new ones are made. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | use g1t_contracts::credentials::{ |
| 12 | Acting, BindRunCredentialsArgs, CreateRunCredentialArgs, CredentialUse, Principal, RevokeRunCredentialsArgs, |
| 13 | RunBinding, RunCredentialKind, intersect, intersect_grants, operations_for, |
| 14 | }; |
| 15 | use g1t_contracts::identity::{ |
| 16 | AGENT_ID, AGENT_NAME, AgentScope, CreateAccessTokenArgs, CreatedAccessToken, |
| 17 | }; |
| 18 | use g1t_contracts::time::SQL_NOW; |
| 19 | use g1t_contracts::{PrincipalKind, User, Viewer}; |
| 20 | use worker::Result; |
| 21 | use worker::wasm_bindgen::JsValue; |
| 22 | |
| 23 | use crate::Identity; |
| 24 | |
| 25 | /// No run outlives this, whatever its caller asks for. |
| 26 | const MAX_RUN_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 6 * 60 * 60; |
| 27 | const MIN_RUN_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 60; |
| 28 | /// More hashes than one sandbox ever holds. |
| 29 | const MAX_HASHES: usize = 8; |
| 30 | |
| 31 | /// Whether a credential is still made for this kind of run and use: a |
| 32 | /// runner's, for sandbox work that is not one of the retired hosted |
| 33 | /// agents' (`RunCredentialKind::retired`). |
| 34 | fn issued_for(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> bool { |
| 35 | !kind.retired() && usage == CredentialUse::Runner |
| 36 | } |
| 37 | |
| 38 | /// A SHA-256 in lowercase hex, as tokens are stored. |
| 39 | fn is_hash(value: &str) -> bool { |
| 40 | value.len() == 64 |
| 41 | && value |
| 42 | .bytes() |
| 43 | .all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)) |
| 44 | } |
| 45 | |
| 46 | impl Identity { |
| 47 | /// The composite identity behind an agent's token: the agent, acting |
| 48 | /// for the person (or workspace) the token was made for, in the run's |
| 49 | /// workspace only, and only while that person still belongs to it. |
| 50 | pub(crate) async fn agent_principal( |
| 51 | &self, |
| 52 | credential_id: &str, |
| 53 | user_id: Option<&str>, |
| 54 | workspace_id: Option<&str>, |
| 55 | scope: AgentScope, |
| 56 | ) -> Result<Viewer> { |
| 57 | let person = match (user_id, workspace_id) { |
| 58 | (Some(id), _) => { |
| 59 | self.find_user( |
| 60 | "SELECT id, username, email_verified_at IS NOT NULL AS verified |
| 61 | FROM users WHERE id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL", |
| 62 | id, |
| 63 | ) |
| 64 | .await? |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | (None, Some(id)) => self.workspace_principal(id).await?, |
| 67 | (None, None) => None, |
| 68 | }; |
| 69 | // The person is gone: so is everything that acted for them. |
| 70 | let Some(person) = person else { |
| 71 | return Ok(None); |
| 72 | }; |
| 73 | let agent = scope |
| 74 | .run |
| 75 | .as_ref() |
| 76 | .map(|run| run.agent.clone()) |
| 77 | .unwrap_or_else(|| AGENT_NAME.to_owned()); |
| 78 | // g1t's own run: the workspace's credential, acting as g1t, so the |
| 79 | // pull request and working copy g1t opened are its own (run.system). |
| 80 | let on_behalf_of = if scope.run.as_ref().is_some_and(|run| run.system) { |
| 81 | Principal { |
| 82 | id: g1t_contracts::system::ID.to_owned(), |
| 83 | username: g1t_contracts::system::USERNAME.to_owned(), |
| 84 | } |
| 85 | } else { |
| 86 | Principal { |
| 87 | id: person.id, |
| 88 | username: person.username, |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | }; |
| 91 | Ok(Some(User { |
| 92 | id: AGENT_ID.to_owned(), |
| 93 | username: AGENT_NAME.to_owned(), |
| 94 | kind: PrincipalKind::Agent, |
| 95 | verified: person.verified, |
| 96 | workspaces: intersect(&person.workspaces, &scope.repo.namespace), |
| 97 | // The person's roles on the workspace's repositories, so an |
| 98 | // outside collaborator's agent works where they may, and never |
| 99 | // beyond Write (credentials::AGENT_CEILING). |
| 100 | grants: intersect_grants(&person.grants, &scope.repo.namespace), |
| 101 | acting: Some(Box::new(Acting { |
| 102 | credential_id: credential_id.to_owned(), |
| 103 | agent, |
| 104 | on_behalf_of, |
| 105 | scope, |
| 106 | })), |
| 107 | ..User::default() |
| 108 | })) |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | |
| 111 | pub async fn create_run_credential( |
| 112 | &self, |
| 113 | a: CreateRunCredentialArgs, |
| 114 | ) -> Result<CreatedAccessToken> { |
| 115 | if !issued_for(a.kind, a.usage) { |
| 116 | return Err(worker::Error::RustError(format!( |
| 117 | "no run credential is made for {} runs' {}", |
| 118 | a.kind.as_str(), |
| 119 | a.usage.as_str() |
| 120 | ))); |
| 121 | } |
| 122 | let agent = AGENT_NAME.to_owned(); |
| 123 | let scope = AgentScope { |
| 124 | repo: a.repo.clone(), |
| 125 | operations: operations_for(a.kind, a.usage) |
| 126 | .into_iter() |
| 127 | .map(str::to_owned) |
| 128 | .collect(), |
| 129 | run: Some(RunBinding { |
| 130 | kind: a.kind, |
| 131 | usage: a.usage, |
| 132 | run_id: None, |
| 133 | number: a.number, |
| 134 | agent: agent.clone(), |
| 135 | system: a.on_behalf_of.kind == PrincipalKind::System, |
| 136 | read: a.read, |
| 137 | push: a.push, |
| 138 | }), |
| 139 | }; |
| 140 | // g1t's own work (a security update's bump) has no person behind it: its credential acts for the workspace, |
| 141 | // as a workspace's own token would. |
| 142 | let on_behalf_of = if a.on_behalf_of.kind == PrincipalKind::System { |
| 143 | match self.workspace_id_of(&a.repo.namespace).await? { |
| 144 | Some(id) => User { |
| 145 | id, |
| 146 | username: a.repo.namespace.to_lowercase(), |
| 147 | kind: PrincipalKind::Workspace, |
| 148 | ..User::default() |
| 149 | }, |
| 150 | None => return Err(worker::Error::RustError(format!("no workspace {}", a.repo.namespace))), |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | } else { |
| 153 | a.on_behalf_of |
| 154 | }; |
| 155 | let created = self |
| 156 | .create_access_token(CreateAccessTokenArgs { |
| 157 | user: on_behalf_of, |
| 158 | name: format!( |
| 159 | "{agent}: {} run in {}/{}{}", |
| 160 | a.kind.as_str(), |
| 161 | a.repo.namespace, |
| 162 | a.repo.name, |
| 163 | a.number.map(|n| format!("#{n}")).unwrap_or_default() |
| 164 | ), |
| 165 | ttl_seconds: Some( |
| 166 | a.ttl_seconds |
| 167 | .clamp(MIN_RUN_TTL_SECONDS, MAX_RUN_TTL_SECONDS), |
| 168 | ), |
| 169 | // A run credential's scope is its run's; see agent_scope. |
| 170 | scopes: None, |
| 171 | listed: false, |
| 172 | }) |
| 173 | .await?; |
| 174 | self.db |
| 175 | .prepare("UPDATE access_tokens SET agent_scope = ? WHERE id = ?") |
| 176 | .bind(&[ |
| 177 | serde_json::to_string(&scope)?.into(), |
| 178 | created.info.id.as_str().into(), |
| 179 | ])? |
| 180 | .run() |
| 181 | .await?; |
| 182 | Ok(created) |
| 183 | } |
| 184 | |
| 185 | /// Ties a sandbox's credentials to the run it recorded. A token |
| 186 | /// already bound keeps its run. |
| 187 | pub async fn bind_run_credentials(&self, a: BindRunCredentialsArgs) -> Result<bool> { |
| 188 | let hashes: Vec<&String> = a |
| 189 | .token_hashes |
| 190 | .iter() |
| 191 | .filter(|hash| is_hash(hash)) |
| 192 | .take(MAX_HASHES) |
| 193 | .collect(); |
| 194 | if hashes.is_empty() || a.run_id.trim().is_empty() { |
| 195 | return Ok(false); |
| 196 | } |
| 197 | let marks = vec!["?"; hashes.len()].join(", "); |
| 198 | let mut values: Vec<JsValue> = vec![a.run_id.as_str().into(), a.run_id.as_str().into()]; |
| 199 | values.extend(hashes.iter().map(|hash| JsValue::from(hash.as_str()))); |
| 200 | self.db |
| 201 | .prepare(format!( |
| 202 | "UPDATE access_tokens |
| 203 | SET run_id = ?, agent_scope = json_set(agent_scope, '$.run.runId', ?) |
| 204 | WHERE token_hash IN ({marks}) AND run_id IS NULL |
| 205 | AND json_extract(agent_scope, '$.run') IS NOT NULL" |
| 206 | )) |
| 207 | .bind(&values)? |
| 208 | .run() |
| 209 | .await?; |
| 210 | Ok(true) |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | |
| 213 | /// Ends a sandbox's credentials: they stop working at once. Only run |
| 214 | /// credentials are touched. |
| 215 | pub async fn revoke_run_credentials(&self, a: RevokeRunCredentialsArgs) -> Result<bool> { |
| 216 | let hashes: Vec<&String> = a |
| 217 | .token_hashes |
| 218 | .iter() |
| 219 | .filter(|hash| is_hash(hash)) |
| 220 | .take(MAX_HASHES) |
| 221 | .collect(); |
| 222 | let mut conditions = Vec::new(); |
| 223 | let mut values: Vec<JsValue> = Vec::new(); |
| 224 | if !hashes.is_empty() { |
| 225 | conditions.push(format!( |
| 226 | "token_hash IN ({})", |
| 227 | vec!["?"; hashes.len()].join(", ") |
| 228 | )); |
| 229 | values.extend(hashes.iter().map(|hash| JsValue::from(hash.as_str()))); |
| 230 | } |
| 231 | if let Some(run_id) = a.run_id.as_deref().filter(|id| !id.trim().is_empty()) { |
| 232 | conditions.push("run_id = ?".to_owned()); |
| 233 | values.push(run_id.into()); |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | if conditions.is_empty() { |
| 236 | return Ok(false); |
| 237 | } |
| 238 | self.db |
| 239 | .prepare(format!( |
| 240 | "UPDATE access_tokens SET expires_at = {SQL_NOW} |
| 241 | WHERE ({}) AND json_extract(agent_scope, '$.run') IS NOT NULL |
| 242 | AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > {SQL_NOW})", |
| 243 | conditions.join(" OR ") |
| 244 | )) |
| 245 | .bind(&values)? |
| 246 | .run() |
| 247 | .await?; |
| 248 | Ok(true) |
| 249 | } |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | |
| 252 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 253 | mod tests { |
| 254 | use super::{CredentialUse, RunCredentialKind, is_hash, issued_for}; |
| 255 | |
| 256 | #[test] |
| 257 | fn credentials_are_made_only_for_sandbox_work_that_is_not_an_agents() { |
| 258 | let issued: Vec<&str> = RunCredentialKind::ALL |
| 259 | .iter() |
| 260 | .filter(|kind| issued_for(**kind, CredentialUse::Runner)) |
| 261 | .map(|kind| kind.as_str()) |
| 262 | .collect(); |
| 263 | assert_eq!(issued, ["checks", "queue", "mergecheck", "deploy", "bump"]); |
| 264 | // A retired hosted agent's tools token is never made. |
| 265 | assert!(RunCredentialKind::ALL.iter().all(|kind| !issued_for(*kind, CredentialUse::Tools))); |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | |
| 268 | #[test] |
| 269 | fn only_hashes_are_taken() { |
| 270 | assert!(is_hash(&"a1".repeat(32))); |
| 271 | assert!(!is_hash(&"A1".repeat(32))); |
| 272 | assert!(!is_hash("g1t_0123")); |
| 273 | assert!(!is_hash(&"0".repeat(63))); |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | } |