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g1t/apps/sudo/README.md

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1# sudo
2
3g1t's staff console, at <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: the back office g1t is
4building for itself, for sales, support and finance. It is organised the
5way customers know g1t: by **workspace**.
6
7The sidebar (`app/lib/nav.ts`) has Overview and Reach out at the top, then
8sections that fold open to their pages: Customers, Revenue, Platform,
9Support and Team. Each fold is a `<details>`, drawn open for the section
10holding the current page; on a phone the same menu sits behind a "Menu"
11button in the top bar. Pages not built yet are marked **Soon**: each is a
12real page (`routes/soon.tsx`, made from its entry in `nav.ts`) saying what
13it will do, why, and what it will have, so the sidebar doubles as the
14roadmap.
15
16- **Overview** (`/`): this month charged, cost and margin; the last six
17 months as a chart; this month by kind of usage; paying workspaces; how
18 many are stopped, near their limit or declined (each a link into Reach
19 out); open invoices; follow-ups due; and the five most urgent signals.
20 From billing's `admin_overview` and `admin_signals`.
21- **Reach out** (`/reach-out`): every workspace worth a word, most urgent
22 first (at limit, declined, near limit, high spend, growing, established,
23 first payment), with its owners, the reason in a sentence, the figure,
24 and its sales stage and owner at g1t. Filter by why and by whose
25 (everyone's, unassigned, mine), or show only **follow-ups due** (a next
26 step due today or earlier, on a deal not won or lost; one per
27 workspace). Rows show the next step and its day. Each row opens the
28 workspace's Sales.
29- **Invoices** (`/invoices`): every invoice g1t has sent, workspaces' and
30 enterprises', newest first (`admin_invoices`, at most 200). Filter by
31 status and month; totals for what is listed (amount, paid, outstanding);
32 each links to its workspace or enterprise and to Stripe's page (https
33 only).
34- **Audit log** (`/audit`): every change made in sudo, and what Stripe told
35 billing, newest first, 100 a page with "Older" (`admin_audit`). Filter by
36 staff email and kind of change; each line links to its workspace or
37 enterprise.
38- **Workspaces** (`/workspaces`): every workspace, newest first, 50 to a
39 page, with its owners, members, who it is billed to, its terms, this
40 month's usage against its limit, what it was charged and what it cost
41 g1t. Search by workspace, owner, email or enterprise (across the whole
42 list); filter to stopped or warning, comped or custom, or on an
43 enterprise. Billing's figures are fetched for exactly the page shown, so
44 the filters, and the totals over the list, cover that page; the page
45 says so when there is more than one. A workspace's page shows its members;
46 **Sales** (its stage, the staff member who has it, the next step and its
47 date, and notes, newest first; `admin_sales`, `admin_set_sales`,
48 `admin_add_note`); and under **Billing** its limit in words (trust, the
49 owners' own spend limit or the default, the most they may set, how it
50 grows), its last six months as a chart, its invoices (`admin_workspace_invoices`,
51 with Stripe's page and PDF), its terms, who it is billed to (move it onto or off an
52 enterprise), a credit form, a Stripe billing link, its ledger and its
53 audit log. If billing does not answer for sales or invoices, the page
54 still opens and says so in those sections. A protected workspace (one
55 nobody can ever delete: identity's `PROTECTED_WORKSPACES`, and
56 flagon-io always) says so beside its name.
57- **Deleted workspaces** (`/workspaces/deleted`, linked from Workspaces):
58 workspaces their owners deleted, newest first (`admin_deleted_workspaces`),
59 each with who deleted it and when, when it is purged, what went with it
60 (repositories, projects, members, counted at the deletion) and the days
61 left. An owner deletes a workspace with everything in it in one step, and
62 identity keeps it 30 days (`WORKSPACE_RESTORE_DAYS`) so support can undo a
63 deletion that was a mistake or not theirs to make. **Restore**
64 (`admin_restore_workspace`) brings it back with its members and tokens,
65 and its repositories, projects and apps with `workspace.restored`; its
66 plan stays ended, so its owners start it again from Billing. Check that
67 whoever asks is an owner of it before restoring. **Purge now**
68 (`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed to confirm) removes it at once,
69 as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up; never for a
70 protected workspace. Both go in the workspace's audit log, as g1t, and in
71 sudo's (`workspace_restored`, `workspace_purged`), naming the staff
72 member.
73- **Aliases** (`/aliases`, under Customers): names that lead to a
74 workspace, set by staff only; there is no way for a customer to make
75 one, and nothing user-facing mentions them. `g1t`, the product's name,
76 leads to `flagon-io`, Flagon, Inc. (seeded by identity's migration
77 `0029_workspace_aliases.sql`), so nobody mistakes the trading name for
78 the organization. Every address under an alias leads to the workspace:
79 pages answer with a 301 to the same page (`/g1t/g1t/issues` to
80 `/flagon-io/g1t/issues`), git over HTTPS is answered in place as the
81 workspace's repository (pushes do not follow redirects), the API and MCP
82 run the call again under the workspace's slug, and the package
83 registries answer a 301 (308 for a publish). An alias points at the
84 workspace's id, so it follows a rename; it goes when the workspace is
85 purged. Each row shows the workspace, why the alias exists, and who added
86 it and when. **Add** (`admin_set_alias`) takes the alias, the
87 workspace's slug and why: identity refuses the site's own routes
88 (`settings`, `api`…), anyone's username, a workspace's slug (deleted, or
89 held after a rename for another workspace) and an existing alias.
90 Reserved names such as `g1t` can be aliases, and an alias is nobody's to
91 register or rename a workspace to while it exists. **Remove**
92 (`admin_remove_alias`) needs a reason. Both go in sudo's audit log
93 (`alias_added`, `alias_removed`), naming the staff member. `@g1t` in
94 text still means g1t's agent: it links to how the agent works, never to
95 `/g1t`.
96- **Enterprises**: customers that pay for several workspaces with one
97 bill, one limit and one set of terms. Each has its workspaces (add or
98 remove them), combined usage, terms, credits, ledger and audit log, and
99 **Invoices**: where they go (the billing email, which also makes its
100 Stripe customer), a "Send invoice now" button, and every invoice with
101 its status (open, paid, overdue, void), a line per workspace, and a link
102 to Stripe's hosted invoice page. An invoice also goes out on its own as
103 each month closes: one Stripe invoice, a line per workspace for what it
104 owes, net 30, emailed by Stripe.
105- **Agents & models** (`/agents`, under Platform): billing's model
106 catalogue, every model g1t can use (`admin_models`). **Check for new
107 models** lists each provider's models now, through the model proxy's
108 `Discovery` entrypoint (the `MODELS` binding), as the daily check does;
109 the result says what each provider listed, what is new or gone, or why a
110 provider could not be listed. **Defaults**: the model behind each of
111 Auto's tiers, the harness's background model and the AI Gateway's first
112 Claude (an available, priced Claude each, shown with what a typical run
113 costs on it), and each kind of job's starting tier and effort. A change
114 needs a reason and shows a review first, the current and new value side
115 by side with what a typical run would cost on each, before **Save**
116 (`admin_set_model_default`); runs pick it up within a minute. A default
117 that has fallen back (its model retired or no longer listed) says so.
118 **New models**: each model a check found, with its prices filled in
119 where known; confirm its name, tier and prices per million tokens (and
120 long-prompt prices) and **Approve**, or **Retire** it
121 (`admin_decide_model`). **Catalogue**: every other model with its status,
122 context, prices, typical run and when its provider last listed it, each
123 with **Retire** or **Restore**. **Checks**: the latest checks of each
124 provider. Every change names the staff member and why in the audit log
125 (account `models`). See docs/BILLING_OPERATIONS.md, "The model
126 catalogue".
127- **Stripe**: whether billing's key is in test or live mode (or off), the
128 webhook Stripe calls (URL, endpoint id, events, who registered it and
129 when), and the events Stripe sent lately with what billing did with
130 each. "Register webhook" (or "Replace") has billing delete the endpoint
131 it made before, create a new one and keep its signing secret, which no
132 one sees. Do it once per mode, and again after switching to live keys.
133
134Sales changes are not money, so they have no confirmation step; they are
135still POSTs from sudo's own pages, recorded with who made them.
136
137Billing's internal account ids (`ws_<slug>` for a workspace's own,
138`ent_…` for an enterprise) are never shown as names; an enterprise's id
139appears only as small "Billing account id" text. Old `/accounts/…` links
140redirect to the workspace or enterprise they meant.
141
142**Cards stay on Stripe.** sudo never shows a card field. To help a customer
143update their card or see invoices, staff make a Stripe billing link on the
144workspace's page (it is recorded) and send it to the owner.
145
146It holds no data. Workspaces, owners and members come from identity's
147staff methods (`admin_workspaces`, `admin_workspace`; `IdentityAdminApi` in
148`packages/contracts/src/identity.ts`); everything about money goes to the
149billing service's (`admin_*`, `BillingAdminApi` in
150`packages/contracts/src/billing.ts`), where each change is recorded with
151the staff member's email. Both are reached over service bindings only, and
152nothing but sudo binds to them.
153
154## How it is locked
155
1561. **Cloudflare Access** sits in front of `sudo.g1t.sh` and signs people in.
1572. **The worker checks Access's work** on every request, the stylesheet
158 included (`run_worker_first`): it verifies the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`
159 JWT itself (RS256 against the team's published keys, audience, issuer,
160 expiry), then requires its email to be in `STAFF_EMAILS`. That email is
161 who every change is recorded as. See `app/lib/access.ts`.
1623. **It fails closed.** Until `ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN`, `ACCESS_AUD` and
163 `STAFF_EMAILS` are all set, every request gets a 403 saying sudo is not
164 configured.
1654. **Changes** are POSTs only, and only from sudo's own pages (`Origin`, or
166 `Referer`, must be `https://sudo.g1t.sh`). Terms, enterprise moves, new
167 enterprises, Stripe billing links, invoice emails, invoices and the
168 webhook show a confirmation step first; a credit needs the workspace's
169 slug typed out.
1705. **The pages ship no JavaScript.** The content security policy forbids
171 every script and inline style; responses are `no-store`, `noindex` and
172 cannot be framed. The worker has no `workers.dev` address or preview URLs.
173
174## Setting up Access (once, in the Cloudflare dashboard)
175
1761. **Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add an application → Self-hosted.**
177 - Application name: `sudo`.
178 - Session duration: short, such as 8 hours.
179 - Public hostname: `sudo.g1t.sh` (path empty, so it covers everything).
1802. **Add a policy** (`g1t staff`): action *Allow*, include *Emails* → the
181 owner's address, and *Emails ending in* → `g1t.sh` for everyone with a
182 g1t address (the same entries as `STAFF_EMAILS`, where a domain is
183 written `@g1t.sh`). Add more staff here *and* in `STAFF_EMAILS`; either
184 one alone is not enough.
1853. Save, then open the application's **Overview** (or *Basic information*)
186 and copy the **Application Audience (AUD) tag**.
1874. Find the **team domain** under **Zero Trust → Settings → Custom pages**
188 (or *Team name and domain*): it looks like `<team>.cloudflareaccess.com`.
1895. Put both into `wrangler.jsonc`:
190
191 ```jsonc
192 "vars": {
193 "ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN": "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com",
194 "ACCESS_AUD": "<the AUD tag>",
195 "STAFF_EMAILS": "syntaqx@gmail.com, @g1t.sh"
196 }
197 ```
198
1996. Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh sudo` (after `billing` and `identity`, whose
200 `admin_*` methods it calls).
201
202Visit <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: Access asks you to sign in, then the workspaces
203list opens. Anyone else gets Access's own refusal; anyone Access lets in who
204is not in `STAFF_EMAILS` gets a 403 from the worker.
205
206## Signing in through WARP
207
208Staff signed in to the Zero Trust org in the Cloudflare One agent (WARP)
209reach sudo without the login page: the org allows WARP sessions as Access
210sign-ins (8 hours), the sudo app accepts them, and the `g1t staff` policy
211is also on the WARP enrollment app, so staff can enroll their devices.
212The same two checks still apply: the Access policy, and `STAFF_EMAILS`.
213
214## Working on it
215
216```sh
217npm run typecheck -w @g1t/sudo
218npm test -w @g1t/sudo # JWT verification, forms, money, the workspace join, paging, nav, charts, signals, models
219npm run build -w @g1t/sudo
220```
221
222`npm run dev` serves the pages, but every request is refused without a real
223Access token, by design.