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g1t.sh
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Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides1# sudo
2
3g1t's staff console, at <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: the back office g1t is
4building for itself, for sales, support and finance. It is organised the
5way customers know g1t: by **workspace**.
6
7The sidebar (`app/lib/nav.ts`) has Overview and Reach out at the top, then
8sections that fold open to their pages: Customers, Revenue, Platform,
9Support and Team. Each fold is a `<details>`, drawn open for the section
10holding the current page; on a phone the same menu sits behind a "Menu"
11button in the top bar. Pages not built yet are marked **Soon**: each is a
12real page (`routes/soon.tsx`, made from its entry in `nav.ts`) saying what
13it will do, why, and what it will have, so the sidebar doubles as the
14roadmap.
15
16- **Overview** (`/`): this month charged, cost and margin; the last six
17 months as a chart; this month by kind of usage; paying workspaces; how
18 many are stopped, near their limit or declined (each a link into Reach
19 out); open invoices; follow-ups due; and the five most urgent signals.
20 From billing's `admin_overview` and `admin_signals`.
21- **Reach out** (`/reach-out`): every workspace worth a word, most urgent
22 first (at limit, declined, near limit, high spend, growing, established,
23 first payment), with its owners, the reason in a sentence, the figure,
24 and its sales stage and owner at g1t. Filter by why and by whose
25 (everyone's, unassigned, mine), or show only **follow-ups due** (a next
26 step due today or earlier, on a deal not won or lost; one per
27 workspace). Rows show the next step and its day. Each row opens the
28 workspace's Sales.
29- **Invoices** (`/invoices`): every invoice g1t has sent, workspaces' and
30 enterprises', newest first (`admin_invoices`, at most 200). Filter by
31 status and month; totals for what is listed (amount, paid, outstanding);
32 each links to its workspace or enterprise and to Stripe's page (https
33 only).
34- **Audit log** (`/audit`): every change made in sudo, and what Stripe told
35 billing, newest first, 100 a page with "Older" (`admin_audit`). Filter by
36 staff email and kind of change; each line links to its workspace or
37 enterprise.
38- **Workspaces** (`/workspaces`): every workspace, newest first, 50 to a
39 page, with its owners, members, who it is billed to, its terms, this
40 month's usage against its limit, what it was charged and what it cost
41 g1t. Search by workspace, owner, email or enterprise (across the whole
42 list); filter to stopped or warning, comped or custom, or on an
43 enterprise. Billing's figures are fetched for exactly the page shown, so
44 the filters, and the totals over the list, cover that page; the page
45 says so when there is more than one. A workspace's page shows its members;
46 **Sales** (its stage, the staff member who has it, the next step and its
47 date, and notes, newest first; `admin_sales`, `admin_set_sales`,
48 `admin_add_note`); and under **Billing** its limit in words (trust, the
49 owners' own spend limit or the default, the most they may set, how it
50 grows), its last six months as a chart, its invoices (`admin_workspace_invoices`,
51 with Stripe's page and PDF), its terms, who it is billed to (move it onto or off an
52 enterprise), a credit form, a Stripe billing link, its ledger and its
53 audit log. If billing does not answer for sales or invoices, the page
54 still opens and says so in those sections. A protected workspace (one
55 nobody can ever delete: identity's `PROTECTED_WORKSPACES`, and
56 flagon-io always) says so beside its name.
Merge main into rm-agents: mirroring removal, open signups, free-tier limits, the g1t CLI and runner fixes, with the agent removal kept. The CLI's table of operations is regenerated from the API without the agent, customize and AI credit operations; no CLI command used them.57- **Suspend and clean up** (`/workspaces/<slug>/abuse`, linked from a
58 workspace's page): suspend the workspace, with a reason (identity's
59 `admin_suspend_workspace`): its own tokens stop, and a billing hold
60 (`Suspended: <reason>`) stops its runs, checks, deploys, new
61 self-hosted runners and telemetry. Lifting it lifts that hold, never one
62 staff set otherwise. Remove its self-hosted runners one at a time or all
63 at once, which also ends its registration tokens (actions'
64 `admin_runners`, `admin_remove_runners`), and revoke its projects'
65 telemetry ingest tokens. Every change is in sudo's audit log.
Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides66- **Deleted workspaces** (`/workspaces/deleted`, linked from Workspaces):
67 workspaces their owners deleted, newest first (`admin_deleted_workspaces`),
68 each with who deleted it and when, when it is purged, what went with it
69 (repositories, projects, members, counted at the deletion) and the days
70 left. An owner deletes a workspace with everything in it in one step, and
71 identity keeps it 30 days (`WORKSPACE_RESTORE_DAYS`) so support can undo a
72 deletion that was a mistake or not theirs to make. **Restore**
73 (`admin_restore_workspace`) brings it back with its members and tokens,
74 and its repositories, projects and apps with `workspace.restored`; its
75 plan stays ended, so its owners start it again from Billing. Check that
76 whoever asks is an owner of it before restoring. **Purge now**
77 (`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed to confirm) removes it at once,
78 as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up; never for a
79 protected workspace. Both go in the workspace's audit log, as g1t, and in
80 sudo's (`workspace_restored`, `workspace_purged`), naming the staff
81 member.
Merge account deletion: soft delete for 30 days, staff restore and purge, ghost for what remains (identity 0037)82- **A person's page** (`/users/<username>`, linked from a workspace's
83 members): their addresses (remove one, with a reason they see), their
Merge shared invite links: label, uses, expiry, domains; joined through recorded (identity 0038)84 security log, and **Delete account**. An account made with a shared
Merge main into rm-agents: mirroring removal, open signups, free-tier limits, the g1t CLI and runner fixes, with the agent removal kept. The CLI's table of operations is regenerated from the API without the agent, customize and AI credit operations; no CLI command used them.85 invite link, before registration opened, says **Joined through
86 <label>** under its name. Delete only when the person asks
Merge account deletion: soft delete for 30 days, staff restore and purge, ghost for what remains (identity 0037)87 (from one of the account's confirmed addresses) or for abuse: give the
88 reason, which goes in sudo's audit log (`account_deleted`), and type the
89 username (`admin_delete_account`). It does what deleting their own
90 account from Settings does: signs them out everywhere, ends their tokens,
91 SSH keys, deploy keys they added and applications, takes them out of
92 every workspace, team and repository, and emails their addresses that
Merge sudo: delete an account with the workspaces it alone owns, purge each93 staff deleted it. While the account is the **only owner of a live
94 workspace**, the page lists those workspaces, each linking to its page,
95 and the form becomes **Delete account and the workspaces it alone
96 owns**: the reason, the username typed, and a box ticked to say the
97 named workspaces go too (`admin_delete_account` with
98 `withSoleWorkspaces`). Use it for an account g1t no longer needs, such
99 as a retired test account and its personal workspace; for a customer,
100 prefer another owner first (an owner makes one under People). Identity
101 checks every one of those workspaces before anything is deleted: one
102 that is protected, or whose billing cannot settle (`close_workspace`:
103 an unpaid invoice, prepaid credit, usage still metering, an enterprise
104 account), refuses the whole deletion, and the page says which and why
105 beside each, instead of the form. Then it deletes each workspace exactly
106 as its owner would (billing closes it, `workspace.deleting`, its
107 repositories and apps go with it, kept 30 days), with the staff member
108 as who deleted it, and the account last. Each workspace is recorded in
109 its own audit log as g1t (rule `staff`) and in sudo's
110 (`workspace_deleted`, with the reason); the account in sudo's
111 (`account_deleted`, naming the workspaces). Should one fail on the way
112 (a card declined that moment), the account is not deleted and the
113 error names the workspace and any that went before; restore those from
114 Deleted workspaces, or try again. Accounts that can never be deleted (`g1t`, `g1t-agent`, `ghost`,
Merge account deletion: soft delete for 30 days, staff restore and purge, ghost for what remains (identity 0037)115 and whatever identity's `PROTECTED_ACCOUNTS` names, by username or id)
116 are marked **Protected** and offer no form. A deleted account's page
117 says so, with who deleted it, why, when it is purged, and **Restore** and
Merge sudo: delete an account with the workspaces it alone owns, purge each118 **Purge now**, as on Deleted accounts; both work at once, with no wait.
119 When workspaces were deleted with it, it lists them too, each with its
120 own **Purge now** (`admin_purge_workspace`, the slug typed; identity
121 purges only a workspace that is still deleted, never a protected one),
122 so staff can remove everything straight away. Purge the workspaces
123 first: once the account is purged its page is gone (they stay on
124 Deleted workspaces). To undo it all, restore the account first, then
125 each workspace, so it comes back with its owner.
Merge main into rm-agents: mirroring removal, open signups, free-tier limits, the g1t CLI and runner fixes, with the agent removal kept. The CLI's table of operations is regenerated from the API without the agent, customize and AI credit operations; no CLI command used them.126- **Suspending an account**, on a person's page: with a reason, it cannot
127 sign in (with a password or GitHub), is signed out everywhere, and its
128 tokens, SSH keys and git passwords stop until the suspension is lifted
129 (identity's `admin_suspend_user`). Nothing is deleted.
130- **Blocked domains** (`/blocked-domains`, under Platform): email domains,
131 and their subdomains, no new account may sign up with or add, each with
132 a reason (`admin_blocked_domains`, `admin_block_domain`). Accounts
133 already there are not touched.
Merge account deletion: soft delete for 30 days, staff restore and purge, ghost for what remains (identity 0037)134- **Deleted accounts** (`/users/deleted`, linked from Workspaces):
135 accounts deleted by the person or by staff, newest first
136 (`admin_deleted_accounts`), each with who deleted it (the person, or the
137 staff member and why), when it is purged, the days left and what it
138 left (workspaces, teams, repositories, tokens, SSH keys). Identity keeps
139 each 30 days (`ACCOUNT_RESTORE_DAYS`). **Restore**
140 (`admin_restore_account`) clears the deletion and puts back the
141 memberships, teams and repository roles it left where they still exist;
142 its sessions, tokens and keys stay ended, and the person signs in with
143 their password. Check that whoever asks owns one of its addresses first.
144 **Purge now** (`admin_purge_account`, the username typed) removes it at
145 once, as the sweep does every 15 minutes once its 30 days are up: its
146 row, addresses, keys, two-factor secret, GitHub link, profile and
147 security log go; its username is kept in `deleted_users` and never given
148 out again; what it wrote shows as `ghost`. Both go in sudo's audit log
149 (`account_restored`, `account_purged`), naming the staff member. There
150 is no API route for deleting an account; only the site and sudo can.
Merge main into rm-agents: mirroring removal, open signups, free-tier limits, the g1t CLI and runner fixes, with the agent removal kept. The CLI's table of operations is regenerated from the API without the agent, customize and AI credit operations; no CLI command used them.151- **Invites** (`/invites`): anyone may register on g1t.sh, so there is
152 no waitlist, allowance or shared link to manage. The page lists every
153 invite code sent with an invitation into a workspace or onto a
154 repository, searchable by a code's start, an email or a username, and
155 revokes a pending one (`admin_invites`, `admin_revoke_invite`). The
156 old waitlist, grants and shared links stay in identity's database,
157 untouched.
Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a8385d293d42c913a'158- **Aliases** (`/aliases`, under Customers): names that lead to a
159 workspace, set by staff only; there is no way for a customer to make
160 one, and nothing user-facing mentions them. `g1t`, the product's name,
161 leads to `flagon-io`, Flagon, Inc. (seeded by identity's migration
162 `0029_workspace_aliases.sql`), so nobody mistakes the trading name for
163 the organization. Every address under an alias leads to the workspace:
164 pages answer with a 301 to the same page (`/g1t/g1t/issues` to
165 `/flagon-io/g1t/issues`), git over HTTPS is answered in place as the
166 workspace's repository (pushes do not follow redirects), the API and MCP
167 run the call again under the workspace's slug, and the package
168 registries answer a 301 (308 for a publish). An alias points at the
169 workspace's id, so it follows a rename; it goes when the workspace is
170 purged. Each row shows the workspace, why the alias exists, and who added
171 it and when. **Add** (`admin_set_alias`) takes the alias, the
172 workspace's slug and why: identity refuses the site's own routes
173 (`settings`, `api`…), anyone's username, a workspace's slug (deleted, or
174 held after a rename for another workspace) and an existing alias.
175 Reserved names such as `g1t` can be aliases, and an alias is nobody's to
176 register or rename a workspace to while it exists. **Remove**
177 (`admin_remove_alias`) needs a reason. Both go in sudo's audit log
178 (`alias_added`, `alias_removed`), naming the staff member. `@g1t` in
179 text still means g1t's agent: it links to how the agent works, never to
180 `/g1t`.
Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides181- **Enterprises**: customers that pay for several workspaces with one
182 bill, one limit and one set of terms. Each has its workspaces (add or
183 remove them), combined usage, terms, credits, ledger and audit log, and
184 **Invoices**: where they go (the billing email, which also makes its
185 Stripe customer), a "Send invoice now" button, and every invoice with
186 its status (open, paid, overdue, void), a line per workspace, and a link
187 to Stripe's hosted invoice page. An invoice also goes out on its own as
188 each month closes: one Stripe invoice, a line per workspace for what it
189 owes, net 30, emailed by Stripe.
190- **Stripe**: whether billing's key is in test or live mode (or off), the
191 webhook Stripe calls (URL, endpoint id, events, who registered it and
192 when), and the events Stripe sent lately with what billing did with
193 each. "Register webhook" (or "Replace") has billing delete the endpoint
194 it made before, create a new one and keep its signing secret, which no
195 one sees. Do it once per mode, and again after switching to live keys.
196
197Sales changes are not money, so they have no confirmation step; they are
198still POSTs from sudo's own pages, recorded with who made them.
199
200Billing's internal account ids (`ws_<slug>` for a workspace's own,
201`ent_…` for an enterprise) are never shown as names; an enterprise's id
202appears only as small "Billing account id" text. Old `/accounts/…` links
203redirect to the workspace or enterprise they meant.
204
205**Cards stay on Stripe.** sudo never shows a card field. To help a customer
206update their card or see invoices, staff make a Stripe billing link on the
207workspace's page (it is recorded) and send it to the owner.
208
209It holds no data. Workspaces, owners and members come from identity's
210staff methods (`admin_workspaces`, `admin_workspace`; `IdentityAdminApi` in
211`packages/contracts/src/identity.ts`); everything about money goes to the
212billing service's (`admin_*`, `BillingAdminApi` in
213`packages/contracts/src/billing.ts`), where each change is recorded with
214the staff member's email. Both are reached over service bindings only, and
215nothing but sudo binds to them.
216
217## How it is locked
218
2191. **Cloudflare Access** sits in front of `sudo.g1t.sh` and signs people in.
2202. **The worker checks Access's work** on every request, the stylesheet
221 included (`run_worker_first`): it verifies the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`
222 JWT itself (RS256 against the team's published keys, audience, issuer,
223 expiry), then requires its email to be in `STAFF_EMAILS`. That email is
224 who every change is recorded as. See `app/lib/access.ts`.
sudo: Access service tokens listed in STAFF_SERVICE_TOKENS are staff, recorded as <name>@service.g1t.sh225 **Service tokens.** A program (Claude, working without a browser) signs
226 in with an Access service token instead: it sends `CF-Access-Client-Id`
227 and `CF-Access-Client-Secret`, the Access application has a policy with
228 the **Service Auth** action that includes the token, and Access sends
229 sudo a JWT with no email whose `common_name` is the token's client id.
230 sudo lets it in only if that client id is in `STAFF_SERVICE_TOKENS`
231 (`<client id>=<name>`, comma separated, in `wrangler.jsonc`), after the
232 same signature, audience, issuer and expiry checks, and records it as
233 `<name>@service.g1t.sh`: `claude@service.g1t.sh` for
234 `claude-sudo`. Its secret lives in `.credentials/sudo-service-token.json`
235 and is used by `scripts/ops/sudo.mjs`, which sends sudo's own `Origin`
236 with each POST so the same-origin check applies to it as to a browser.
237 To take its access away, remove its entry here, or delete or revoke the
238 token in Zero Trust.
Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides2393. **It fails closed.** Until `ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN`, `ACCESS_AUD` and
240 `STAFF_EMAILS` are all set, every request gets a 403 saying sudo is not
241 configured.
2424. **Changes** are POSTs only, and only from sudo's own pages (`Origin`, or
243 `Referer`, must be `https://sudo.g1t.sh`). Terms, enterprise moves, new
244 enterprises, Stripe billing links, invoice emails, invoices and the
245 webhook show a confirmation step first; a credit needs the workspace's
246 slug typed out.
2475. **The pages ship no JavaScript.** The content security policy forbids
248 every script and inline style; responses are `no-store`, `noindex` and
249 cannot be framed. The worker has no `workers.dev` address or preview URLs.
250
251## Setting up Access (once, in the Cloudflare dashboard)
252
2531. **Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add an application → Self-hosted.**
254 - Application name: `sudo`.
255 - Session duration: short, such as 8 hours.
256 - Public hostname: `sudo.g1t.sh` (path empty, so it covers everything).
2572. **Add a policy** (`g1t staff`): action *Allow*, include *Emails* → the
258 owner's address, and *Emails ending in* → `g1t.sh` for everyone with a
259 g1t address (the same entries as `STAFF_EMAILS`, where a domain is
260 written `@g1t.sh`). Add more staff here *and* in `STAFF_EMAILS`; either
261 one alone is not enough.
2623. Save, then open the application's **Overview** (or *Basic information*)
263 and copy the **Application Audience (AUD) tag**.
2644. Find the **team domain** under **Zero Trust → Settings → Custom pages**
265 (or *Team name and domain*): it looks like `<team>.cloudflareaccess.com`.
2665. Put both into `wrangler.jsonc`:
267
268 ```jsonc
269 "vars": {
270 "ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN": "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com",
271 "ACCESS_AUD": "<the AUD tag>",
272 "STAFF_EMAILS": "syntaqx@gmail.com, @g1t.sh"
273 }
274 ```
275
2766. Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh sudo` (after `billing` and `identity`, whose
277 `admin_*` methods it calls).
278
279Visit <https://sudo.g1t.sh>: Access asks you to sign in, then the workspaces
280list opens. Anyone else gets Access's own refusal; anyone Access lets in who
281is not in `STAFF_EMAILS` gets a 403 from the worker.
282
283## Signing in through WARP
284
285Staff signed in to the Zero Trust org in the Cloudflare One agent (WARP)
286reach sudo without the login page: the org allows WARP sessions as Access
287sign-ins (8 hours), the sudo app accepts them, and the `g1t staff` policy
288is also on the WARP enrollment app, so staff can enroll their devices.
289The same two checks still apply: the Access policy, and `STAFF_EMAILS`.
290
291## Working on it
292
293```sh
294npm run typecheck -w @g1t/sudo
Merge branch 'main' into actions-toolkit-oidc-artifacts295npm test -w @g1t/sudo # JWT verification, forms, money, the workspace join, paging, nav, charts, signals, models
Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides296npm run build -w @g1t/sudo
297```
298
299`npm run dev` serves the pages, but every request is refused without a real
300Access token, by design.

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