Pick any line to see why it is the way it is: the commit, the pull request and issue it came from, and what the agent was thinking.
| Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides | 1 | { |
| 2 | "$schema": "../../node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json", | |
| 3 | "name": "g1t-sudo", | |
| 4 | "account_id": "1e6f2cffa3f445920836e8ebe446bb58", | |
| 5 | "compatibility_date": "2026-09-26", | |
| 6 | "placement": { "mode": "off" }, | |
| 7 | "main": "./workers/app.ts", | |
| 8 | // Staff only: reachable at sudo.g1t.sh, behind Cloudflare Access, and | |
| 9 | // nowhere else. No workers.dev address and no preview URLs, so there is | |
| 10 | // no way round Access to the worker. | |
| 11 | "routes": [{ "pattern": "sudo.g1t.sh", "custom_domain": true }], | |
| 12 | "workers_dev": false, | |
| 13 | "preview_urls": false, | |
| 14 | // Even the stylesheet goes through the worker, which checks the Access | |
| 15 | // token on every request before anything is served. | |
| 16 | "assets": { "binding": "ASSETS", "run_worker_first": true }, | |
| 17 | // Billing's and identity's staff-only methods (admin_*). Nothing else | |
| 18 | // binds to identity's admin_* methods. The event log, read-only, for | |
| 19 | // `abuse.flagged` (Abuse & fraud). | |
| 20 | "services": [ | |
| 21 | { "binding": "BILLING", "service": "g1t-billing" }, | |
| 22 | { "binding": "IDENTITY", "service": "g1t-identity" }, | |
| 23 | { "binding": "EVENTS", "service": "g1t-events" }, | |
| 24 | // The status page's staff-only entrypoint: posting incidents to | |
| 25 | // status.g1t.sh (apps/status). Only bindings reach it. | |
| Merge main into rm-agents: mirroring removal, open signups, free-tier limits, the g1t CLI and runner fixes, with the agent removal kept. The CLI's table of operations is regenerated from the API without the agent, customize and AI credit operations; no CLI command used them. | 26 | { "binding": "STATUS", "service": "g1t-status", "entrypoint": "StatusAdmin" }, |
| 27 | // Suspending a workspace and cleaning up after abuse: its self-hosted | |
| 28 | // runners (actions' admin_runners and admin_remove_runners), its | |
| 29 | // projects, and their telemetry ingest tokens. | |
| 30 | { "binding": "ACTIONS", "service": "g1t-actions" }, | |
| 31 | { "binding": "PROJECTS", "service": "g1t-projects" }, | |
| 32 | { "binding": "TELEMETRY", "service": "g1t-telemetry" } | |
| Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides | 33 | ], |
| 34 | "vars": { | |
| 35 | // The Zero Trust team domain, such as `g1t.cloudflareaccess.com`. | |
| 36 | "ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN": "syntaqx.cloudflareaccess.com", | |
| 37 | // The Access application's Audience (AUD) tag. | |
| 38 | "ACCESS_AUD": "5479fcf84130fc7ae68c207ae69a81b2aa17d97714443c6f1dddd058c530b8cf", | |
| 39 | // Who may use sudo, comma separated. Access lets them in; this | |
| 40 | // decides again, in case the Access policy is ever widened. | |
| sudo: Access service tokens listed in STAFF_SERVICE_TOKENS are staff, recorded as <name>@service.g1t.sh | 41 | "STAFF_EMAILS": "syntaqx@gmail.com, @g1t.sh", |
| 42 | // Access service tokens let in as staff: `<client id>=<name>`, comma | |
| 43 | // separated. Each acts, and is recorded, as `<name>@service.g1t.sh`. | |
| 44 | // The Access application needs a Service Auth policy including it. | |
| 45 | "STAFF_SERVICE_TOKENS": "434297ede60761875e84742d0486cf27.access=claude" | |
| Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides | 46 | }, |
| Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a8752162fea25f63f' into spend-guardrails | 47 | // Every log kept: staff only, few requests. |
| 48 | "observability": { "enabled": true, "head_sampling_rate": 1 }, | |
| Security: postcss-selector-parser 7.1.6 and basic-ftp 6.2.2, pinned by overrides | 49 | "upload_source_maps": true |
| 50 | } |
This file's history is long; its oldest lines are credited to the oldest commit read.