flagon-io/g1t

public

1	# sudo
2
3	g1t's staff console, at <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: the back office g1t is
4	building for itself, for sales, support and finance. It is organised the
5	way customers know g1t: by workspace.
6
7	The sidebar (`app/lib/nav.ts`) has Overview and Reach out at the top, then
8	sections that fold open to their pages: Customers, Revenue, Platform,
9	Support and Team. Each fold is a `<details>`, drawn open for the section
10	holding the current page; on a phone the same menu sits behind a "Menu"
11	button in the top bar. Pages not built yet are marked Soon: each is a
12	real page (`routes/soon.tsx`, made from its entry in `nav.ts`) saying what
13	it will do, why, and what it will have, so the sidebar doubles as the
14	roadmap.
15
16	- Overview (`/`): this month charged, cost and margin; the last six
17	months as a chart; this month by kind of usage; paying workspaces; how
18	many are stopped, near their limit or declined (each a link into Reach
19	out); open invoices; follow-ups due; and the five most urgent signals.
20	From billing's `admin_overview` and `admin_signals`.
21	- Reach out (`/reach-out`): every workspace worth a word, most urgent
22	first (at limit, declined, near limit, high spend, growing, established,
23	first payment), with its owners, the reason in a sentence, the figure,
24	and its sales stage and owner at g1t. Filter by why and by whose
25	(everyone's, unassigned, mine), or show only follow-ups due (a next
26	step due today or earlier, on a deal not won or lost; one per
27	workspace). Rows show the next step and its day. Each row opens the
28	workspace's Sales.
29	- Invoices (`/invoices`): every invoice g1t has sent, workspaces' and
30	enterprises', newest first (`admin_invoices`, at most 200). Filter by
31	status and month; totals for what is listed (amount, paid, outstanding);
32	each links to its workspace or enterprise and to Stripe's page (https
33	only).
34	- Audit log (`/audit`): every change made in sudo, and what Stripe told
35	billing, newest first, 100 a page with "Older" (`admin_audit`). Filter by
36	staff email and kind of change; each line links to its workspace or
37	enterprise.
38	- Workspaces (`/workspaces`): every workspace, newest first, 50 to a
39	page, with its owners, members, who it is billed to, its terms, this
40	month's usage against its limit, what it was charged and what it cost
41	g1t. Search by workspace, owner, email or enterprise (across the whole
42	list); filter to stopped or warning, comped or custom, or on an
43	enterprise. Billing's figures are fetched for exactly the page shown, so
44	the filters, and the totals over the list, cover that page; the page
45	says so when there is more than one. A workspace's page shows its members;
46	Sales (its stage, the staff member who has it, the next step and its
47	date, and notes, newest first; `admin_sales`, `admin_set_sales`,
48	`admin_add_note`); and under Billing its limit in words (trust, the
49	owners' own spend limit or the default, the most they may set, how it
50	grows), its last six months as a chart, its invoices (`admin_workspace_invoices`,
51	with Stripe's page and PDF), its terms, who it is billed to (move it onto or off an
52	enterprise), a credit form, a Stripe billing link, its ledger and its
53	audit log. If billing does not answer for sales or invoices, the page
54	still opens and says so in those sections. A protected workspace (one
55	nobody can ever delete: identity's `PROTECTED_WORKSPACES`, and
56	flagon-io always) says so beside its name.
57	- Suspend and clean up (`/workspaces/<slug>/abuse`, linked from a
58	workspace's page): suspend the workspace, with a reason (identity's
59	`admin_suspend_workspace`): its own tokens stop, and a billing hold
60	(`Suspended: <reason>`) stops its runs, checks, deploys, new
61	self-hosted runners and telemetry. Lifting it lifts that hold, never one
62	staff set otherwise. Remove its self-hosted runners one at a time or all
63	at once, which also ends its registration tokens (actions'
64	`admin_runners`, `admin_remove_runners`), and revoke its projects'
65	telemetry ingest tokens. Every change is in sudo's audit log.
66	- Deleted workspaces (`/workspaces/deleted`, linked from Workspaces):
67	workspaces their owners deleted, newest first (`admin_deleted_workspaces`),
68	each with who deleted it and when, when it is purged, what went with it
69	(repositories, projects, members, counted at the deletion) and the days
70	left. An owner deletes a workspace with everything in it in one step, and
71	identity keeps it 30 days (`WORKSPACE_RESTORE_DAYS`) so support can undo a
72	deletion that was a mistake or not theirs to make. Restore
73	(`admin_restore_workspace`) brings it back with its members and tokens,
74	and its repositories, projects and apps with `workspace.restored`; its
75	plan stays ended, so its owners start it again from Billing. Check that
76	whoever asks is an owner of it before restoring. Purge now
77	(`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed to confirm) removes it at once,
78	as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up; never for a
79	protected workspace. Both go in the workspace's audit log, as g1t, and in
80	sudo's (`workspace_restored`, `workspace_purged`), naming the staff
81	member.
82	- A person's page (`/users/<username>`, linked from a workspace's
83	members): their addresses (remove one, with a reason they see), their
84	security log, and Delete account. An account made with a shared
85	invite link, before registration opened, says **Joined through
86	<label>** under its name. Delete only when the person asks
87	(from one of the account's confirmed addresses) or for abuse: give the
88	reason, which goes in sudo's audit log (`account_deleted`), and type the
89	username (`admin_delete_account`). It does what deleting their own
90	account from Settings does: signs them out everywhere, ends their tokens,
91	SSH keys, deploy keys they added and applications, takes them out of
92	every workspace, team and repository, and emails their addresses that
93	staff deleted it. While the account is the **only owner of a live
94	workspace**, the page lists those workspaces, each linking to its page,
95	and the form becomes **Delete account and the workspaces it alone
96	owns**: the reason, the username typed, and a box ticked to say the
97	named workspaces go too (`admin_delete_account` with
98	`withSoleWorkspaces`). Use it for an account g1t no longer needs, such
99	as a retired test account and its personal workspace; for a customer,
100	prefer another owner first (an owner makes one under People). Identity
101	checks every one of those workspaces before anything is deleted: one
102	that is protected, or whose billing cannot settle (`close_workspace`:
103	an unpaid invoice, prepaid credit, usage still metering, an enterprise
104	account), refuses the whole deletion, and the page says which and why
105	beside each, instead of the form. Then it deletes each workspace exactly
106	as its owner would (billing closes it, `workspace.deleting`, its
107	repositories and apps go with it, kept 30 days), with the staff member
108	as who deleted it, and the account last. Each workspace is recorded in
109	its own audit log as g1t (rule `staff`) and in sudo's
110	(`workspace_deleted`, with the reason); the account in sudo's
111	(`account_deleted`, naming the workspaces). Should one fail on the way
112	(a card declined that moment), the account is not deleted and the
113	error names the workspace and any that went before; restore those from
114	Deleted workspaces, or try again. Accounts that can never be deleted (`g1t`, `g1t-agent`, `ghost`,
115	and whatever identity's `PROTECTED_ACCOUNTS` names, by username or id)
116	are marked Protected and offer no form. A deleted account's page
117	says so, with who deleted it, why, when it is purged, and Restore and
118	Purge now, as on Deleted accounts; both work at once, with no wait.
119	When workspaces were deleted with it, it lists them too, each with its
120	own Purge now (`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed; identity
121	purges only a workspace that is still deleted, never a protected one),
122	so staff can remove everything straight away. Purge the workspaces
123	first: once the account is purged its page is gone (they stay on
124	Deleted workspaces). To undo it all, restore the account first, then
125	each workspace, so it comes back with its owner.
126	- Suspending an account, on a person's page: with a reason, it cannot
127	sign in (with a password or GitHub), is signed out everywhere, and its
128	tokens, SSH keys and git passwords stop until the suspension is lifted
129	(identity's `admin_suspend_user`). Nothing is deleted.
130	- Blocked domains (`/blocked-domains`, under Platform): email domains,
131	and their subdomains, no new account may sign up with or add, each with
132	a reason (`admin_blocked_domains`, `admin_block_domain`). Accounts
133	already there are not touched.
134	- Deleted accounts (`/users/deleted`, linked from Workspaces):
135	accounts deleted by the person or by staff, newest first
136	(`admin_deleted_accounts`), each with who deleted it (the person, or the
137	staff member and why), when it is purged, the days left and what it
138	left (workspaces, teams, repositories, tokens, SSH keys). Identity keeps
139	each 30 days (`ACCOUNT_RESTORE_DAYS`). Restore
140	(`admin_restore_account`) clears the deletion and puts back the
141	memberships, teams and repository roles it left where they still exist;
142	its sessions, tokens and keys stay ended, and the person signs in with
143	their password. Check that whoever asks owns one of its addresses first.
144	Purge now (`admin_purge_account`, the username typed) removes it at
145	once, as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up: its
146	row, addresses, keys, two-factor secret, GitHub link, profile and
147	security log go; its username is kept in `deleted_users` and never given
148	out again; what it wrote shows as `ghost`. Both go in sudo's audit log
149	(`account_restored`, `account_purged`), naming the staff member. There
150	is no API route for deleting an account; only the site and sudo can.
151	- Invites (`/invites`): anyone may register on g1t.sh, so there is
152	no waitlist, allowance or shared link to manage. The page lists every
153	invite code sent with an invitation into a workspace or onto a
154	repository, searchable by a code's start, an email or a username, and
155	revokes a pending one (`admin_invites`, `admin_revoke_invite`). The
156	old waitlist, grants and shared links stay in identity's database,
157	untouched.
158	- Aliases (`/aliases`, under Customers): names that lead to a
159	workspace, set by staff only; there is no way for a customer to make
160	one, and nothing user-facing mentions them. `g1t`, the product's name,
161	leads to `flagon-io`, Flagon, Inc. (seeded by identity's migration
162	`0029_workspace_aliases.sql`), so nobody mistakes the trading name for
163	the organization. Every address under an alias leads to the workspace:
164	pages answer with a 301 to the same page (`/g1t/g1t/issues` to
165	`/flagon-io/g1t/issues`), git over HTTPS is answered in place as the
166	workspace's repository (pushes do not follow redirects), the API and MCP
167	run the call again under the workspace's slug, and the package
168	registries answer a 301 (308 for a publish). An alias points at the
169	workspace's id, so it follows a rename; it goes when the workspace is
170	purged. Each row shows the workspace, why the alias exists, and who added
171	it and when. Add (`admin_set_alias`) takes the alias, the
172	workspace's slug and why: identity refuses the site's own routes
173	(`settings`, `api`…), anyone's username, a workspace's slug (deleted, or
174	held after a rename for another workspace) and an existing alias.
175	Reserved names such as `g1t` can be aliases, and an alias is nobody's to
176	register or rename a workspace to while it exists. Remove
177	(`admin_remove_alias`) needs a reason. Both go in sudo's audit log
178	(`alias_added`, `alias_removed`), naming the staff member. `@g1t` in
179	text still means g1t's agent: it links to how the agent works, never to
180	`/g1t`.
181	- Enterprises: customers that pay for several workspaces with one
182	bill, one limit and one set of terms. Each has its workspaces (add or
183	remove them), combined usage, terms, credits, ledger and audit log, and
184	Invoices: where they go (the billing email, which also makes its
185	Stripe customer), a "Send invoice now" button, and every invoice with
186	its status (open, paid, overdue, void), a line per workspace, and a link
187	to Stripe's hosted invoice page. An invoice also goes out on its own as
188	each month closes: one Stripe invoice, a line per workspace for what it
189	owes, net 30, emailed by Stripe.
190	- Stripe: whether billing's key is in test or live mode (or off), the
191	webhook Stripe calls (URL, endpoint id, events, who registered it and
192	when), and the events Stripe sent lately with what billing did with
193	each. "Register webhook" (or "Replace") has billing delete the endpoint
194	it made before, create a new one and keep its signing secret, which no
195	one sees. Do it once per mode, and again after switching to live keys.
196
197	Sales changes are not money, so they have no confirmation step; they are
198	still POSTs from sudo's own pages, recorded with who made them.
199
200	Billing's internal account ids (`ws_<slug>` for a workspace's own,
201	`ent_…` for an enterprise) are never shown as names; an enterprise's id
202	appears only as small "Billing account id" text. Old `/accounts/…` links
203	redirect to the workspace or enterprise they meant.
204
205	Cards stay on Stripe. sudo never shows a card field. To help a customer
206	update their card or see invoices, staff make a Stripe billing link on the
207	workspace's page (it is recorded) and send it to the owner.
208
209	It holds no data. Workspaces, owners and members come from identity's
210	staff methods (`admin_workspaces`, `admin_workspace`; `IdentityAdminApi` in
211	`packages/contracts/src/identity.ts`); everything about money goes to the
212	billing service's (`admin_*`, `BillingAdminApi` in
213	`packages/contracts/src/billing.ts`), where each change is recorded with
214	the staff member's email. Both are reached over service bindings only, and
215	nothing but sudo binds to them.
216
217	## How it is locked
218
219	1. Cloudflare Access sits in front of `sudo.g1t.sh` and signs people in.
220	2. The worker checks Access's work on every request, the stylesheet
221	included (`run_worker_first`): it verifies the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`
222	JWT itself (RS256 against the team's published keys, audience, issuer,
223	expiry), then requires its email to be in `STAFF_EMAILS`. That email is
224	who every change is recorded as. See `app/lib/access.ts`.
225	Service tokens. A program (Claude, working without a browser) signs
226	in with an Access service token instead: it sends `CF-Access-Client-Id`
227	and `CF-Access-Client-Secret`, the Access application has a policy with
228	the Service Auth action that includes the token, and Access sends
229	sudo a JWT with no email whose `common_name` is the token's client id.
230	sudo lets it in only if that client id is in `STAFF_SERVICE_TOKENS`
231	(`<client id>=<name>`, comma separated, in `wrangler.jsonc`), after the
232	same signature, audience, issuer and expiry checks, and records it as
233	`<name>@service.g1t.sh`: `claude@service.g1t.sh` for
234	`claude-sudo`. Its secret lives in `.credentials/sudo-service-token.json`
235	and is used by `scripts/ops/sudo.mjs`, which sends sudo's own `Origin`
236	with each POST so the same-origin check applies to it as to a browser.
237	To take its access away, remove its entry here, or delete or revoke the
238	token in Zero Trust.
239	3. It fails closed. Until `ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN`, `ACCESS_AUD` and
240	`STAFF_EMAILS` are all set, every request gets a 403 saying sudo is not
241	configured.
242	4. Changes are POSTs only, and only from sudo's own pages (`Origin`, or
243	`Referer`, must be `https://sudo.g1t.sh`). Terms, enterprise moves, new
244	enterprises, Stripe billing links, invoice emails, invoices and the
245	webhook show a confirmation step first; a credit needs the workspace's
246	slug typed out.
247	5. The pages ship no JavaScript. The content security policy forbids
248	every script and inline style; responses are `no-store`, `noindex` and
249	cannot be framed. The worker has no `workers.dev` address or preview URLs.
250
251	## Setting up Access (once, in the Cloudflare dashboard)
252
253	1. Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add an application → Self-hosted.
254	- Application name: `sudo`.
255	- Session duration: short, such as 8 hours.
256	- Public hostname: `sudo.g1t.sh` (path empty, so it covers everything).
257	2. Add a policy (`g1t staff`): action Allow, include Emails → the
258	owner's address, and Emails ending in → `g1t.sh` for everyone with a
259	g1t address (the same entries as `STAFF_EMAILS`, where a domain is
260	written `@g1t.sh`). Add more staff here and in `STAFF_EMAILS`; either
261	one alone is not enough.
262	3. Save, then open the application's Overview (or Basic information)
263	and copy the Application Audience (AUD) tag.
264	4. Find the team domain under Zero Trust → Settings → Custom pages
265	(or Team name and domain): it looks like `<team>.cloudflareaccess.com`.
266	5. Put both into `wrangler.jsonc`:
267
268	```jsonc
269	"vars": {
270	"ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN": "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com",
271	"ACCESS_AUD": "<the AUD tag>",
272	"STAFF_EMAILS": "syntaqx@gmail.com, @g1t.sh"
273	}
274	```
275
276	6. Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh sudo` (after `billing` and `identity`, whose
277	`admin_*` methods it calls).
278
279	Visit <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: Access asks you to sign in, then the workspaces
280	list opens. Anyone else gets Access's own refusal; anyone Access lets in who
281	is not in `STAFF_EMAILS` gets a 403 from the worker.
282
283	## Signing in through WARP
284
285	Staff signed in to the Zero Trust org in the Cloudflare One agent (WARP)
286	reach sudo without the login page: the org allows WARP sessions as Access
287	sign-ins (8 hours), the sudo app accepts them, and the `g1t staff` policy
288	is also on the WARP enrollment app, so staff can enroll their devices.
289	The same two checks still apply: the Access policy, and `STAFF_EMAILS`.
290
291	## Working on it
292
293	```sh
294	npm run typecheck -w @g1t/sudo
295	npm test -w @g1t/sudo # JWT verification, forms, money, the workspace join, paging, nav, charts, signals, models
296	npm run build -w @g1t/sudo
297	```
298
299	`npm run dev` serves the pages, but every request is refused without a real
300	Access token, by design.