| 1 | //! Run credentials: the least-privilege tokens a sandbox works with. |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! Every sandbox run (checks, the merge queue, a merge check, a deployment, |
| 4 | //! a security update's bump) gets its own tokens, bound to the run, its |
| 5 | //! repository, what that kind of run needs to do, and an expiry no later |
| 6 | //! than the run's timeout. Each carries a composite identity: g1t acting on |
| 7 | //! behalf of the person who started the work. What it may do is the |
| 8 | //! intersection of the two: the run's scope, and what that person may do |
| 9 | //! right now. |
| 10 | //! |
| 11 | //! A session g1t starts on an agent's harness (Claude Managed Agents) holds |
| 12 | //! one too, of the kind `session`: what it does over the API, MCP and the |
| 13 | //! CLI is recorded as g1t's, for that person, and git takes its pushes as |
| 14 | //! theirs. See [`RunCredentialKind::Session`]. |
| 15 | //! |
| 16 | //! g1t's retired hosted agents had run credentials too (`implement`, |
| 17 | //! `revise`, `review`, `answer`, `update`, `plan`). Those kinds still parse, |
| 18 | //! so stored tokens and the history they wrote read as before, but no |
| 19 | //! credential is made for them and they grant nothing |
| 20 | //! ([`RunCredentialKind::retired`]). |
| 21 | //! |
| 22 | //! The policy lives here, as pure functions, so that identity (which mints |
| 23 | //! the tokens), the API (which serves REST and MCP) and repos (which serves |
| 24 | //! git) all enforce the same rules, and so the rules can be tested. |
| 25 | |
| 26 | use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; |
| 27 | |
| 28 | use crate::identity::AgentScope; |
| 29 | use crate::repos::RepoPath; |
| 30 | use crate::access::{BasePermission, RepoGrant, RepoRole}; |
| 31 | use crate::{Membership, PrincipalKind, Role, User}; |
| 32 | |
| 33 | /// What a run does, as far as its credentials are concerned. |
| 34 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 35 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 36 | pub enum RunCredentialKind { |
| 37 | /// Retired with g1t's hosted agents, as are `revise`, `review`, |
| 38 | /// `answer`, `update` and `plan`: kept so stored tokens parse; never |
| 39 | /// issued, and they grant nothing. |
| 40 | Implement, |
| 41 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 42 | Revise, |
| 43 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 44 | Review, |
| 45 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 46 | Answer, |
| 47 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 48 | Update, |
| 49 | /// Retired: see [`RunCredentialKind::Implement`]. |
| 50 | Plan, |
| 51 | Checks, |
| 52 | Queue, |
| 53 | Mergecheck, |
| 54 | Deploy, |
| 55 | /// A security update: raising one package's version in its lockfiles |
| 56 | /// and pushing that to a branch of its own. Not an agent. |
| 57 | Bump, |
| 58 | /// A session g1t started on an agent's harness (Claude Managed Agents) |
| 59 | /// for the person who asked, on one issue or pull request. It works |
| 60 | /// through the API, MCP and the CLI with what [`SESSION_SCOPES`] allow, |
| 61 | /// in its repository only, and pushes to that repository and its pull |
| 62 | /// requests' working copies. What it writes (comments, reviews, closes, |
| 63 | /// the issues and pull requests it opens) is g1t's, for that person; |
| 64 | /// what it may do is that person's role there, never beyond |
| 65 | /// [`AGENT_CEILING`]. |
| 66 | Session, |
| 67 | } |
| 68 | |
| 69 | impl RunCredentialKind { |
| 70 | pub const ALL: [RunCredentialKind; 12] = [ |
| 71 | RunCredentialKind::Implement, |
| 72 | RunCredentialKind::Revise, |
| 73 | RunCredentialKind::Review, |
| 74 | RunCredentialKind::Answer, |
| 75 | RunCredentialKind::Update, |
| 76 | RunCredentialKind::Plan, |
| 77 | RunCredentialKind::Checks, |
| 78 | RunCredentialKind::Queue, |
| 79 | RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck, |
| 80 | RunCredentialKind::Deploy, |
| 81 | RunCredentialKind::Bump, |
| 82 | RunCredentialKind::Session, |
| 83 | ]; |
| 84 | |
| 85 | pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { |
| 86 | match self { |
| 87 | RunCredentialKind::Implement => "implement", |
| 88 | RunCredentialKind::Revise => "revise", |
| 89 | RunCredentialKind::Review => "review", |
| 90 | RunCredentialKind::Answer => "answer", |
| 91 | RunCredentialKind::Update => "update", |
| 92 | RunCredentialKind::Plan => "plan", |
| 93 | RunCredentialKind::Checks => "checks", |
| 94 | RunCredentialKind::Queue => "queue", |
| 95 | RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck => "mergecheck", |
| 96 | RunCredentialKind::Deploy => "deploy", |
| 97 | RunCredentialKind::Bump => "bump", |
| 98 | RunCredentialKind::Session => "session", |
| 99 | } |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /// Whether this kind was one of g1t's retired hosted agents' runs: it |
| 103 | /// still parses, but no credential is made for it and it grants |
| 104 | /// nothing. |
| 105 | pub fn retired(self) -> bool { |
| 106 | matches!( |
| 107 | self, |
| 108 | RunCredentialKind::Implement |
| 109 | | RunCredentialKind::Revise |
| 110 | | RunCredentialKind::Review |
| 111 | | RunCredentialKind::Answer |
| 112 | | RunCredentialKind::Update |
| 113 | | RunCredentialKind::Plan |
| 114 | ) |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | /// Which part of a sandbox a credential is for. |
| 119 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 120 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 121 | pub enum CredentialUse { |
| 122 | /// g1t's runner: cloning, fetching and pushing what the run needs. It |
| 123 | /// acts as the person downstream, so that what it pushes is theirs, |
| 124 | /// within the run's scope. A session's is also its agent's token for |
| 125 | /// the API, MCP and the CLI. |
| 126 | Runner, |
| 127 | /// A retired hosted agent's own tools, over MCP. Kept so stored tokens |
| 128 | /// parse; never issued. |
| 129 | Tools, |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | |
| 132 | impl CredentialUse { |
| 133 | pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str { |
| 134 | match self { |
| 135 | CredentialUse::Runner => "runner", |
| 136 | CredentialUse::Tools => "tools", |
| 137 | } |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | } |
| 140 | |
| 141 | /// A repository a run may push to, and the one branch, if only one. |
| 142 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 143 | pub struct GitGrant { |
| 144 | pub repo: RepoPath, |
| 145 | /// Null: any branch. A pull request's fork is its own repository, so |
| 146 | /// the whole of it is the pull request's. |
| 147 | #[serde(default)] |
| 148 | pub branch: Option<String>, |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | |
| 151 | /// What binds a token to one run. Absent on tokens g1t's retired hosted |
| 152 | /// agents were issued before run credentials. |
| 153 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 154 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 155 | pub struct RunBinding { |
| 156 | pub kind: RunCredentialKind, |
| 157 | #[serde(rename = "use")] |
| 158 | pub usage: CredentialUse, |
| 159 | /// The run, once the sandbox has recorded it. |
| 160 | #[serde(default)] |
| 161 | pub run_id: Option<String>, |
| 162 | /// The pull request the run works on, for the kinds that work on one. |
| 163 | #[serde(default)] |
| 164 | pub number: Option<u32>, |
