| 1 | /** |
| 2 | * Guardrails, as the runner applies them to a sandbox: what it may reach, |
| 3 | * what its harness refuses, and how long and how much a run may take. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * - The network list is enforced here, outside the sandbox: a guarded |
| 6 | * sandbox starts with no internet, and every HTTP(S) request it makes |
| 7 | * comes to `egress` below, which forwards it or refuses it. |
| 8 | * - Command rules and the cost cap are handed to the harness inside the |
| 9 | * sandbox as `GUARDRAILS`, which applies them to the agent. |
| 10 | * - The time cap is enforced twice: by the harness, and by the sandbox's |
| 11 | * own alarm here, which stops the whole sandbox a little after. |
| 12 | */ |
| 13 | import type { OutboundHandlerContext } from "@cloudflare/containers"; |
| 14 | |
| 15 | import { type RepoPath, type RunKind, type ServiceBinding, guardrailsClient } from "@g1t/contracts"; |
| 16 | |
| 17 | import { |
| 18 | ABUSE_HOST, |
| 19 | type ModelHosts, |
| 20 | type RunGuard, |
| 21 | type WorkflowJob, |
| 22 | allows, |
| 23 | buildHosts, |
| 24 | jobHosts, |
| 25 | refusal, |
| 26 | sandboxHosts, |
| 27 | sandboxNamespace, |
| 28 | } from "./egress"; |
| 29 | import { type BrokeredParams, brokered } from "./broker-egress.ts"; |
| 30 | |
| 31 | export { |
| 32 | ABUSE_EXIT_CODE, |
| 33 | ABUSE_HOST, |
| 34 | ABUSE_MESSAGE, |
| 35 | SANDBOX_BINDINGS, |
| 36 | dockerFor, |
| 37 | harnessEnv, |
| 38 | jobHosts, |
| 39 | newlyBlocked, |
| 40 | sandboxNamespace, |
| 41 | timeCapMessage, |
| 42 | withPlanLimits, |
| 43 | } from "./egress"; |
| 44 | export type { PlanLimits, RunGuard, WorkflowJob } from "./egress"; |
| 45 | |
| 46 | /** |
| 47 | * What the outbound handler is given: the hosts this sandbox may reach, |
| 48 | * and what brokered secrets need (broker-egress.ts). |
| 49 | */ |
| 50 | export type EgressParams = { hosts: string[] } & BrokeredParams; |
| 51 | |
| 52 | |
| 53 | /** The stop by the sandbox's alarm comes this long after the harness's own. */ |
| 54 | export const ALARM_GRACE_SECONDS = 3 * 60; |
| 55 | |
| 56 | /** |
| 57 | * The guardrails of a run in `repo`. Throws when they cannot be read: a |
| 58 | * sandbox is not started without them. |
| 59 | */ |
| 60 | export async function guardFor(work: ServiceBinding, repo: RepoPath, kind: RunKind): Promise<RunGuard> { |
| 61 | const found = await guardrailsClient(work).runGuardrails(repo); |
| 62 | if (!found.ok) throw new Error(`g1t could not read this project's guardrails: ${found.error.message}`); |
| 63 | const policy = found.value; |
| 64 | return { policy, minutes: policy.minutes[kind] ?? 60 }; |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | |
| 67 | /** |
| 68 | * The guardrails of a workflow job, deploy build or security update in |
| 69 | * `repo`: its project's network list, plus what builds need (`buildHosts`), and the |
| 70 | * time cap it was given. `repo` is the project, not a pull request's |
| 71 | * working copy; `repoId`, when known, finds it however it has moved. |
| 72 | * A workflow job of a trusted run also gets the workflow-only domains |
| 73 | * that name its workflow and environment (`jobHosts`); nothing else |
| 74 | * ever does. Throws when they cannot be read: no build starts without them. |
| 75 | */ |
| 76 | export async function buildGuardFor( |
| 77 | work: ServiceBinding, |
| 78 | repo: RepoPath, |
| 79 | kind: "actions" | "deploy" | "bump", |
| 80 | minutes: number, |
| 81 | repoId?: string | null, |
| 82 | job?: WorkflowJob | null, |
| 83 | extra: readonly string[] = [], |
| 84 | ): Promise<RunGuard> { |
| 85 | const found = await guardrailsClient(work).runGuardrails(repo, repoId); |
| 86 | if (!found.ok) throw new Error(`g1t could not read this project's guardrails: ${found.error.message}`); |
| 87 | const policy = found.value; |
| 88 | const hosts = [...policy.hosts, ...buildHosts(kind), ...jobHosts(policy, kind, job), ...extra]; |
