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Pick any line to see why it is the way it is: the commit, the pull request and issue it came from, and what the agent was thinking.

Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1//! Run credentials: the least-privilege tokens a sandbox works with.
2//!
3//! Every sandbox run gets its own tokens, bound to the run, its repository
4//! (and the pull request's fork), what that kind of run needs to do, and an
5//! expiry no later than the run's timeout. Each carries a composite
6//! identity: an agent acting on behalf of the person who started the work.
7//! What it may do is the intersection of the two: the run's scope, and what
8//! that person may do right now.
9//!
10//! The policy lives here, as pure functions, so that identity (which mints
11//! the tokens), the API (which serves REST and MCP) and repos (which serves
12//! git) all enforce the same rules, and so the rules can be tested.
13
14use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
15
16use crate::identity::AgentScope;
17use crate::repos::RepoPath;
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look18use crate::access::{BasePermission, RepoGrant, RepoRole};
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API19use crate::{Membership, PrincipalKind, Role, User};
20
21/// What a run does, as far as its credentials are concerned. The same names
22/// as [`crate::agents::RunKind`], plus `deploy`, a build of one commit.
23#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
24#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
25pub enum RunCredentialKind {
26 Implement,
27 Revise,
28 Review,
29 Answer,
30 Update,
31 Plan,
32 Checks,
33 Queue,
34 Mergecheck,
35 Deploy,
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily36 /// A security update: raising one package's version in its lockfiles
37 /// and pushing that to a branch of its own. Not an agent.
38 Bump,
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API39}
40
41impl RunCredentialKind {
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily42 pub const ALL: [RunCredentialKind; 11] = [
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API43 RunCredentialKind::Implement,
44 RunCredentialKind::Revise,
45 RunCredentialKind::Review,
46 RunCredentialKind::Answer,
47 RunCredentialKind::Update,
48 RunCredentialKind::Plan,
49 RunCredentialKind::Checks,
50 RunCredentialKind::Queue,
51 RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck,
52 RunCredentialKind::Deploy,
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily53 RunCredentialKind::Bump,
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API54 ];
55
56 pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
57 match self {
58 RunCredentialKind::Implement => "implement",
59 RunCredentialKind::Revise => "revise",
60 RunCredentialKind::Review => "review",
61 RunCredentialKind::Answer => "answer",
62 RunCredentialKind::Update => "update",
63 RunCredentialKind::Plan => "plan",
64 RunCredentialKind::Checks => "checks",
65 RunCredentialKind::Queue => "queue",
66 RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck => "mergecheck",
67 RunCredentialKind::Deploy => "deploy",
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily68 RunCredentialKind::Bump => "bump",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API69 }
70 }
71
72 /// Whether the run works on one pull request, whose session and
73 /// readiness it reports.
74 fn works_on_a_pull(self) -> bool {
75 matches!(
76 self,
77 RunCredentialKind::Implement
78 | RunCredentialKind::Revise
79 | RunCredentialKind::Answer
80 | RunCredentialKind::Update
81 )
82 }
83}
84
85/// Which part of a sandbox a credential is for.
86#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
87#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
88pub enum CredentialUse {
89 /// g1t's runner: cloning, pushing the result, recording the session.
90 /// It acts as the person downstream, so that what it pushes and records
91 /// is theirs, within the run's scope.
92 Runner,
93 /// The agent's own tools, over MCP. It acts as the agent.
94 Tools,
95}
96
97impl CredentialUse {
98 pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
99 match self {
100 CredentialUse::Runner => "runner",
101 CredentialUse::Tools => "tools",
102 }
103 }
104}
105
106/// A repository a run may push to, and the one branch, if only one.
107#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
108pub struct GitGrant {
109 pub repo: RepoPath,
110 /// Null: any branch. A pull request's fork is its own repository, so
111 /// the whole of it is the pull request's.
112 #[serde(default)]
113 pub branch: Option<String>,
114}
115
116/// What binds an agent's token to one run. Absent on agent tokens made
117/// before run credentials, which keep working for the API only.
118#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
119#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
120pub struct RunBinding {
121 pub kind: RunCredentialKind,
122 #[serde(rename = "use")]
123 pub usage: CredentialUse,
124 /// The agent run, once the sandbox has recorded it.
125 #[serde(default)]
126 pub run_id: Option<String>,
127 /// The pull request the run works on, for the kinds that work on one.
128 #[serde(default)]
129 pub number: Option<u32>,
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent130 /// The agent's name, such as `g1t`.
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API131 pub agent: String,
132 /// Repositories it may clone and fetch, besides those it may push to.
133 #[serde(default)]
134 pub read: Vec<RepoPath>,
135 /// Where it may push.
136 #[serde(default)]
137 pub push: Vec<GitGrant>,
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily138 /// g1t's own run (a security update, an agent g1t put on one): the
139 /// credential belongs to the workspace, and acts on behalf of g1t
140 /// (`system::ID`), so what it does is g1t's, and the pull request g1t
141 /// opened, and its working copy, are its own.
142 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
143 pub system: bool,
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API144}
145
146/// A person, by id and name.
147#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
148pub struct Principal {
149 pub id: String,
150 pub username: String,
151}
152
g1t is the stored author of what it opens; the person who asked is requested_by and keeps the author's rights153impl From<&User> for Principal {
154 fn from(user: &User) -> Self {
155 Principal {
156 id: user.id.clone(),
157 username: user.username.clone(),
158 }
159 }
160}
161
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API162/// Set on a [`User`] resolved from an agent's token: the composite
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent163/// identity, "g1t on behalf of syntaqx", and what it may do.
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API164#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
165#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
166pub struct Acting {
167 /// The token's id, as audit entries name it.
168 pub credential_id: String,
169 pub agent: String,
170 pub on_behalf_of: Principal,
171 pub scope: AgentScope,
172}
173
174impl Acting {
175 pub fn run(&self) -> Option<&RunBinding> {
176 self.scope.run.as_ref()
177 }
178}
179
180/// `create_run_credential`: a token for one sandbox run. It acts as
181/// `agent` on behalf of `on_behalf_of`, can do only what `kind` and `usage`
182/// allow in `repo`, and expires after `ttl_seconds`, which should be the
183/// run's timeout. Returns `CreatedAccessToken`.
184#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
185#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
186pub struct CreateRunCredentialArgs {
187 pub on_behalf_of: User,
188 pub repo: RepoPath,
189 pub kind: RunCredentialKind,
190 #[serde(rename = "use")]
191 pub usage: CredentialUse,
192 #[serde(default)]
193 pub number: Option<u32>,
194 #[serde(default)]
195 pub read: Vec<RepoPath>,
196 #[serde(default)]
197 pub push: Vec<GitGrant>,
198 pub ttl_seconds: u64,
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent199 /// Defaults to `g1t`.
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API200 #[serde(default)]
201 pub agent: Option<String>,
202}
203
204/// `bind_run_credentials`: ties tokens, named by the SHA-256 of their
205/// text in hex, to the agent run their sandbox recorded. Returns how many.
206#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
207#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
208pub struct BindRunCredentialsArgs {
209 pub token_hashes: Vec<String>,
210 pub run_id: String,
211}
212
213/// `revoke_run_credentials`: ends tokens when their sandbox stops, by hash
214/// or by run. Only run credentials are touched, never a token a person
215/// made. Returns how many.
216#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
217#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
218pub struct RevokeRunCredentialsArgs {
219 #[serde(default)]
220 pub token_hashes: Vec<String>,
221 #[serde(default)]
222 pub run_id: Option<String>,
223}
224
225// --- Policy --------------------------------------------------------------
226
227/// Operations that only read.
228pub const READ_OPERATIONS: &[&str] = &[
229 "whoami",
Usage, Billing settings and prepaid AI credit; fixes from the UX audit230 "get_usage",
231 "get_budget",
232 "get_ai_credit",
233 "list_invoices",
234 "get_billing_details",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API235 "list_repos",
236 "get_repo",
Merge branch 'main' into worktree-agent-a69aeabc4b0deeb97237 "list_projects",
238 "get_project",
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look239 "list_deleted_repos",
240 "list_collaborators",
241 "get_collaborator_permission",
242 "list_repo_invitations",
243 "list_my_repo_invitations",
244 "list_outside_collaborators",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar245 "list_teams",
246 "get_team",
247 "list_team_members",
248 "list_child_teams",
249 "list_team_repos",
250 "list_user_teams",
251 "get_codeowners_errors",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API252 "get_repo_settings",
Fast pages, required checks on the branch, self-hosted runners, honest incidents253 "list_check_names",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API254 "get_merge_queue",
255 "recall",
256 "list_issues",
257 "get_issue",
258 "get_plan",
259 "list_labels",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar260 "list_issue_labels",
261 "list_milestones",
262 "get_milestone",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API263 "list_pull_requests",
264 "get_pull_request",
265 "read_session",
266 "get_pull_request_changes",
267 "list_events",
268 "get_context",
269 "search_context",
270 "get_entity",
Search across all of g1t, Explore, and a command palette271 "search",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API272 "list_workflows",
273 "list_workflow_runs",
274 "get_workflow_run",
275 "get_job_logs",
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a3abfcce648e87dca'276 "get_pending_deployments",
277 "get_workflow_permissions",
278 "get_fork_pr_approval",
Merge checks: statuses and check runs on every commit279 "list_commit_statuses",
280 "get_combined_status",
281 "list_check_runs_for_ref",
282 "get_check_run",
283 "list_check_run_annotations",
284 "list_check_suites_for_ref",
285 "get_check_suite",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API286 "list_integrations",
287 "get_model_routes",
288 "list_webhooks",
289 "list_webhook_deliveries",
290 "list_actions_secrets",
291 "list_actions_variables",
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily292 "list_security_alerts",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar293 "list_secret_scanning_alerts",
294 "get_secret_scanning_alert",
295 "list_secret_scanning_locations",
296 "list_bypass_requests",
297 "list_custom_patterns",
298 "list_code_scanning_alerts",
299 "get_code_scanning_alert",
300 "list_code_scanning_analyses",
301 "get_sarif_upload",
302 "list_vulnerability_alerts",
303 "get_vulnerability_alert",
304 "get_dependency_graph",
305 "get_sbom",
306 "compare_dependencies",
307 "get_security_settings",
308 "get_workspace_security_settings",
309 "get_security_overview",
API: notifications over REST and MCP, with notifications scopes310 "list_notifications",
311 "get_notification_thread",
312 "get_thread_subscription",
313 "get_repo_subscription",
314 "list_watched_repos",
API: pinned projects over REST and MCP315 "list_pinned_projects",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API316];
317
318/// What no agent's token may ever do, whatever its scope says: workspaces,
319/// repositories' settings, members, tokens, billing, integrations,
320/// webhooks, secrets, workflows' controls, merging, and putting more agents
321/// to work.
322pub const NEVER: &[&str] = &[
Usage, Billing settings and prepaid AI credit; fixes from the UX audit323 // Billing is people's: agents never spend or change it.
324 "set_budget",
325 "buy_ai_credit",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API326 "create_workspace",
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look327 "delete_workspace",
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily328 "update_workspace",
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens329 // So is who belongs to a workspace and who owns it.
330 "list_members",
331 "update_member",
332 "remove_member",
333 "transfer_ownership",
334 "leave_workspace",
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look335 "transfer_repo",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API336 "create_repo",
337 "update_repo",
Merge branch 'main' into worktree-agent-a69aeabc4b0deeb97338 "update_project",
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look339 "delete_repo",
340 "list_deleted_repos",
341 "restore_repo",
342 "purge_repo",
343 "rename_repo",
344 "archive_repo",
345 "unarchive_repo",
346 "set_repo_visibility",
347 "rename_branch",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API348 "update_repo_settings",
349 "merge_pull_request",
350 "assign_issue",
351 "plan_work",
352 "apply_plan",
353 "import_issue",
354 "list_integrations",
355 "connect_integration",
AI Gateway: OpenAI's format, open models, and your own providers356 "update_integration",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API357 "disconnect_integration",
358 "test_integration",
359 "get_model_routes",
360 "set_model_routes",
361 "list_webhooks",
362 "create_webhook",
363 "update_webhook",
364 "delete_webhook",
365 "ping_webhook",
366 "list_webhook_deliveries",
367 "redeliver_webhook",
368 "dispatch_workflow",
369 "cancel_workflow_run",
370 "rerun_workflow_run",
371 "update_workflow",
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a3abfcce648e87dca'372 // Nor lets runs or deployments through, or changes what holds them.
373 "approve_workflow_run",
374 "review_pending_deployments",
375 "update_environment",
376 "delete_environment",
377 "set_workflow_permissions",
378 "set_fork_pr_approval",
379 "create_repository_dispatch",
380 "set_workspace_workflow_permissions",
Merge checks: statuses and check runs on every commit381 // An agent never reports checks on its own work, nor asks for them
382 // to run again: what checks say is the integrations' to say.
383 "create_commit_status",
384 "create_check_run",
385 "update_check_run",
386 "rerequest_check_run",
387 "rerequest_check_suite",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API388 "list_actions_secrets",
389 "set_actions_secret",
390 "delete_actions_secret",
391 "list_actions_variables",
392 "set_actions_variable",
393 "delete_actions_variable",
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look394 "list_collaborators",
395 "get_collaborator_permission",
396 "add_collaborator",
397 "update_collaborator",
398 "remove_collaborator",
399 "list_repo_invitations",
400 "revoke_repo_invitation",
401 "list_my_repo_invitations",
402 "accept_repo_invitation",
403 "decline_repo_invitation",
404 "set_base_permission",
405 "list_outside_collaborators",
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a5a5de74d8863d554' into worktree-agent-a16631325aecf58ca406 // Deploy keys, which let a machine into a repository.
407 "list_deploy_keys",
408 "get_deploy_key",
409 "create_deploy_key",
410 "delete_deploy_key",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar411 // Teams: who is in which, and what they reach, is for people.
412 "create_team",
413 "update_team",
414 "delete_team",
415 "set_team_member",
416 "remove_team_member",
417 "set_team_repo",
418 "remove_team_repo",
419 "set_team_review_assignment",
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily420 // Dismissing a secret lets it through push protection.
421 "dismiss_security_alert",
422 "reopen_security_alert",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar423 // Nor any other decision about security: closing or reopening an
424 // alert, pushing past push protection or deciding who may, changing
425 // what is looked for or when checks fail, or putting more agents to
426 // work. An agent fixes what it finds in its own pull request.
427 "update_secret_scanning_alert",
428 "bypass_push_protection",
429 "review_bypass_request",
430 "create_custom_pattern",
431 "update_custom_pattern",
432 "delete_custom_pattern",
433 "update_code_scanning_alert",
434 "update_vulnerability_alert",
435 "fix_security_alert",
436 "update_security_settings",
437 "update_workspace_security_settings",
API: notifications over REST and MCP, with notifications scopes438 // A person's own inbox: g1t's agents act as g1t, which has none.
439 "list_notifications",
440 "get_notification_thread",
441 "mark_notifications_read",
442 "mark_thread_read",
443 "mark_thread_done",
444 "save_thread",
445 "snooze_thread",
446 "get_thread_subscription",
447 "set_thread_subscription",
448 "delete_thread_subscription",
449 "get_repo_subscription",
450 "set_repo_subscription",
451 "delete_repo_subscription",
452 "list_watched_repos",
API: pinned projects over REST and MCP453 // Pins are a person's own, as the inbox is.
454 "list_pinned_projects",
455 "pin_project",
456 "unpin_project",
457 "reorder_pinned_projects",
Merge packages: roles, Actions access, source label, soft delete, API458 // Deleting packages and deciding who may use them is for people: an
459 // agent publishes its repository's packages and never deletes them.
460 "update_package",
461 "link_package",
462 "unlink_package",
463 "set_package_access",
464 "remove_package_access",
465 "set_package_actions_access",
466 "remove_package_actions_access",
467 "delete_package",
468 "restore_package",
469 "delete_package_version",
470 "restore_package_version",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API471];
472
473/// Reading what an agent needs to know about its repository.
474const TOOLS_READ: &[&str] = &[
475 "get_repo",
476 "list_issues",
477 "get_issue",
478 "list_labels",
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar479 "list_issue_labels",
480 "list_milestones",
481 "get_milestone",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API482 "list_pull_requests",
483 "get_pull_request",
484 "get_pull_request_changes",
485 "read_session",
486 "get_merge_queue",
487 "list_events",
488 "recall",
489 "search_context",
490 "get_entity",
Search across all of g1t, Explore, and a command palette491 "search",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API492 "list_workflows",
493 "list_workflow_runs",
494 "get_workflow_run",
495 "get_job_logs",
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a3abfcce648e87dca'496 "get_pending_deployments",
497 "get_workflow_permissions",
498 "get_fork_pr_approval",
Merge checks: statuses and check runs on every commit499 "list_commit_statuses",
500 "get_combined_status",
501 "list_check_runs_for_ref",
502 "get_check_run",
503 "list_check_run_annotations",
504 "list_check_suites_for_ref",
505 "get_check_suite",
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API506];
507
508pub fn is_read(operation: &str) -> bool {
509 READ_OPERATIONS.contains(&operation)
510}
511
512/// The API and MCP operations a run of `kind` may use with a credential
513/// for `usage`. Git is separate: see [`decide_git`].
514pub fn operations_for(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<&'static str> {
515 use RunCredentialKind as K;
516 let mut operations: Vec<&'static str> = Vec::new();
517 match usage {
518 CredentialUse::Runner => {
519 if kind.works_on_a_pull() {
520 operations.extend(["get_repo", "get_pull_request", "record_session"]);
521 }
522 if kind == K::Implement {
523 operations.push("mark_pull_request_ready");
524 }
525 }
526 CredentialUse::Tools => match kind {
527 K::Implement | K::Revise | K::Answer => {
528 operations.extend(TOOLS_READ.iter().copied());
529 operations.extend([
530 "create_issue",
531 "add_comment",
532 "take_messages",
533 "remember",
534 "message_agent",
535 "answer_message",
536 "get_context",
537 ]);
538 }
539 K::Review => {
540 operations.extend(TOOLS_READ.iter().copied());
541 operations.extend(["add_comment", "review_pull_request", "get_context"]);
542 }
543 K::Plan => {
544 operations.extend(TOOLS_READ.iter().copied());
545 operations.extend(["create_issue", "get_context"]);
546 }
547 K::Update => operations.extend(TOOLS_READ.iter().copied()),
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily548 K::Checks | K::Queue | K::Mergecheck | K::Deploy | K::Bump => {}
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API549 },
550 }
551 operations
552}
553
Thirteen MCP tools and classic token scopes; agents rate their confidence and can be put on an issue in one step554/// What a run's credential may do, in the scope vocabulary that access
555/// tokens use (see [`crate::scopes`]): the scopes of its operations, and
556/// for a runner, git's. Its operations, its repository and its run still
557/// bound it more tightly than these scopes say.
558pub fn run_scopes(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> Vec<crate::scopes::Scope> {
559 use crate::scopes::{Scope, normalize, scope_for};
560 let mut scopes: Vec<Scope> = operations_for(kind, usage)
561 .into_iter()
562 .filter_map(scope_for)
563 .collect();
564 if usage == CredentialUse::Runner {
565 scopes.push(Scope::CodeRead);
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily566 if matches!(
567 kind,
568 RunCredentialKind::Implement
569 | RunCredentialKind::Revise
570 | RunCredentialKind::Answer
571 | RunCredentialKind::Update
572 | RunCredentialKind::Bump
573 ) {
Thirteen MCP tools and classic token scopes; agents rate their confidence and can be put on an issue in one step574 scopes.push(Scope::CodeWrite);
575 }
576 }
577 normalize(&mut scopes);
578 scopes
579}
580
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API581/// Operations that change a pull request, which a runner may do only to
582/// the pull request its run works on.
583const PULL_WRITES: &[&str] = &["record_session", "mark_pull_request_ready"];
584
585/// Whether something was allowed, and the rule that decided it.
586#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
587pub struct Decision {
588 pub allowed: bool,
589 /// A short, stable name: `run:implement/tools`, `never`,
590 /// `scope:repository` and so on. Shown in the audit log.
591 pub rule: String,
592 /// Why it was refused, for the caller.
593 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
594 pub reason: Option<String>,
595}
596
597impl Decision {
598 pub fn allow(rule: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
599 Decision {
600 allowed: true,
601 rule: rule.into(),
602 reason: None,
603 }
604 }
605
606 pub fn deny(rule: impl Into<String>, reason: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
607 Decision {
608 allowed: false,
609 rule: rule.into(),
610 reason: Some(reason.into()),
611 }
612 }
613}
614
615fn same_repo(a: &RepoPath, b: &RepoPath) -> bool {
616 a.namespace.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.namespace) && a.name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&b.name)
617}
618
619fn scope_rule(scope: &AgentScope) -> String {
620 match &scope.run {
621 Some(run) => format!("run:{}/{}", run.kind.as_str(), run.usage.as_str()),
622 None => "agent-token".to_owned(),
623 }
624}
625
626/// Whether `user`, resolved from an agent's token with `scope`, may use
627/// `operation`. `repo` is the repository the call names, if any, and
628/// `needs_repo` whether the operation is about one; `number` the issue or
629/// pull request it names.
630pub fn decide_operation(
631 user: &User,
632 scope: &AgentScope,
633 operation: &str,
634 repo: Option<&RepoPath>,
635 needs_repo: bool,
636 number: Option<u32>,
637) -> Decision {
638 let who = "A g1t agent's token";
639 if NEVER.contains(&operation) {
640 return Decision::deny(
641 "never",
642 format!(
643 "{who} can never use {operation}: settings, members, tokens, billing, integrations, webhooks, secrets and merging are for people."
644 ),
645 );
646 }
647 if !scope.operations.iter().any(|name| name == operation) {
648 return Decision::deny(
649 "scope:operation",
650 format!("{who} for this run cannot use {operation}."),
651 );
652 }
653 if needs_repo && !repo.is_some_and(|asked| same_repo(asked, &scope.repo)) {
654 return Decision::deny(
655 "scope:repository",
656 format!(
657 "{who} works in {}/{} only.",
658 scope.repo.namespace, scope.repo.name
659 ),
660 );
661 }
662 // The intersection: the person it acts for must still be able to work
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look663 // in the repository's workspace, as a member or with a role on its
664 // repositories. What it may do in the repository itself is their
665 // role there, which services check (`access::can`).
666 if !crate::access::has_access_in(user, &scope.repo.namespace) {
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API667 return Decision::deny(
668 "on-behalf-of:membership",
669 format!(
670 "The person this agent works for is no longer a member of {}.",
671 scope.repo.namespace
672 ),
673 );
674 }
675 if let Some(run) = &scope.run
676 && run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner
677 && PULL_WRITES.contains(&operation)
678 && run.number.is_some()
679 && number != run.number
680 {
681 return Decision::deny(
682 "scope:pull",
683 format!(
684 "{who} can change pull request #{} only.",
685 run.number.unwrap_or_default()
686 ),
687 );
688 }
689 Decision::allow(scope_rule(scope))
690}
691
692/// Whether a run credential may clone or fetch (`write` false), or push to
693/// (`write` true), the repository at `repo`.
694pub fn decide_git(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, write: bool) -> Decision {
695 let Some(run) = scope
696 .run
697 .as_ref()
698 .filter(|run| run.usage == CredentialUse::Runner)
699 else {
700 return Decision::deny(
701 "git:not-a-run",
702 "A g1t agent's tools token cannot be used with git.",
703 );
704 };
705 let pushable = run.push.iter().any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo));
706 if write {
707 return if pushable {
708 Decision::allow(format!("{}:push", scope_rule(scope)))
709 } else {
710 Decision::deny(
711 "git:push",
712 format!(
713 "A {} run cannot push to {}/{}.",
714 run.kind.as_str(),
715 repo.namespace,
716 repo.name
717 ),
718 )
719 };
720 }
721 let readable = pushable
722 || same_repo(&scope.repo, repo)
723 || run.read.iter().any(|path| same_repo(path, repo));
724 if readable {
725 Decision::allow(format!("{}:read", scope_rule(scope)))
726 } else {
727 Decision::deny(
728 "git:read",
729 format!(
730 "A {} run cannot read {}/{}.",
731 run.kind.as_str(),
732 repo.namespace,
733 repo.name
734 ),
735 )
736 }
737}
738
739/// Whether a push to `repo` is limited to certain branches, so that the
740/// refs it moves have to be read and checked with [`decide_refs`].
741pub fn limits_branches(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath) -> bool {
742 scope
743 .run
744 .iter()
745 .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter())
746 .any(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo) && grant.branch.is_some())
747}
748
749/// Whether a push to `repo` may move `refs` (full refs, such as
750/// `refs/heads/main`). Tags are never a run's to move.
751pub fn decide_refs(scope: &AgentScope, repo: &RepoPath, refs: &[String]) -> Decision {
752 let repo_decision = decide_git(scope, repo, true);
753 if !repo_decision.allowed {
754 return repo_decision;
755 }
756 let grants: Vec<&GitGrant> = scope
757 .run
758 .iter()
759 .flat_map(|run| run.push.iter())
760 .filter(|grant| same_repo(&grant.repo, repo))
761 .collect();
762 for git_ref in refs {
763 let Some(branch) = git_ref.strip_prefix("refs/heads/") else {
764 return Decision::deny("git:ref", format!("A run cannot push {git_ref}."));
765 };
766 let allowed = grants
767 .iter()
768 .any(|grant| grant.branch.as_deref().is_none_or(|only| only == branch));
769 if !allowed {
770 return Decision::deny(
771 "git:ref",
772 format!(
773 "A run cannot push to {branch} in {}/{}.",
774 repo.namespace, repo.name
775 ),
776 );
777 }
778 }
779 repo_decision
780}
781
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look782/// The most an agent may be on a repository, whoever it works for: it
783/// can push, merge and run, never change settings or who has access.
784pub const AGENT_CEILING: RepoRole = RepoRole::Write;
785
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API786/// The memberships an agent working for `person` has: the run's
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look787/// workspace, as a member, only if the person is in it now, with the
788/// person's role on its repositories (an owner's Admin included) cut down
789/// to [`AGENT_CEILING`].
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API790pub fn intersect(person: &[Membership], namespace: &str) -> Vec<Membership> {
791 let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase();
792 person
793 .iter()
794 .filter(|membership| membership.slug == namespace)
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look795 .map(|membership| {
796 let base = match membership.role {
797 Role::Owner => BasePermission::Admin,
798 Role::Member => membership.base_permission.unwrap_or_default(),
799 };
800 Membership {
801 role: Role::Member,
802 base_permission: Some(match base {
803 BasePermission::Admin => BasePermission::Write,
804 base => base,
805 }),
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens806 // Billing and security manager are the person's, never
807 // their agent's.
808 org_roles: Vec::new(),
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look809 ..membership.clone()
810 }
811 })
812 .collect()
813}
814
815/// The repository grants an agent working for `person` has: those in the
816/// run's workspace, each cut down to [`AGENT_CEILING`].
817pub fn intersect_grants(person: &[RepoGrant], namespace: &str) -> Vec<RepoGrant> {
818 let namespace = namespace.to_lowercase();
819 person
820 .iter()
821 .filter(|grant| grant.workspace == namespace)
822 .map(|grant| RepoGrant {
823 role: grant.role.min(AGENT_CEILING),
824 ..grant.clone()
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API825 })
826 .collect()
827}
828
829/// Who a runner's credential acts as downstream: the person, with only the
830/// agent's (already intersected) memberships. `None` for anything else.
831pub fn as_person(user: &User) -> Option<User> {
832 let acting = user.acting.as_ref()?;
833 if user.kind != PrincipalKind::Agent {
834 return None;
835 }
836 let run = acting.run()?;
837 if run.usage != CredentialUse::Runner {
838 return None;
839 }
840 Some(User {
841 id: acting.on_behalf_of.id.clone(),
842 username: acting.on_behalf_of.username.clone(),
843 kind: PrincipalKind::User,
844 verified: user.verified,
845 workspaces: user.workspaces.clone(),
846 avatar: None,
847 acting: None,
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look848 grants: user.grants.clone(),
Thirteen MCP tools and classic token scopes; agents rate their confidence and can be put on an issue in one step849 token: None,
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens850 held: Vec::new(),
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API851 })
852}
853
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent854/// How an actor is described: "g1t on behalf of syntaqx".
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API855pub fn describe(user: &User) -> String {
856 match &user.acting {
857 Some(acting) => format!(
858 "{} on behalf of {}",
859 acting.agent, acting.on_behalf_of.username
860 ),
861 None => user.username.clone(),
862 }
863}
864
865#[cfg(test)]
866mod tests {
867 use super::*;
868
869 #[test]
Thirteen MCP tools and classic token scopes; agents rate their confidence and can be put on an issue in one step870 fn a_run_s_scopes_are_never_admin() {
871 for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL {
872 for usage in [CredentialUse::Runner, CredentialUse::Tools] {
873 let scopes = run_scopes(kind, usage);
874 assert!(scopes.iter().all(|scope| !scope.dangerous()), "{kind:?} {usage:?}: {scopes:?}");
875 }
876 }
877 let review = run_scopes(RunCredentialKind::Review, CredentialUse::Tools);
878 assert!(review.contains(&crate::scopes::Scope::PullRequestsWrite));
879 assert!(!review.contains(&crate::scopes::Scope::CodeWrite));
880 }
881
882 #[test]
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API883 fn agents_can_search_the_context_hub() {
884 for kind in [RunCredentialKind::Implement, RunCredentialKind::Review, RunCredentialKind::Plan] {
885 let tools = operations_for(kind, CredentialUse::Tools);
886 assert!(tools.contains(&"search_context") && tools.contains(&"get_entity"));
887 }
888 assert!(is_read("search_context") && is_read("get_entity"));
889 }
890
Search across all of g1t, Explore, and a command palette891 #[test]
892 fn agents_can_search_all_of_g1t() {
893 // Site-wide search only reads: every run that reads its repository
894 // may use it, and nothing that never reads gets it.
895 assert!(is_read("search"));
896 assert!(!NEVER.contains(&"search"));
897 for kind in [
898 RunCredentialKind::Implement,
899 RunCredentialKind::Revise,
900 RunCredentialKind::Answer,
901 RunCredentialKind::Review,
902 RunCredentialKind::Plan,
903 RunCredentialKind::Update,
904 ] {
905 let tools = operations_for(kind, CredentialUse::Tools);
906 assert!(tools.contains(&"search"), "{kind:?} should search");
907 // The context hub's search stays its own tool beside it.
908 assert!(tools.contains(&"search_context"), "{kind:?} keeps search_context");
909 }
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily910 for kind in [RunCredentialKind::Checks, RunCredentialKind::Queue, RunCredentialKind::Mergecheck, RunCredentialKind::Deploy, RunCredentialKind::Bump] {
Search across all of g1t, Explore, and a command palette911 assert!(!operations_for(kind, CredentialUse::Tools).contains(&"search"));
912 }
913 assert!(!operations_for(RunCredentialKind::Implement, CredentialUse::Runner).contains(&"search"));
914 }
915
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API916 fn path(namespace: &str, name: &str) -> RepoPath {
917 RepoPath {
918 namespace: namespace.to_owned(),
919 name: name.to_owned(),
920 }
921 }
922
923 fn scope(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse) -> AgentScope {
924 AgentScope {
925 repo: path("acme", "rocket"),
926 operations: operations_for(kind, usage)
927 .into_iter()
928 .map(str::to_owned)
929 .collect(),
930 run: Some(RunBinding {
931 kind,
932 usage,
933 run_id: Some("run_1".to_owned()),
934 number: Some(7),
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent935 agent: "g1t".to_owned(),
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily936 system: false,
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API937 read: vec![path("acme", "rocket")],
938 push: match kind {
939 RunCredentialKind::Implement
940 | RunCredentialKind::Revise
941 | RunCredentialKind::Answer => vec![GitGrant {
942 repo: path("pulls", "pul_7"),
943 branch: None,
944 }],
945 RunCredentialKind::Update => vec![GitGrant {
946 repo: path("acme", "rocket"),
947 branch: Some("fix-login".to_owned()),
948 }],
949 _ => vec![],
950 },
951 }),
952 }
953 }
954
955 fn agent(member_of: &[&str], scope: AgentScope) -> User {
956 User {
957 id: "usr_g1t_agent".to_owned(),
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent958 username: "g1t".to_owned(),
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API959 kind: PrincipalKind::Agent,
960 verified: true,
961 workspaces: member_of
962 .iter()
963 .map(|slug| Membership::member(*slug))
964 .collect(),
965 avatar: None,
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look966 grants: Vec::new(),
Thirteen MCP tools and classic token scopes; agents rate their confidence and can be put on an issue in one step967 token: None,
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens968 held: Vec::new(),
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API969 acting: Some(Box::new(Acting {
970 credential_id: "tok_1".to_owned(),
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent971 agent: "g1t".to_owned(),
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API972 on_behalf_of: Principal {
973 id: "usr_1".to_owned(),
974 username: "syntaqx".to_owned(),
975 },
976 scope,
977 })),
978 }
979 }
980
981 fn op(kind: RunCredentialKind, usage: CredentialUse, operation: &str) -> Decision {
982 let scope = scope(kind, usage);
983 let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone());
984 decide_operation(
985 &user,
986 &scope,
987 operation,
988 Some(&path("acme", "rocket")),
989 true,
990 Some(7),
991 )
992 }
993
994 use CredentialUse::{Runner, Tools};
995 use RunCredentialKind as K;
996
997 /// Which operations each kind of run may use through its tools: the
998 /// allowed and denied matrix.
999 #[test]
1000 fn tools_matrix() {
1001 let cases: [(&str, [bool; 6]); 12] = [
1002 // implement revise answer review plan checks
1003 ("get_issue", [true, true, true, true, true, false]),
1004 ("create_issue", [true, true, true, false, true, false]),
1005 ("add_comment", [true, true, true, true, false, false]),
1006 (
1007 "review_pull_request",
1008 [false, false, false, true, false, false],
1009 ),
1010 ("remember", [true, true, true, false, false, false]),
1011 ("take_messages", [true, true, true, false, false, false]),
1012 ("record_session", [false, false, false, false, false, false]),
1013 (
1014 "merge_pull_request",
1015 [false, false, false, false, false, false],
1016 ),
1017 (
1018 "update_repo_settings",
1019 [false, false, false, false, false, false],
1020 ),
1021 ("create_webhook", [false, false, false, false, false, false]),
1022 (
1023 "set_actions_secret",
1024 [false, false, false, false, false, false],
1025 ),
1026 ("assign_issue", [false, false, false, false, false, false]),
1027 ];
1028 let kinds = [
1029 K::Implement,
1030 K::Revise,
1031 K::Answer,
1032 K::Review,
1033 K::Plan,
1034 K::Checks,
1035 ];
1036 for (operation, expected) in cases {
1037 for (kind, allowed) in kinds.into_iter().zip(expected) {
1038 assert_eq!(
1039 op(kind, Tools, operation).allowed,
1040 allowed,
1041 "{operation} by a {} run's tools",
1042 kind.as_str()
1043 );
1044 }
1045 }
1046 }
1047
1048 #[test]
1049 fn runner_matrix() {
1050 assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "record_session").allowed);
1051 assert!(op(K::Implement, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed);
1052 assert!(op(K::Revise, Runner, "record_session").allowed);
1053 assert!(!op(K::Revise, Runner, "mark_pull_request_ready").allowed);
1054 assert!(!op(K::Implement, Runner, "create_issue").allowed);
1055 assert!(!op(K::Review, Runner, "record_session").allowed);
1056 assert!(!op(K::Checks, Runner, "get_issue").allowed);
1057 }
1058
1059 #[test]
1060 fn settings_billing_tokens_and_members_are_never_reachable() {
1061 for kind in RunCredentialKind::ALL {
1062 for usage in [Runner, Tools] {
1063 for operation in NEVER.iter().copied() {
1064 let decision = op(kind, usage, operation);
1065 assert!(!decision.allowed);
1066 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never");
1067 }
1068 }
1069 }
1070 // Even a scope that lists one is refused.
1071 let mut wide = scope(K::Implement, Tools);
1072 wide.operations.push("merge_pull_request".to_owned());
1073 let user = agent(&["acme"], wide.clone());
1074 let decision = decide_operation(
1075 &user,
1076 &wide,
1077 "merge_pull_request",
1078 Some(&path("acme", "rocket")),
1079 true,
1080 Some(7),
1081 );
1082 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "never");
1083 }
1084
1085 #[test]
1086 fn another_repository_is_refused() {
1087 let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools);
1088 let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone());
1089 let decision = decide_operation(
1090 &user,
1091 &scope,
1092 "create_issue",
1093 Some(&path("acme", "other")),
1094 true,
1095 None,
1096 );
1097 assert!(!decision.allowed);
1098 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository");
1099 let decision = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "create_issue", None, true, None);
1100 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "scope:repository");
1101 // The repository's name is matched without regard to case.
1102 let decision = decide_operation(
1103 &user,
1104 &scope,
1105 "create_issue",
1106 Some(&path("Acme", "Rocket")),
1107 true,
1108 None,
1109 );
1110 assert!(decision.allowed);
1111 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "run:implement/tools");
1112 }
1113
1114 #[test]
1115 fn the_permission_is_the_intersection_with_the_person() {
1116 let scope = scope(K::Implement, Tools);
1117 // The person left the workspace: their agent can do nothing there.
1118 let user = agent(&[], scope.clone());
1119 let decision = decide_operation(
1120 &user,
1121 &scope,
1122 "get_issue",
1123 Some(&path("acme", "rocket")),
1124 true,
1125 Some(1),
1126 );
1127 assert!(!decision.allowed);
1128 assert_eq!(decision.rule, "on-behalf-of:membership");
1129 // And an owner's agent is only ever a member.
1130 let owner = vec![
1131 Membership {
1132 slug: "acme".to_owned(),
1133 role: Role::Owner,
1134 name: None,
1135 avatar: None,
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look1136 base_permission: Some(BasePermission::None),
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-ad7c6d88d93adc817'1137 team_creation: None,
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens1138 org_roles: vec![crate::OrgRole::SecurityManager],
1139 privileges: None,
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1140 },
1141 Membership::member("elsewhere"),
1142 ];
1143 let memberships = intersect(&owner, "Acme");
1144 assert_eq!(memberships.len(), 1);
1145 assert_eq!(memberships[0].slug, "acme");
1146 assert_eq!(memberships[0].role, Role::Member);
Merge main (membership, two-factor, GitHub repo roles) into tokens1147 assert!(memberships[0].org_roles.is_empty());
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1148 assert!(intersect(&owner, "nowhere").is_empty());
1149 }
1150
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look1151 /// An agent gets at most the person's role on the repository, and
1152 /// never more than Write; nothing outside the run's workspace.
1153 #[test]
1154 fn an_agent_has_at_most_its_persons_role() {
1155 use crate::access::{Capability, RepoRef, can, permission};
1156 let rocket = RepoRef { id: "rep_1", namespace: "acme", private: true };
1157 let other = RepoRef { id: "rep_2", namespace: "acme", private: true };
1158 let elsewhere = RepoRef { id: "rep_3", namespace: "globex", private: true };
1159 let tools = scope(K::Implement, Tools);
1160 let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner);
1161 // An owner's agent: Write, never Admin.
1162 let owner = [Membership { role: Role::Owner, ..Membership::member("acme") }, Membership::member("globex")];
1163 let mut agent_user = agent(&[], scope.clone());
1164 agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&owner, "acme");
1165 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write));
1166 assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::ManageSettings));
1167 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None);
1168 // A member whose workspace gives Read: Read, so it cannot push.
1169 let reader = [Membership { base_permission: Some(BasePermission::Read), ..Membership::member("acme") }];
1170 agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&reader, "acme");
1171 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Read));
1172 assert!(!can(Some(&agent_user), rocket, Capability::Push));
1173 // An outside collaborator with Maintain on one repository: Write
1174 // there, nothing elsewhere, and the run is allowed.
1175 let grants = [
Teams and CODEOWNERS, labels and milestones, dependency updates, the security suite, and a clearer top bar1176 RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_1".into(), workspace: "acme".into(), role: RepoRole::Maintain, team: None },
1177 RepoGrant { repo_id: "rep_3".into(), workspace: "globex".into(), role: RepoRole::Admin, team: None },
Invite-only launch: sign in with GitHub, repository access and lifecycle, many emails, a new look1178 ];
1179 agent_user.workspaces = intersect(&[], "acme");
1180 agent_user.grants = intersect_grants(&grants, "Acme");
1181 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write));
1182 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), other), None);
1183 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&agent_user), elsewhere), None);
1184 let decision = decide_operation(&agent_user, &tools, "get_issue", Some(&path("acme", "rocket")), true, Some(1));
1185 assert!(decision.allowed, "{}", decision.reason.unwrap_or_default());
1186 // The person, downstream of a runner's credential, carries the same.
1187 let person = as_person(&agent_user).expect("a runner acts as the person");
1188 assert_eq!(permission(Some(&person), rocket), Some(RepoRole::Write));
1189 }
1190
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1191 #[test]
1192 fn a_runner_changes_only_its_own_pull_request() {
1193 let scope = scope(K::Implement, Runner);
1194 let user = agent(&["acme"], scope.clone());
1195 let repo = path("acme", "rocket");
1196 let other = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(8));
1197 assert!(!other.allowed);
1198 assert_eq!(other.rule, "scope:pull");
1199 let own = decide_operation(&user, &scope, "record_session", Some(&repo), true, Some(7));
1200 assert!(own.allowed);
1201 // Reading another is fine.
1202 assert!(
1203 decide_operation(
1204 &user,
1205 &scope,
1206 "get_pull_request",
1207 Some(&repo),
1208 true,
1209 Some(8)
1210 )
1211 .allowed
1212 );
1213 }
1214
1215 #[test]
1216 fn git_matrix() {
1217 let fork = path("pulls", "pul_7");
1218 let upstream = path("acme", "rocket");
1219 let elsewhere = path("acme", "billing");
1220 let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner);
1221 assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, true).allowed);
1222 assert!(decide_git(&implement, &fork, false).allowed);
1223 assert!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, false).allowed);
1224 assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &upstream, true).rule, "git:push");
1225 assert_eq!(decide_git(&implement, &elsewhere, false).rule, "git:read");
1226 let review = scope(K::Review, Runner);
1227 assert!(decide_git(&review, &upstream, false).allowed);
1228 assert!(!decide_git(&review, &upstream, true).allowed);
1229 assert!(!decide_git(&review, &fork, true).allowed);
1230 // A tools token made before run credentials never reaches git.
1231 let old = AgentScope {
1232 repo: upstream.clone(),
1233 operations: vec!["get_issue".to_owned()],
1234 run: None,
1235 };
1236 assert_eq!(decide_git(&old, &upstream, false).rule, "git:not-a-run");
1237 // Nor does an agent's tools token.
1238 assert_eq!(
1239 decide_git(&scope(K::Implement, Tools), &upstream, false).rule,
1240 "git:not-a-run"
1241 );
1242 }
1243
1244 #[test]
1245 fn a_push_moves_only_granted_branches() {
1246 let update = scope(K::Update, Runner);
1247 let repo = path("acme", "rocket");
1248 let refs = |names: &[&str]| {
1249 names
1250 .iter()
1251 .map(|name| (*name).to_owned())
1252 .collect::<Vec<_>>()
1253 };
1254 assert!(decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login"])).allowed);
1255 assert_eq!(
1256 decide_refs(&update, &repo, &refs(&["refs/heads/main"])).rule,
1257 "git:ref"
1258 );
1259 assert_eq!(
1260 decide_refs(
1261 &update,
1262 &repo,
1263 &refs(&["refs/heads/fix-login", "refs/tags/v1"])
1264 )
1265 .rule,
1266 "git:ref"
1267 );
1268 let implement = scope(K::Implement, Runner);
1269 assert!(
1270 decide_refs(
1271 &implement,
1272 &path("pulls", "pul_7"),
1273 &refs(&["refs/heads/main"])
1274 )
1275 .allowed
1276 );
1277 }
1278
1279 #[test]
1280 fn a_runner_acts_downstream_as_the_person() {
1281 let user = agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Runner));
1282 let person = as_person(&user).unwrap();
1283 assert_eq!(person.id, "usr_1");
1284 assert_eq!(person.username, "syntaqx");
1285 assert_eq!(person.kind, PrincipalKind::User);
1286 assert!(person.is_member("acme"));
1287 assert!(person.acting.is_none());
g1t is one name: its agent's work, commits and comments show as @g1t, and nobody can claim g1t or g1t-agent1288 assert_eq!(describe(&user), "g1t on behalf of syntaqx");
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1289 // The tools act as the agent.
1290 assert!(as_person(&agent(&["acme"], scope(K::Implement, Tools))).is_none());
1291 }
1292
1293 #[test]
1294 fn scopes_without_a_run_still_parse() {
1295 let old: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str(
1296 r#"{"repo":{"namespace":"acme","name":"rocket"},"operations":["get_issue"]}"#,
1297 )
1298 .unwrap();
1299 assert!(old.run.is_none());
1300 let written = serde_json::to_string(&scope(K::Review, Tools)).unwrap();
1301 assert!(written.contains(r#""use":"tools""#));
1302 assert!(written.contains(r#""kind":"review""#));
1303 let back: AgentScope = serde_json::from_str(&written).unwrap();
1304 assert_eq!(back.run.unwrap().kind, K::Review);
Git storage hardened, pages in tens of milliseconds, honest security alerts, and costs reconciled daily1305 // Only g1t's own runs say so; every other reads as not.
1306 assert!(!written.contains("system"));
1307 assert!(!back_run(&written).system);
1308 let mut own = scope(K::Bump, Runner);
1309 own.run.as_mut().unwrap().system = true;
1310 let written = serde_json::to_string(&own).unwrap();
1311 assert!(written.contains(r#""system":true"#));
1312 assert!(back_run(&written).system);
1313 }
1314
1315 fn back_run(written: &str) -> RunBinding {
1316 serde_json::from_str::<AgentScope>(written).unwrap().run.unwrap()
Agents get guardrails, run credentials, an audit log, a context hub, repository instructions and mentions; security upkeep; snake_case API1317 }
1318}

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