| 165 | /// Who acts, as the audit log names it: `g1t`. |
| 166 | pub agent: String, |
| 167 | /// Repositories it may clone and fetch, besides those it may push to. |
| 168 | #[serde(default)] |
| 169 | pub read: Vec<RepoPath>, |
| 170 | /// Where it may push. |
| 171 | #[serde(default)] |
| 172 | pub push: Vec<GitGrant>, |
| 173 | /// g1t's own run (a security update): the |
| 174 | /// credential belongs to the workspace, and acts on behalf of g1t |
| 175 | /// (`system::ID`), so what it does is g1t's, and the pull request g1t |
| 176 | /// opened, and its working copy, are its own. |
| 177 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")] |
| 178 | pub system: bool, |
| 179 | } |
| 180 | |
| 181 | /// A person, by id and name. |
| 182 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 183 | pub struct Principal { |
| 184 | pub id: String, |
| 185 | pub username: String, |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | impl From<&User> for Principal { |
| 189 | fn from(user: &User) -> Self { |
| 190 | Principal { |
| 191 | id: user.id.clone(), |
| 192 | username: user.username.clone(), |
| 193 | } |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | |
| 197 | /// Set on a [`User`] resolved from a run credential: the composite |
| 198 | /// identity, "g1t on behalf of syntaqx", and what it may do. |
| 199 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 200 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 201 | pub struct Acting { |
| 202 | /// The token's id, as audit entries name it. |
| 203 | pub credential_id: String, |
| 204 | pub agent: String, |
| 205 | pub on_behalf_of: Principal, |
| 206 | pub scope: AgentScope, |
| 207 | } |
| 208 | |
| 209 | impl Acting { |
| 210 | pub fn run(&self) -> Option<&RunBinding> { |
| 211 | self.scope.run.as_ref() |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | } |
| 214 | |
| 215 | /// `create_run_credential`: a token for one sandbox run. It acts as g1t on |
| 216 | /// behalf of `on_behalf_of`, can do only what `kind` and `usage` allow in |
| 217 | /// `repo`, and expires after `ttl_seconds`, which should be the run's |
| 218 | /// timeout. A [retired](RunCredentialKind::retired) kind is refused. |
| 219 | /// Returns `CreatedAccessToken`. |
| 220 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 221 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 222 | pub struct CreateRunCredentialArgs { |
| 223 | pub on_behalf_of: User, |
| 224 | pub repo: RepoPath, |
| 225 | pub kind: RunCredentialKind, |
| 226 | #[serde(rename = "use")] |
| 227 | pub usage: CredentialUse, |
| 228 | #[serde(default)] |
| 229 | pub number: Option<u32>, |
| 230 | #[serde(default)] |
| 231 | pub read: Vec<RepoPath>, |
| 232 | #[serde(default)] |
| 233 | pub push: Vec<GitGrant>, |
| 234 | pub ttl_seconds: u64, |
| 235 | } |
| 236 | |
| 237 | /// `bind_run_credentials`: ties tokens, named by the SHA-256 of their |
| 238 | /// text in hex, to the run their sandbox recorded. Returns how many. |
| 239 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 240 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 241 | pub struct BindRunCredentialsArgs { |
| 242 | pub token_hashes: Vec<String>, |
| 243 | pub run_id: String, |
| 244 | } |
| 245 | |
| 246 | /// `revoke_run_credentials`: ends tokens when their sandbox stops, by hash |
| 247 | /// or by run. Only run credentials are touched, never a token a person |
| 248 | /// made. Returns how many. |
| 249 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 250 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 251 | pub struct RevokeRunCredentialsArgs { |
| 252 | #[serde(default)] |
| 253 | pub token_hashes: Vec<String>, |
| 254 | #[serde(default)] |
| 255 | pub run_id: Option<String>, |
| 256 | } |
| 257 | |
| 258 | // --- Policy -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 259 | |
| 260 | /// Operations that only read. |
| 261 | pub const READ_OPERATIONS: &[&str] = &[ |
| 262 | "whoami", |
| 263 | "get_usage", |
| 264 | "get_budget", |
| 265 | "list_invoices", |
| 266 | "get_billing_details", |
| 267 | "list_repos", |
| 268 | "get_repo", |
| 269 | "list_forks", |
| 270 | "list_repo_commit_comments", |
| 271 | "list_commit_comments", |
| 272 | "list_projects", |
| 273 | "get_project", |
| 274 | "get_deployment_settings", |
| 275 | "list_deleted_repos", |
| 276 | "list_collaborators", |
| 277 | "get_collaborator_permission", |
| 278 | "list_repo_invitations", |
| 279 | "list_my_repo_invitations", |
| 280 | "list_outside_collaborators", |
| 281 | "list_teams", |
| 282 | "get_team", |
| 283 | "list_team_members", |
| 284 | "list_child_teams", |
| 285 | "list_team_repos", |
| 286 | "list_user_teams", |
| 287 | "get_codeowners_errors", |
| 288 | "get_repo_settings", |
| 289 | "list_check_names", |
| 290 | "get_merge_queue", |
| 291 | "get_pull_request_merge_options", |
| 292 | "list_issues", |
| 293 | "get_issue", |
| 294 | "list_labels", |
| 295 | "list_issue_labels", |
| 296 | "list_milestones", |
| 297 | "get_milestone", |
| 298 | "list_pull_requests", |
| 299 | "get_pull_request", |
| 300 | "read_session", |
| 301 | "list_decisions", |
| 302 | "why", |
| 303 | "get_pull_request_changes", |
| 304 | "list_events", |
| 305 | "get_context", |
| 306 | "search", |
| 307 | "list_workflows", |
| 308 | "get_workflow", |
| 309 | "list_workflow_runs", |
| 310 | "get_workflow_run", |
| 311 | "get_job_logs", |
| 312 | "get_pending_deployments", |
| 313 | "get_workflow_permissions", |
| 314 | "get_fork_pr_approval", |
| 315 | "get_actions_permissions", |
| 316 | "list_commit_statuses", |
| 317 | "get_combined_status", |
| 318 | "list_check_runs_for_ref", |
| 319 | "get_check_run", |
| 320 | "list_check_run_annotations", |
| 321 | "list_check_suites_for_ref", |
| 322 | "get_check_suite", |
| 323 | "list_integrations", |
| 324 | "list_ai_providers", |
| 325 | "get_ask_settings", |
| 326 | "list_webhooks", |
| 327 | "list_webhook_deliveries", |
| 328 | "list_actions_secrets", |
| 329 | "list_actions_variables", |
| 330 | "list_security_alerts", |
| 331 | "list_secret_scanning_alerts", |
| 332 | "get_secret_scanning_alert", |
| 333 | "list_secret_scanning_locations", |
| 334 | "list_bypass_requests", |
| 335 | "list_custom_patterns", |
| 336 | "list_code_scanning_alerts", |
| 337 | "get_code_scanning_alert", |
| 338 | "list_code_scanning_analyses", |
| 339 | "get_sarif_upload", |
| 340 | "list_vulnerability_alerts", |
| 341 | "get_vulnerability_alert", |
| 342 | "get_dependency_graph", |
| 343 | "get_sbom", |
| 344 | "compare_dependencies", |
| 345 | "get_security_settings", |
| 346 | "get_workspace_security_settings", |
| 347 | "get_security_overview", |
| 348 | "list_security_advisories", |
| 349 | "get_security_advisory", |
| 350 | "list_vulnerability_reports", |
| 351 | "list_notifications", |
| 352 | "get_notification_thread", |
| 353 | "get_thread_subscription", |
| 354 | "get_repo_subscription", |
| 355 | "list_watched_repos", |
| 356 | "list_pinned_projects", |
| 357 | ]; |
| 358 | |
| 359 | /// What no run credential may ever do, whatever its scope says: |
| 360 | /// workspaces, repositories' settings, members, tokens, billing, |
| 361 | /// integrations, AI providers, webhooks, secrets, workflows' controls and merging. |
| 362 | pub const NEVER: &[&str] = &[ |
| 363 | // Billing is people's: runs never spend or change it. |
| 364 | "set_budget", |
| 365 | "create_workspace", |
| 366 | "delete_workspace", |
| 367 | "update_workspace", |
| 368 | // So is who belongs to a workspace and who owns it. |
| 369 | "list_members", |
| 370 | "update_member", |
| 371 | "remove_member", |
| 372 | "transfer_ownership", |
| 373 | "leave_workspace", |
| 374 | "transfer_repo", |
| 375 | "create_repo", |
| 376 | "fork_repo", |
| 377 | "sync_fork", |
| 378 | "detach_fork", |
| 379 | "update_repo", |
| 380 | "update_project", |
| 381 | // Turning a project's deployments on starts paid work; off, takes it down. |
| 382 | "update_deployment_settings", |
| 383 | "delete_repo", |
| 384 | "list_deleted_repos", |
| 385 | "restore_repo", |
| 386 | "purge_repo", |
| 387 | "rename_repo", |
| 388 | "archive_repo", |
| 389 | "unarchive_repo", |
| 390 | "set_repo_visibility", |
| 391 | "rename_branch", |
| 392 | "delete_branch", |
| 393 | "update_repo_settings", |
| 394 | "merge_pull_request", |
| 395 | // Merging later, as a person asked, is merging; and a merged pull |
| 396 | // request's branch is deleted or restored by people. |
| 397 | "enable_pull_request_auto_merge", |
| 398 | "disable_pull_request_auto_merge", |
| 399 | "delete_pull_request_head_branch", |
| 400 | "restore_pull_request_head_branch", |
| 401 | "import_issue", |
| 402 | "list_integrations", |
| 403 | "connect_integration", |
| 404 | "update_integration", |
| 405 | "disconnect_integration", |
| 406 | "test_integration", |
| 407 | // A workspace's AI: its providers' keys, and what Ask answers with. |
| 408 | "list_ai_providers", |
| 409 | "add_ai_provider", |
| 410 | "update_ai_provider", |
| 411 | "remove_ai_provider", |
| 412 | "test_ai_provider", |
| 413 | "get_ask_settings", |
| 414 | "set_ask_settings", |
| 415 | "list_webhooks", |
| 416 | "create_webhook", |
| 417 | "update_webhook", |
| 418 | "delete_webhook", |
| 419 | "ping_webhook", |
| 420 | "list_webhook_deliveries", |
| 421 | "redeliver_webhook", |
| 422 | "dispatch_workflow", |
| 423 | "cancel_workflow_run", |
| 424 | "rerun_workflow_run", |
| 425 | "update_workflow", |
| 426 | // Nor lets runs or deployments through, or changes what holds them. |
| 427 | "approve_workflow_run", |
| 428 | "review_pending_deployments", |
| 429 | "update_environment", |
| 430 | "delete_environment", |
| 431 | "set_workflow_permissions", |
| 432 | "set_fork_pr_approval", |
| 433 | "set_actions_access", |
| 434 | "set_actions_permissions", |
| 435 | "create_repository_dispatch", |
| 436 | "set_workspace_workflow_permissions", |
| 437 | // An agent never reports checks on its own work, nor asks for them |
| 438 | // to run again: what checks say is the integrations' to say. |
| 439 | "create_commit_status", |
| 440 | "create_check_run", |
| 441 | "update_check_run", |
| 442 | "rerequest_check_run", |
| 443 | "rerequest_check_suite", |
| 444 | "list_actions_secrets", |
| 445 | "set_actions_secret", |
| 446 | "delete_actions_secret", |
| 447 | "list_actions_variables", |
| 448 | "set_actions_variable", |
| 449 | "delete_actions_variable", |
| 450 | "list_collaborators", |
| 451 | "get_collaborator_permission", |
| 452 | "add_collaborator", |
| 453 | "update_collaborator", |
| 454 | "remove_collaborator", |
| 455 | "list_repo_invitations", |
| 456 | "revoke_repo_invitation", |
| 457 | "list_my_repo_invitations", |
| 458 | "accept_repo_invitation", |
| 459 | "decline_repo_invitation", |
| 460 | // Nor answers a workspace invitation: only the person it is for does. |
| 461 | "accept_invitation", |
| 462 | "decline_invitation", |
| 463 | "set_base_permission", |
| 464 | "list_outside_collaborators", |
| 465 | // Deploy keys, which let a machine into a repository. |
| 466 | "list_deploy_keys", |
| 467 | "get_deploy_key", |
| 468 | "create_deploy_key", |
| 469 | "delete_deploy_key", |
| 470 | // Teams: who is in which, and what they reach, is for people. |
| 471 | "create_team", |
| 472 | "update_team", |
| 473 | "delete_team", |
| 474 | "set_team_member", |
| 475 | "remove_team_member", |
| 476 | "set_team_repo", |
| 477 | "remove_team_repo", |
| 478 | "set_team_review_assignment", |
| 479 | // Dismissing a secret lets it through push protection. |
| 480 | "dismiss_security_alert", |
| 481 | "reopen_security_alert", |
| 482 | // Nor any other decision about security: closing or reopening an |
| 483 | // alert, pushing past push protection or deciding who may, or changing |
| 484 | // what is looked for or when checks fail. |
| 485 | "update_secret_scanning_alert", |
| 486 | "bypass_push_protection", |
| 487 | "review_bypass_request", |
| 488 | "create_custom_pattern", |
| 489 | "update_custom_pattern", |
| 490 | "delete_custom_pattern", |
| 491 | "update_code_scanning_alert", |
| 492 | "update_vulnerability_alert", |
| 493 | "update_security_settings", |
| 494 | "update_workspace_security_settings", |
| 495 | // A person's own inbox: a run acts as g1t, which has none. |
| 496 | "list_notifications", |
| 497 | "get_notification_thread", |
| 498 | "mark_notifications_read", |
| 499 | "mark_thread_read", |
| 500 | "mark_thread_done", |
| 501 | "save_thread", |
| 502 | "snooze_thread", |
| 503 | "get_thread_subscription", |
| 504 | "set_thread_subscription", |
| 505 | "delete_thread_subscription", |
| 506 | "get_repo_subscription", |
| 507 | "set_repo_subscription", |
| 508 | "delete_repo_subscription", |
| 509 | "list_watched_repos", |
| 510 | // Pins are a person's own, as the inbox is, and so is Getting started. |
| 511 | "get_onboarding", |
| 512 | "update_onboarding", |
| 513 | "list_pinned_projects", |
| 514 | "pin_project", |
| 515 | "unpin_project", |
| 516 | "reorder_pinned_projects", |
| 517 | // Deleting packages and deciding who may use them is for people: an |
| 518 | // agent publishes its repository's packages and never deletes them. |
| 519 | "update_package", |
| 520 | "link_package", |
| 521 | "unlink_package", |
| 522 | "set_package_access", |
| 523 | "remove_package_access", |
| 524 | "set_package_actions_access", |
| 525 | "remove_package_actions_access", |
| 526 | "delete_package", |
| 527 | "restore_package", |
| 528 | "delete_package_version", |
| 529 | "restore_package_version", |
| 530 | // Sharing an artifact and deleting one for good are for people. |
| 531 | "set_workspace_artifact_access", |
| 532 | "purge_workspace_artifact", |
| 533 | ]; |
| 534 | |
| 535 | pub fn is_read(operation: &str) -> bool { |
| 536 | READ_OPERATIONS.contains(&operation) |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | |
| 539 | /// The scopes of a session's credential ([`RunCredentialKind::Session`]): |
| 540 | /// what working on an issue needs, named as an access token's are. |
| 541 | pub const SESSION_SCOPES: [&str; 8] = [ |
| 542 | "repo:read", |
| 543 | "code:write", |
| 544 | "issues:write", |
| 545 | "pull_requests:write", |
| 546 | "checks:read", |
| 547 | "workflows:read", |
| 548 | "deployments:read", |
| 549 | "observability:read", |
| 550 | ]; |
| 551 | |
| 552 | /// The API and MCP operations a run of `kind` may use with a credential |
| 553 | /// for `usage`. Git is separate: see [`decide_git`]. A session's may use |
| 554 | /// every operation [`SESSION_SCOPES`] allow, and never one in [`NEVER`]; |
| 555 | /// every other run still issued works through git alone, and a |
| 556 | /// [retired](RunCredentialKind::retired) kind grants nothing. A stored |
| 557 | /// token keeps the operations it was made with until it expires. |
| 558 | pub fn operations_for(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<&'static str> { |
| 559 | use crate::scopes::{NO_SCOPE, OPERATIONS, Scope}; |
| 560 | if kind != RunCredentialKind::Session || usage != CredentialUse::Runner { |
| 561 | return Vec::new(); |
| 562 | } |
| 563 | let held: Vec<Scope> = SESSION_SCOPES.iter().filter_map(|scope| Scope::parse(scope)).collect(); |
| 564 | NO_SCOPE |
| 565 | .iter() |
| 566 | .copied() |
| 567 | .chain( |
| 568 | OPERATIONS |
| 569 | .iter() |
| 570 | .filter(|(_, needed)| held.iter().any(|scope| scope.includes(*needed))) |
| 571 | .map(|(name, _)| *name), |
| 572 | ) |
| 573 | .filter(|name| !NEVER.contains(name)) |
| 574 | .collect() |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | |
| 577 | /// What a run's credential may do, in the scope vocabulary that access |
| 578 | /// tokens use (see [`crate::scopes`]): the scopes of its operations, and |
| 579 | /// for a runner, git's. Its operations, its repository and its run still |
| 580 | /// bound it more tightly than these scopes say. |
| 581 | pub fn run_scopes(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<crate::scopes::Scope> { |
| 582 | use crate::scopes::{Scope, normalize, scope_for}; |
| 583 | let mut scopes: Vec<Scope> = operations_for(kind, usage) |
| 584 | .into_iter() |
| 585 | .filter_map(scope_for) |
| 586 | .collect(); |
| 587 | if usage == CredentialUse::Runner && !kind.retired() { |
| 588 | scopes.push(Scope::CodeRead); |
| 589 | if matches!(kind, RunCredentialKind::Bump | RunCredentialKind::Session) { |
| 590 | scopes.push(Scope::CodeWrite); |
| 591 | } |
| 592 | } |
| 593 | normalize(&mut scopes); |
| 594 | scopes |
| 595 | } |
| 596 | |
| 597 | /// Operations that change a pull request, which a runner may do only to |
| 598 | /// the pull request its run works on. |
| 599 | const PULL_WRITES: &[&str] = &["record_session", "record_decision", "mark_pull_request_ready"]; |
| 600 | |
| 601 | /// Whether something was allowed, and the rule that decided it. |
| 602 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 603 | pub struct Decision { |
| 604 | pub allowed: bool, |
| 605 | /// A short, stable name: `run:implement/tools`, `never`, |
| 606 | /// `scope:repository` and so on. Shown in the audit log. |
| 607 | pub rule: String, |
| 608 | /// Why it was refused, for the caller. |
| 609 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] |
| 610 | pub reason: Option<String>, |
| 611 | } |
| 612 | |
| 613 | impl Decision { |
| 614 | pub fn allow(rule: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 615 | Decision { |
| 616 | allowed: true, |
| 617 | rule: rule.into(), |
| 618 | reason: None, |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | } |
| 621 | |
| 622 | pub fn deny(rule: impl Into<String>, reason: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 623 | Decision { |
| 624 | allowed: false, |
| 625 | rule: rule.into(), |
| 626 | reason: Some(reason.into()), |
| 627 | } |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | } |
| 630 | |
| 631 | fn same_repo(a: &RepoPath, b: &RepoPath) -> bool { |
| 632 | a.namespace.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.namespace) && a.name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.name) |
| 633 | } |
| 634 | |
| 635 | fn scope_rule(scope: &AgentScope) -> String { |
| 636 | match &scope.run { |
| 637 | Some(run) => format!("run:{}/{}", run.kind.as_str(), run.usage.as_str()), |
| 638 | None => "agent-token".to_owned(), |
| 639 | } |
| 640 | } |
| 641 | |
| 642 | /// Whether `user`, resolved from a run credential with `scope`, may use |
| 643 | /// `operation`. `repo` is the repository the call names, if any, and |
| 644 | /// `needs_repo` whether the operation is about one; `number` the issue or |
| 645 | /// pull request it names. |
| 646 | pub fn decide_operation( |
| 647 | user: &User, |
| 648 | scope: &AgentScope, |
| 649 | operation: &str, |
| 650 | repo: Option<&RepoPath>, |
| 651 | needs_repo: bool, |
| 652 | number: Option<u32>, |
| 653 | ) -> Decision { |
| 654 | let who = "A run's token"; |
| 655 | if NEVER.contains(&operation) { |
| 656 | return Decision::deny( |
| 657 | "never", |
| 658 | format!( |
| 659 | "{who} can never use {operation}: settings, members, tokens, billing, integrations, webhooks, secrets and merging are for people." |
| 660 | ), |
| 661 | ); |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | if !scope.operations.iter().any(|name| name == operation) { |
| 664 | return Decision::deny( |
| 665 | "scope:operation", |
| 666 | format!("{who} for this run cannot use {operation}."), |
| 667 | ); |
| 668 | } |
| 669 | if needs_repo && !repo.is_some_and(|asked| same_repo(asked, &scope.repo)) { |
| 670 | return Decision::deny( |
| 671 | "scope:repository", |
| 672 | format!( |
| 673 | "{who} works in {}/{} only.", |
| 674 | scope.repo.namespace, scope.repo.name |
| 675 | ), |
| 676 | ); |
| 677 | } |
| 678 | // The intersection: the person it acts for must still be able to work |
| 679 | // in the repository's workspace, as a member or with a role on its |
| 680 | // repositories. What it may do in the repository itself is their |
| 681 | // role there, which services check (`access::can`). |
| 682 | if !crate::access::has_access_in(user, &scope.repo.namespace) { |
| 683 | return Decision::deny( |
| 684 | "on-behalf-of:membership", |
| 685 | format!( |
| 686 | "The person this run works for is no longer a member of {}.", |
| 687 | scope.repo.namespace |
| 688 | ), |
| 689 | ); |
| 690 | } |
| 691 | if let Some(run) = &scope.run |
| 692 | && run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner |
| 693 | && PULL_WRITES.contains(&operation) |
| 694 | && run.number.is_some() |
| 695 | && number != run.number |
| 696 | { |
| 697 | return Decision::deny( |
| 698 | "scope:pull", |
| 699 | format!( |
| 700 | "{who} can change pull request #{} only.", |
| 701 | run.number.unwrap_or_default() |
| 702 | ), |
| 703 | ); |
| 704 | } |
| 705 | Decision::allow(scope_rule(scope)) |
| 706 | } |
| 707 | |
| 708 | /// Whether a run credential may clone or fetch (`write` false), or push to |
| 709 | /// (`write` true), the repository at `repo`. |
| 710 | pub fn decide_git(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, write: bool) -> Decision { |
| 711 | decide_git_at(scope, repo, None, write) |
| 712 | } |
| 713 | |
| 714 | /// [`decide_git`] for the repository at `repo`, which is a pull request's |
| 715 | /// working copy of `source` when `source` is set. A session's credential |
| 716 | /// reaches the working copies of its own repository's pull requests as it |
| 717 | /// does the repository: the pull requests it opens get theirs after the |
| 718 | /// credential is made. |
| 719 | pub fn decide_git_at(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, source: Option<&RepoPath>, write: bool) -> Decision { |
| 720 | let Some(run) = scope |
| 721 | .run |
| 722 | .as_ref() |
| 723 | .filter(|run| run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner) |
| 724 | else { |
| 725 | return Decision::deny( |
| 726 | "git:not-a-run", |
| 727 | "A tools token cannot be used with git.", |
| 728 | ); |
| 729 | }; |
| 730 | let own_copy = run.kind == RunCredentialKind::Session && source.is_some_and(|source| same_repo(source, &scope.repo)); |
| 731 | let pushable = own_copy || run.push.iter().any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo)); |
| 732 | if write { |
| 733 | return if pushable { |
| 734 | Decision::allow(format!("{}:push", scope_rule(scope))) |
| 735 | } else { |
| 736 | Decision::deny( |
| 737 | "git:push", |
| 738 | format!( |
| 739 | "A {} run cannot push to {}/{}.", |
| 740 | run.kind.as_str(), |
| 741 | repo.namespace, |
| 742 | repo.name |
| 743 | ), |
| 744 | ) |
| 745 | }; |
| 746 | } |
| 747 | let readable = pushable |
| 748 | || same_repo(&scope.repo, repo) |
| 749 | || run.read.iter().any(|path| same_repo(path, repo)); |
| 750 | if readable { |
| 751 | Decision::allow(format!("{}:read", scope_rule(scope))) |
| 752 | } else { |
| 753 | Decision::deny( |
| 754 | "git:read", |
| 755 | format!( |
| 756 | "A {} run cannot read {}/{}.", |
| 757 | run.kind.as_str(), |
| 758 | repo.namespace, |
| 759 | repo.name |
| 760 | ), |
| 761 | ) |
| 762 | } |
| 763 | } |
| 764 | |
| 765 | /// Whether a push to `repo` is limited to certain branches, so that the |
| 766 | /// refs it moves have to be read and checked with [`decide_refs`]. |
| 767 | pub fn limits_branches(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath) -> bool { |
| 768 | scope |
| 769 | .run |
| 770 | .iter() |
| 771 | .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter()) |
| 772 | .any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo) && grant.branch.is_some()) |
| 773 | } |
| 774 | |
| 775 | /// Whether a push to `repo` may move `refs` (full refs, such as |
| 776 | /// `refs/heads/main`). Tags are never a run's to move. |
| 777 | pub fn decide_refs(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, refs: &[String]) -> Decision { |
| 778 | let repo_decision = decide_git(scope, repo, true); |
| 779 | if !repo_decision.allowed { |
| 780 | return repo_decision; |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | let grants: Vec<&GitGrant> = scope |
| 783 | .run |
| 784 | .iter() |
| 785 | .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter()) |
| 786 | .filter(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo)) |
| 787 | .collect(); |
| 788 | for git_ref in refs { |
| 789 | let Some(branch) = git_ref.strip_prefix("refs/heads/") else { |
| 790 | return Decision::deny("git:ref", format!("A run cannot push {git_ref}.")); |
| 791 | }; |
| 792 | let allowed = grants |
| 793 | .iter() |
| 794 | .any(|grant| grant.branch.as_deref().is_none_or(|only| only == branch)); |
| 795 | if !allowed { |
| 796 | return Decision::deny( |
| 797 | "git:ref", |
| 798 | format!( |
| 799 | "A run cannot push to {branch} in {}/{}.", |
| 800 | repo.namespace, repo.name |
| 801 | ), |
| 802 | ); |
| 803 | } |
| 804 | } |
| 805 | repo_decision |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | |
| 808 | /// The most an agent may be on a repository, whoever it works for: it |
| 809 | /// can push, merge and run, never change settings or who has access. |
| 810 | pub const AGENT_CEILING: RepoRole = RepoRole::Write; |
| 811 | |
| 812 | /// The memberships an agent working for `person` has: the run's |
| 813 | /// workspace, as a member, only if the person is in it now, with the |
| 814 | /// person's role on its repositories (an owner's Admin included) cut down |
| 815 | /// to [`AGENT_CEILING`]. |
| 816 | pub fn intersect(person: &[Membership], namespace: &str) -> Vec<Membership> { |
| 817 | let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase(); |
| 818 | person |
| 819 | .iter() |
| 820 | .filter(|membership| membership.slug == namespace) |
| 821 | .map(|membership| { |
| 822 | let base = match membership.role { |
| 823 | Role::Owner => BasePermission::Admin, |
| 824 | Role::Member => membership.base_permission.unwrap_or_default(), |
| 825 | }; |
| 826 | Membership { |
| 827 | role: Role::Member, |
| 828 | base_permission: Some(match base { |
| 829 | BasePermission::Admin => BasePermission::Write, |
| 830 | base => base, |
| 831 | }), |
| 832 | // Billing and security manager are the person's, never |
| 833 | // their agent's. |
| 834 | org_roles: Vec::new(), |
| 835 | ..membership.clone() |
| 836 | } |
| 837 | }) |
| 838 | .collect() |
| 839 | } |
| 840 | |
| 841 | /// The repository grants an agent working for `person` has: those in the |
| 842 | /// run's workspace, each cut down to [`AGENT_CEILING`]. |
| 843 | pub fn intersect_grants(person: &[RepoGrant], namespace: &str) -> Vec<RepoGrant> { |
| 844 | let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase(); |
| 845 | person |
| 846 | .iter() |
| 847 | .filter(|grant| grant.workspace == namespace) |
| 848 | .map(|grant| RepoGrant { |
| 849 | role: grant.role.min(AGENT_CEILING), |
| 850 | ..grant.clone() |
| 851 | }) |
| 852 | .collect() |
| 853 | } |
| 854 | |
| 855 | /// Who a runner's credential acts as downstream: the person, with only the |
| 856 | /// agent's (already intersected) memberships. A session's keeps what it |
| 857 | /// acts as ([`Acting`]), so that what it writes is recorded as g1t's for |
| 858 | /// that person ([`crate::work::authorship`]), while whose it is (its |
| 859 | /// session, its claims) and what may be done stay the person's. `None` |
| 860 | /// for anything else. |
| 861 | pub fn as_person(user: &User) -> Option<User> { |
| 862 | let acting = user.acting.as_ref()?; |
| 863 | if user.kind != PrincipalKind::Agent { |
| 864 | return None; |
| 865 | } |
| 866 | let run = acting.run()?; |
| 867 | if run.usage != CredentialUse::Runner { |
| 868 | return None; |
| 869 | } |
| 870 | Some(User { |
| 871 | id: acting.on_behalf_of.id.clone(), |
| 872 | username: acting.on_behalf_of.username.clone(), |
| 873 | display_username: None, |
| 874 | kind: PrincipalKind::User, |
| 875 | verified: user.verified, |
| 876 | workspaces: user.workspaces.clone(), |
| 877 | avatar: None, |
| 878 | acting: (run.kind == RunCredentialKind::Session).then(|| acting.clone()), |
| 879 | grants: user.grants.clone(), |
| 880 | token: None, |
| 881 | held: Vec::new(), |
| 882 | }) |
| 883 | } |
| 884 | |
| 885 | /// How an actor is described: "g1t on behalf of syntaqx". |
| 886 | pub fn describe(user: &User) -> String { |
| 887 | match &user.acting { |
| 888 | Some(acting) => format!( |
| 889 | "{} on behalf of {}", |
| 890 | acting.agent, acting.on_behalf_of.username |
| 891 | ), |
| 892 | None => user.username.clone(), |
| 893 | } |
| 894 | } |
| 895 | |
| 896 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 897 | mod tests { |
| 898 | use super::*; |
| 899 | |
| 900 | #[test] |
| 901 | fn a_run_s_scopes_are_never_admin() { |
| 902 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 903 | for usage in [CredentialUse::Runner, CredentialUse::Tools] { |
| 904 | let scopes = run_scopes(kind, usage); |
| 905 | assert!(scopes.iter().all(|scope| !scope.dangerous()), "{kind:?} {usage:?}: {scopes:?}"); |
| 906 | } |
| 907 | } |
| 908 | use crate::scopes::Scope; |
| 909 | let bump = run_scopes(RunCredentialKind::Bump, CredentialUse::Runner); |
| 910 | assert!(bump.len() == 2 && bump.contains(&Scope::CodeRead) && bump.contains(&Scope::CodeWrite)); |
| 911 | assert_eq!(run_scopes(RunCredentialKind::Checks, CredentialUse::Runner), [Scope::CodeRead]); |
| 912 | } |
| 913 | |
| 914 | /// The hosted agents' kinds still parse, so stored tokens read, but |
| 915 | /// they grant nothing: no operations, no scopes. |
| 916 | #[test] |
| 917 | fn retired_kinds_parse_and_grant_nothing() { |
| 918 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 919 | let parsed: RunCredentialKind = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!(kind.as_str())).unwrap(); |
| 920 | assert_eq!(parsed, kind); |
| 921 | for usage in [CredentialUse::Runner, CredentialUse::Tools] { |
| 922 | if kind == RunCredentialKind::Session && usage == CredentialUse::Runner { |
| 923 | continue; |
| 924 | } |
| 925 | assert!(operations_for(kind, usage).is_empty(), "{kind:?} {usage:?}"); |
| 926 | if kind.retired() { |
| 927 | assert!(run_scopes(kind, usage).is_empty(), "{kind:?} {usage:?}"); |
| 928 | } |
| 929 | } |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | let retired: Vec<&str> = RunCredentialKind::ALL.iter().filter(|kind| kind.retired()).map(|kind| kind.as_str()).collect(); |
| 932 | assert_eq!(retired, ["implement", "revise", "review", "answer", "update", "plan"]); |
| 933 | } |
| 934 | |
| 935 | #[test] |
| 936 | fn site_wide_search_only_reads() { |
| 937 | assert!(is_read("search")); |
| 938 | assert!(!NEVER.contains(&"search")); |
| 939 | } |
| 940 | |
| 941 | fn path(namespace: &str, name: &str) -> RepoPath { |
| 942 | RepoPath { |
| 943 | namespace: namespace.to_owned(), |
| 944 | name: name.to_owned(), |
| 945 | } |
| 946 | } |
| 947 | |
| 948 | /// What a token stored before the hosted agents were retired lists: |
| 949 | /// the operations it was made with, which it keeps until it expires. |
| 950 | fn stored_operations(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<String> { |
| 951 | use RunCredentialKind as K; |
| 952 | let names: Vec<&str> = match usage { |
| 953 | CredentialUse::Runner => match kind { |
| 954 | K::Implement => vec!["get_repo", "get_pull_request", "record_session", "mark_pull_request_ready"], |
| 955 | K::Revise | K::Answer | K::Update => vec!["get_repo", "get_pull_request", "record_session"], |
| 956 | _ => vec![], |
| 957 | }, |
| 958 | CredentialUse::Tools => match kind { |
| 959 | K::Implement | K::Revise | K::Answer => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "create_issue", "add_comment", "remember"], |
| 960 | K::Review => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "add_comment", "review_pull_request"], |
| 961 | K::Plan => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request", "create_issue"], |
| 962 | K::Update => vec!["get_issue", "get_pull_request"], |
| 963 | _ => vec![], |
| 964 | }, |
| 965 | }; |
| 966 | names.into_iter().map(str::to_owned).collect() |
| 967 | } |
| 968 | |
| 969 | fn scope(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> AgentScope { |
| 970 | AgentScope { |
| 971 | repo: path("acme", "rocket"), |
| 972 | operations: stored_operations(kind, usage), |
| 973 | run: Some(RunBinding { |
| 974 | kind, |
| 975 | usage, |
| 976 | run_id: Some("run_1".to_owned()), |
| 977 | number: Some(7), |
| 978 | agent: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 979 | system: false, |
| 980 | read: vec![path("acme", "rocket")], |
| 981 | push: match kind { |
| 982 | RunCredentialKind::Implement |
| 983 | | RunCredentialKind::Revise |
| 984 | | RunCredentialKind::Answer => vec![GitGrant { |
| 985 | repo: path("pulls", "pul_7"), |
| 986 | branch: None, |
| 987 | }], |
| 988 | RunCredentialKind::Update => vec![GitGrant { |
| 989 | repo: path("acme", "rocket"), |
| 990 | branch: Some("fix-login".to_owned()), |
| 991 | }], |
| 992 | _ => vec![], |
| 993 | }, |
| 994 | }), |
| 995 | } |
| 996 | } |
| 997 | |
| 998 | fn agent(member_of: &[&str], scope: AgentScope) -> User { |
| 999 | User { |
| 1000 | id: "usr_g1t_agent".to_owned(), |
| 1001 | username: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 1002 | display_username: None, |
| 1003 | kind: PrincipalKind::Agent, |
| 1004 | verified: true, |
| 1005 | workspaces: member_of |
| 1006 | .iter() |
| 1007 | .map(|slug| Membership::member(*slug)) |
| 1008 | .collect(), |
| 1009 | avatar: None, |
| 1010 | grants: Vec::new(), |
| 1011 | token: None, |
| 1012 | held: Vec::new(), |
| 1013 | acting: Some(Box::new(Acting { |
| 1014 | credential_id: "tok_1".to_owned(), |
| 1015 | agent: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 1016 | on_behalf_of: Principal { |
| 1017 | id: "usr_1".to_owned(), |
| 1018 | username: "syntaqx".to_owned(), |
| 1019 | }, |
| 1020 | scope, |
| 1021 | })), |
| 1022 | } |
| 1023 | } |
| 1024 | |
| 1025 | fn op(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse, operation: &str) -> Decision { |
| 1026 | let scope = scope(kind, usage); |
| 1027 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1028 | decide_operation( |
| 1029 | &user, |
| 1030 | &scope, |
| 1031 | operation, |
| 1032 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 1033 | true, |
| 1034 | Some(7), |
| 1035 | ) |
| 1036 | } |
| 1037 | |
| 1038 | use CredentialUse::{Runner, Tools}; |
| 1039 | use RunCredentialKind as K; |
| 1040 | |
| 1041 | /// A stored token may use only what it lists, and never what no run |
| 1042 | /// may. |
| 1043 | #[test] |
| 1044 | fn a_stored_token_uses_only_what_it_lists() { |
| 1045 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Tools, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 1046 | assert!(op(K::Review, Tools, "review_pull_request").allowed); |
| 1047 | assert!(!op(K::Review, Tools, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 1048 | assert!(!op(K::Plan, Tools, "add_comment").allowed); |
| 1049 | assert!(!op(K::Checks, Tools, "get_issue").allowed); |
| 1050 | for operation in ["record_session", "merge_pull_request", "update_repo_settings", "create_webhook", "set_actions_secret"] { |
| 1051 | for kind in [K::Implement, K::Revise, K::Answer, K::Review, K::Plan, K::Checks] { |
| 1052 | assert!(!op(kind, Tools, operation).allowed, "{operation} by a {} run's tools", kind.as_str()); |
| 1053 | } |
| 1054 | } |
| 1055 | } |
| 1056 | |
| 1057 | #[test] |
| 1058 | fn runner_matrix() { |
| 1059 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 1060 | assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed); |
| 1061 | assert!(op(K::Revise, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 1062 | assert!(!op(K::Revise, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed); |
| 1063 | assert!(!op(K::Implement, Runner, "create_issue").allowed); |
| 1064 | assert!(!op(K::Review, Runner, "record_session").allowed); |
| 1065 | assert!(!op(K::Checks, Runner, "get_issue").allowed); |
| 1066 | } |
| 1067 | |
| 1068 | #[test] |
| 1069 | fn settings_billing_tokens_and_members_are_never_reachable() { |
| 1070 | for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL { |
| 1071 | for usage in [Runner, Tools] { |
| 1072 | for operation in NEVER.iter().copied() { |
| 1073 | let decision = op(kind, usage, operation); |
| 1074 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 1075 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never"); |
| 1076 | } |
| 1077 | } |
| 1078 | } |
| 1079 | // Even a scope that lists one is refused. |
| 1080 | let mut wide = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1081 | wide.operations.push("merge_pull_request".to_owned()); |
| 1082 | let user = agent(&["acme"], wide.clone()); |
| 1083 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1084 | &user, |
| 1085 | &wide, |
| 1086 | "merge_pull_request", |
| 1087 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 1088 | true, |
| 1089 | Some(7), |
| 1090 | ); |
| 1091 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never"); |
| 1092 | } |
| 1093 | |
| 1094 | #[test] |
| 1095 | fn another_repository_is_refused() { |
| 1096 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1097 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1098 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1099 | &user, |
| 1100 | &scope, |
| 1101 | "create_issue", |
| 1102 | Some(&path("acme", "other")), |
| 1103 | true, |
| 1104 | None, |
| 1105 | ); |
| 1106 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 1107 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository"); |
| 1108 | let decision = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "create_issue", None, true, None); |
| 1109 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository"); |
| 1110 | // The repository's name is matched without regard to case. |
| 1111 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1112 | &user, |
| 1113 | &scope, |
| 1114 | "create_issue", |
| 1115 | Some(&path("Acme", "Rocket")), |
| 1116 | true, |
| 1117 | None, |
| 1118 | ); |
| 1119 | assert!(decision.allowed); |
| 1120 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "run:implement/tools"); |
| 1121 | } |
| 1122 | |
| 1123 | #[test] |
| 1124 | fn the_permission_is_the_intersection_with_the_person() { |
| 1125 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1126 | // The person left the workspace: their agent can do nothing there. |
| 1127 | let user = agent(&[], scope.clone()); |
| 1128 | let decision = decide_operation( |
| 1129 | &user, |
| 1130 | &scope, |
| 1131 | "get_issue", |
| 1132 | Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), |
| 1133 | true, |
| 1134 | Some(1), |
| 1135 | ); |
| 1136 | assert!(!decision.allowed); |
| 1137 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "on-behalf-of:membership"); |
| 1138 | // And an owner's agent is only ever a member. |
| 1139 | let owner = vec![ |
| 1140 | Membership { |
| 1141 | slug: "acme".to_owned(), |
| 1142 | role: Role::Owner, |
| 1143 | name: None, |
| 1144 | avatar: None, |
| 1145 | base_permission: Some(BasePermission::None), |
| 1146 | team_creation: None, |
| 1147 | org_roles: vec![crate::OrgRole::SecurityManager], |
| 1148 | privileges: None, |
| 1149 | }, |
| 1150 | Membership::member("elsewhere"), |
| 1151 | ]; |
| 1152 | let memberships = intersect(&owner, "Acme"); |
| 1153 | assert_eq!(memberships.len(), 1); |
| 1154 | assert_eq!(memberships[0].slug, "acme"); |
| 1155 | assert_eq!(memberships[0].role, Role::Member); |
| 1156 | assert!(memberships[0].org_roles.is_empty()); |
| 1157 | assert!(intersect(&owner, "nowhere").is_empty()); |
| 1158 | } |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | /// An agent gets at most the person's role on the repository, and |
| 1161 | /// never more than Write; nothing outside the run's workspace. |
| 1162 | #[test] |
| 1163 | fn an_agent_has_at_most_its_persons_role() { |
| 1164 | use crate::access::{Capability, RepoRef, can, permission}; |
| 1165 | let rocket = RepoRef { id: "rep_1", namespace: "acme", private: true }; |
| 1166 | let other = RepoRef { id: "rep_2", namespace: "acme", private: true }; |
| 1167 | let elsewhere = RepoRef { id: "rep_3", namespace: "globex", private: true }; |
| 1168 | let tools = scope(K::Implement, Tools); |
| 1169 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1170 | // An owner's agent: Write, never Admin. |
| 1171 | let owner = [Membership { role: Role::Owner, ..Membership::member("acme") }, Membership::member("globex")]; |
| 1172 | let mut agent_user = agent(&[], scope.clone()); |
| 1173 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&owner, "acme"); |
| 1174 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1175 | assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::ManageSettings)); |
| 1176 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None); |
| 1177 | // A member whose workspace gives Read: Read, so it cannot push. |
| 1178 | let reader = [Membership { base_permission: Some(BasePermission::Read), ..Membership::member("acme") }]; |
| 1179 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&reader, "acme"); |
| 1180 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Read)); |
| 1181 | assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::Push)); |
| 1182 | // An outside collaborator with Maintain on one repository: Write |
| 1183 | // there, nothing elsewhere, and the run is allowed. |
| 1184 | let grants = [ |
| 1185 | RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_1".into(), workspace: "acme".into(), role: RepoRole::Maintain, team: None }, |
| 1186 | RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_3".into(), workspace: "globex".into(), role: RepoRole::Admin, team: None }, |
| 1187 | ]; |
| 1188 | agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&[], "acme"); |
| 1189 | agent_user.grants = intersect_grants(&grants, "Acme"); |
| 1190 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1191 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), other), None); |
| 1192 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None); |
| 1193 | let decision = decide_operation(&agent_user, &tools, "get_issue", Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), true, Some(1)); |
| 1194 | assert!(decision.allowed, "{}", decision.reason.unwrap_or_default()); |
| 1195 | // The person, downstream of a runner's credential, carries the same. |
| 1196 | let person = as_person(&agent_user).expect("a runner acts as the person"); |
| 1197 | assert_eq!(permission(Some(&person), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write)); |
| 1198 | } |
| 1199 | |
| 1200 | #[test] |
| 1201 | fn a_runner_changes_only_its_own_pull_request() { |
| 1202 | let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1203 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1204 | let repo = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1205 | let other = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(8)); |
| 1206 | assert!(!other.allowed); |
| 1207 | assert_eq!(other.rule, "scope:pull"); |
| 1208 | let own = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(7)); |
| 1209 | assert!(own.allowed); |
| 1210 | // Reading another is fine. |
| 1211 | assert!( |
| 1212 | decide_operation( |
| 1213 | &user, |
| 1214 | &scope, |
| 1215 | "get_pull_request", |
| 1216 | Some(&repo), |
| 1217 | true, |
| 1218 | Some(8) |
| 1219 | ) |
| 1220 | .allowed |
| 1221 | ); |
| 1222 | } |
| 1223 | |
| 1224 | #[test] |
| 1225 | fn git_matrix() { |
| 1226 | let fork = path("pulls", "pul_7"); |
| 1227 | let upstream = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1228 | let elsewhere = path("acme", "billing"); |
| 1229 | let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1230 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, true).allowed); |
| 1231 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, false).allowed); |
| 1232 | assert!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, false).allowed); |
| 1233 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, true).rule, "git:push"); |
| 1234 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &elsewhere, false).rule, "git:read"); |
| 1235 | let review = scope(K::Review, Runner); |
| 1236 | assert!(decide_git(&review, &upstream, false).allowed); |
| 1237 | assert!(!decide_git(&review, &upstream, true).allowed); |
| 1238 | assert!(!decide_git(&review, &fork, true).allowed); |
| 1239 | // A tools token made before run credentials never reaches git. |
| 1240 | let old = AgentScope { |
| 1241 | repo: upstream.clone(), |
| 1242 | operations: vec!["get_issue".to_owned()], |
| 1243 | run: None, |
| 1244 | }; |
| 1245 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&old, &upstream, false).rule, "git:not-a-run"); |
| 1246 | // Nor does an agent's tools token. |
| 1247 | assert_eq!( |
| 1248 | decide_git(&scope(K::Implement, Tools), &upstream, false).rule, |
| 1249 | "git:not-a-run" |
| 1250 | ); |
| 1251 | } |
| 1252 | |
| 1253 | #[test] |
| 1254 | fn a_push_moves_only_granted_branches() { |
| 1255 | let update = scope(K::Update, Runner); |
| 1256 | let repo = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1257 | let refs = |names: &[&str]| { |
| 1258 | names |
| 1259 | .iter() |
| 1260 | .map(|name| (*name).to_owned()) |
| 1261 | .collect::<Vec<_>>() |
| 1262 | }; |
| 1263 | assert!(decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login"])).allowed); |
| 1264 | assert_eq!( |
| 1265 | decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/main"])).rule, |
| 1266 | "git:ref" |
| 1267 | ); |
| 1268 | assert_eq!( |
| 1269 | decide_refs( |
| 1270 | &update, |
| 1271 | &repo, |
| 1272 | &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login", "refs/tags/v1"]) |
| 1273 | ) |
| 1274 | .rule, |
| 1275 | "git:ref" |
| 1276 | ); |
| 1277 | let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner); |
| 1278 | assert!( |
| 1279 | decide_refs( |
| 1280 | &implement, |
| 1281 | &path("pulls", "pul_7"), |
| 1282 | &refs(&["refs/heads/main"]) |
| 1283 | ) |
| 1284 | .allowed |
| 1285 | ); |
| 1286 | } |
| 1287 | |
| 1288 | #[test] |
| 1289 | fn a_runner_acts_downstream_as_the_person() { |
| 1290 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Runner)); |
| 1291 | let person = as_person(&user).unwrap(); |
| 1292 | assert_eq!(person.id, "usr_1"); |
| 1293 | assert_eq!(person.username, "syntaqx"); |
| 1294 | assert_eq!(person.kind, PrincipalKind::User); |
| 1295 | assert!(person.is_member("acme")); |
| 1296 | assert!(person.acting.is_none()); |
| 1297 | assert_eq!(describe(&user), "g1t on behalf of syntaqx"); |
| 1298 | // The tools act as the agent. |
| 1299 | assert!(as_person(&agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Tools))).is_none()); |
| 1300 | } |
| 1301 | |
| 1302 | #[test] |
| 1303 | fn scopes_without_a_run_still_parse() { |
| 1304 | let old: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str( |
| 1305 | r#"{"repo":{"namespace":"acme","name":"rocket"},"operations":["get_issue"]}"#, |
| 1306 | ) |
| 1307 | .unwrap(); |
| 1308 | assert!(old.run.is_none()); |
| 1309 | let written = serde_json::to_string(&scope(K::Review, Tools)).unwrap(); |
| 1310 | assert!(written.contains(r#""use":"tools""#)); |
| 1311 | assert!(written.contains(r#""kind":"review""#)); |
| 1312 | let back: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str(&written).unwrap(); |
| 1313 | assert_eq!(back.run.unwrap().kind, K::Review); |
| 1314 | // Only g1t's own runs say so; every other reads as not. |
| 1315 | assert!(!written.contains("system")); |
| 1316 | assert!(!back_run(&written).system); |
| 1317 | let mut own = scope(K::Bump, Runner); |
| 1318 | own.run.as_mut().unwrap().system = true; |
| 1319 | let written = serde_json::to_string(&own).unwrap(); |
| 1320 | assert!(written.contains(r#""system":true"#)); |
| 1321 | assert!(back_run(&written).system); |
| 1322 | } |
| 1323 | |
| 1324 | fn session_scope() -> AgentScope { |
| 1325 | AgentScope { |
| 1326 | repo: path("acme", "rocket"), |
| 1327 | operations: operations_for(K::Session, Runner).into_iter().map(str::to_owned).collect(), |
| 1328 | run: Some(RunBinding { |
| 1329 | kind: K::Session, |
| 1330 | usage: Runner, |
| 1331 | run_id: None, |
| 1332 | number: None, |
| 1333 | agent: "g1t".to_owned(), |
| 1334 | system: false, |
| 1335 | read: Vec::new(), |
| 1336 | push: vec![GitGrant { repo: path("acme", "rocket"), branch: None }], |
| 1337 | }), |
| 1338 | } |
| 1339 | } |
| 1340 | |
| 1341 | /// A session works on its issue through the API and MCP with what its |
| 1342 | /// scopes allow, in its repository, and never with what no run may. |
| 1343 | #[test] |
| 1344 | fn a_session_does_what_its_scopes_allow_in_its_repository() { |
| 1345 | let scope = session_scope(); |
| 1346 | let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone()); |
| 1347 | let rocket = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1348 | let decide = |operation: &str, repo: &RepoPath| decide_operation(&user, &scope, operation, Some(repo), true, Some(1)); |
| 1349 | for operation in [ |
| 1350 | "whoami", |
| 1351 | "get_work", |
| 1352 | "claim_issue", |
| 1353 | "add_comment", |
| 1354 | "close_issue", |
| 1355 | "create_pull_request", |
| 1356 | "review_pull_request", |
| 1357 | "mark_pull_request_ready", |
| 1358 | "record_session", |
| 1359 | "update_session", |
| 1360 | "get_workflow_run", |
| 1361 | ] { |
| 1362 | let decision = decide(operation, &rocket); |
| 1363 | assert!(decision.allowed, "{operation}: {:?}", decision.reason); |
| 1364 | assert_eq!(decision.rule, "run:session/runner"); |
| 1365 | } |
| 1366 | assert_eq!(decide("add_comment", &path("acme", "billing")).rule, "scope:repository"); |
| 1367 | for operation in ["merge_pull_request", "update_repo_settings", "set_actions_secret", "list_members", "delete_repo"] { |
| 1368 | assert_eq!(decide(operation, &rocket).rule, "never", "{operation}"); |
| 1369 | } |
| 1370 | // What its scopes do not reach: workspaces' settings, deleting. |
| 1371 | for operation in ["update_workspace", "delete_package", "create_webhook"] { |
| 1372 | assert!(!decide(operation, &rocket).allowed, "{operation}"); |
| 1373 | } |
| 1374 | use crate::scopes::Scope; |
| 1375 | let scopes = run_scopes(K::Session, Runner); |
| 1376 | assert!(scopes.contains(&Scope::CodeWrite) && scopes.contains(&Scope::IssuesWrite)); |
| 1377 | assert!(scopes.iter().all(|scope| !scope.dangerous())); |
| 1378 | } |
| 1379 | |
| 1380 | /// It pushes to its repository, any branch (a new repository's first |
| 1381 | /// version goes to its default branch), and to the working copies of |
| 1382 | /// that repository's pull requests, made after it was. |
| 1383 | #[test] |
| 1384 | fn a_session_pushes_to_its_repository_and_its_pull_requests() { |
| 1385 | let session = session_scope(); |
| 1386 | let rocket = path("acme", "rocket"); |
| 1387 | let copy = path("pulls", "pul_9"); |
| 1388 | assert!(decide_git(&session, &rocket, true).allowed); |
| 1389 | assert!(!limits_branches(&session, &rocket)); |
| 1390 | assert!(decide_git_at(&session, ©, Some(&rocket), true).allowed); |
| 1391 | assert!(decide_git_at(&session, ©, Some(&rocket), false).allowed); |
| 1392 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&session, ©, true).rule, "git:push"); |
| 1393 | assert_eq!(decide_git_at(&session, ©, Some(&path("acme", "billing")), true).rule, "git:push"); |
| 1394 | assert_eq!(decide_git(&session, &path("acme", "billing"), false).rule, "git:read"); |
| 1395 | // Another kind of run never reaches a pull request's copy this way. |
| 1396 | assert!(!decide_git_at(&scope(K::Update, Runner), ©, Some(&rocket), true).allowed); |
| 1397 | } |
| 1398 | |
| 1399 | /// Downstream it is the person, so the session and claims it records |
| 1400 | /// are theirs, and it still says it is g1t acting for them, so what it |
| 1401 | /// writes is g1t's. |
| 1402 | #[test] |
| 1403 | fn a_session_acts_downstream_as_the_person_through_g1t() { |
| 1404 | let user = agent(&["acme"], session_scope()); |
| 1405 | let person = as_person(&user).unwrap(); |
| 1406 | assert_eq!((person.id.as_str(), person.kind), ("usr_1", PrincipalKind::User)); |
| 1407 | let acting = person.acting.as_ref().expect("it says it is g1t acting for them"); |
| 1408 | assert_eq!((acting.agent.as_str(), acting.on_behalf_of.username.as_str()), ("g1t", "syntaqx")); |
| 1409 | assert_eq!(describe(&person), "g1t on behalf of syntaqx"); |
| 1410 | let (author, asked) = crate::work::authorship(&person); |
| 1411 | assert_eq!(author.username, "g1t"); |
| 1412 | assert_eq!(asked.map(|asked| asked.username).as_deref(), Some("syntaqx")); |
| 1413 | } |
| 1414 | |
| 1415 | fn back_run(written: &str) -> RunBinding { |
| 1416 | serde_json::from_str::<AgentScope>(written).unwrap().run.unwrap() |
| 1417 | } |
| 1418 | } |