| 89 | return { policy: { ...policy, hosts: [...new Set(hosts)] }, minutes }; |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | |
| 92 | |
| 93 | /** Every host the sandbox may reach, for the outbound handler. */ |
| 94 | export function egressHosts(guard: RunGuard, env: ModelHosts, sandboxEnv: Record<string, string>): string[] { |
| 95 | return sandboxHosts(guard.policy.hosts, env, sandboxEnv); |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | |
| 98 | /** |
| 99 | * The outbound handler of a guarded sandbox: every HTTP and HTTPS request |
| 100 | * it makes. An allowed host is fetched as asked; any other is refused, and |
| 101 | * the sandbox told so it can say so on the run. |
| 102 | */ |
| 103 | export async function egress( |
| 104 | request: Request, |
| 105 | env: { SANDBOX: DurableObjectNamespace; ACTIONS?: ServiceBinding }, |
| 106 | ctx: OutboundHandlerContext<EgressParams>, |
| 107 | ): Promise<Response> { |
| 108 | const host = new URL(request.url).host; |
| 109 | // A sandbox reporting that it stopped itself for mining. |
| 110 | if (host === ABUSE_HOST) return abuse(request, env, ctx); |
| 111 | if (ctx.params?.open || allows(ctx.params?.hosts ?? [], host)) { |
| 112 | // A workflow job's brokered secrets are filled in first, if it has any. |
| 113 | return (await brokered(request, env, ctx)) ?? fetch(request); |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | try { |
| 116 | const namespace = sandboxNamespace(env, ctx.className); |
| 117 | const sandbox = namespace.get(namespace.idFromString(ctx.containerId)) as unknown as { |
| 118 | noteBlocked(host: string): Promise<void>; |
| 119 | }; |
| 120 | await sandbox.noteBlocked(host); |
| 121 | } catch (error) { |
| 122 | console.log("blocked host not reported", host, String(error)); |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | return refusal(host); |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | |
| 127 | /** |
| 128 | * A sandbox's report that it stopped itself for mining (crates/runner |
| 129 | * abuse.rs), handed to its Durable Object. Reached through `egress` for a |
| 130 | * guarded sandbox and as the handler for `ABUSE_HOST` for any other. |
| 131 | */ |
| 132 | export async function abuse( |
| 133 | request: Request, |
| 134 | env: { SANDBOX: DurableObjectNamespace }, |
| 135 | ctx: OutboundHandlerContext<unknown>, |
| 136 | ): Promise<Response> { |
| 137 | let verdict: unknown = null; |
| 138 | try { |
| 139 | verdict = ((await request.json()) as { verdict?: unknown }).verdict ?? null; |
| 140 | } catch { |
| 141 | // A report without its metrics still stops the run. |
| 142 | } |
| 143 | try { |
| 144 | const namespace = sandboxNamespace(env, ctx.className); |
| 145 | const sandbox = namespace.get(namespace.idFromString(ctx.containerId)) as unknown as { |
| 146 | flagAbuse(verdict: unknown): Promise<void>; |
| 147 | }; |
| 148 | await sandbox.flagAbuse(verdict); |
| 149 | } catch (error) { |
| 150 | console.log("abuse report not handled", String(error)); |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | return new Response("noted\n"); |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | /** Adds a step to a run, with its token. Never fails the caller. */ |
| 156 | export async function reportRun( |
| 157 | work: ServiceBinding, |
| 158 | tracked: { runId: string; token: string }, |
| 159 | report: { steps?: string[]; halt?: "budget" | "time" | "abuse"; error?: string }, |
| 160 | ): Promise<void> { |
| 161 | await work |
| 162 | .fetch("https://service/rpc/report_run", { |
| 163 | method: "POST", |
| 164 | headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, |
| 165 | body: JSON.stringify({ runId: tracked.runId, token: tracked.token, ...report }), |
| 166 | }) |
| 167 | .catch((error: unknown) => console.log("run report failed", tracked.runId, String(error))); |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | |